UN pulls some foreign staff from Kandahar
UN pulls some foreign staff from Kandahar
United Nations withdraws half of its twenty foreign staff, orders local workers to stay home in wake of blasts
Sonia Verma
Kandahar — Globe and Mail Update
Published on Monday, Apr. 26, 2010 10:38AM EDT
Quote:
The United Nations has withdrawn roughly half of its twenty foreign staff from Kandahar City and ordered its local Afghan workers to stay home, underscoring a growing sense of insecurity in this southern city.
The move came just a few hours after militants detonated three bombs in downtown Kandahar City Monday morning, killing two civilians and wounding two others.
“We’re re-evaluating the security situation and have pulled some of our staff to Kabul,” confirmed Susan Manuel, director of communications for the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
The decision was made based on a “combination of information and action,” she said. Ms. Manuel described the new measures as temporary but would not specify when staff would resume their postings.
Monday’s attacks signified the Taliban’s latest effort to show their strength in the city that is both their spiritual birthplace and the staging ground for a major NATO military offensive this summer.
As coalition troops ramp up operations ahead of a broad military surge meant to take decisive control of the area, Taliban insurgents have also stepped up attacks with a series of brazen assassinations and bombings.
Since April 12, at least 20 civilians have been killed in Kandahar City, including prominent Afghan politicians and civilians including children.
The attacks have become almost daily occurrences, rattling residents already deeply wary of the coming NATO operation, billed as the make-or-break battle of the war....
Nato engages Ahmad Wali Karzai in Kandahar
Nato gambles on collaboration with Ahmad Wali Karzai in Kandahar
Anthony Loyd, Kandahar
Times Online
Quote:
Nato has taken one of the biggest gambles of its mission in Afghanistan by reluctantly deciding to collaborate with Ahmad Wali Karzai, the notorious power-broker of Kandahar — despite allegations that the half-brother of the President is involved in the drugs trade....
Senior coalition officers would prefer to see the back of Wali Karzai but they have come to the conclusion that their only option is to work with him. They are trying, in the words of one officer, to “remodel” a man accused of running a private fiefdom in the south.
“The plan is to incorporate him, to shape him. Unless you eliminate him, you have to [do this],” said a senior coalition official involved in planning what is viewed as this summer’s make-or-break military operation in Kandahar. “You can’t ignore him,” he added. “He’s the proverbial 800lb gorilla and he’s in the middle of a lot of rooms. He’s the mafia don, the family fixer, the troubleshooter
I suppose this has been a long time coming. This Karzai seems to be the main sphere of influence that bridges the underground world of A'stan. He knows everyone through family, trade, and relationships. From a military planning viewpoint, we tread lightly with these types of dudes waiting for the appropriate timing to properly shape. We did the same thing with Muqtada al Sadr and the Ayatolla Sistani.
Recently, I've wondered if waiting too long to talk is the wrong approach. I just watch HBO's new documetary Sergio based on Samantha Power's book "Sergio: One Man's Fight to Save the World."
Sergio Vieira de Mello was the head of the UN mission in Iraq until he was killed, but before that, he worked throughout conflict zones with great success in Cambodia and East Timor. He was fascinated with the intellectual mind of evil men, and his approach upon arriving in country was to go talk to everyone. He did not wait.
Perhaps, we could learn some lessons from the UN :wry:.
v/r
Mike
Kandahar Through the Taliban's Eyes
A somewhat different, if provocative article by Greg Mills (a South African commentator on COIN):http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article..._eyes?page=0,0
Kandahar: stop, start and ponder
Mark Urban, one of the BBC's better correspondents, was on Newsnight on the 11th this week reporting from Kandahar, a few passages:
Quote:
In recent months Nato and Afghan authorities have sometimes appeared tongue-tied about the progress of Operation Hamkari, their attempt to secure the place. Contradictory stories have appeared saying it has been shelved, it is entering a higher gear, or it is hopelessly bogged down.
Operation Hamkari has indeed been underway for four months. It involves a series of ambitious initiatives by Nato and it has not been scaled back. But while the security drive is happening, it is less clear that it can keep to schedule or that people in the city have yet registered any positive effect.
The fighting in Arghandab has already cost many casualties - American and Afghan. One reporter recently embedded with troops there for two weeks told me: "Counter insurgency is impossible there - the local people have cleared out and the soldiers get hit almost as soon as they leave the base."
Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programme...ht/8902527.stm and to his short blog comment:http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/
Sorry I expect the film report will not work for many.
Maybe I'm obtuse, but I don't get it...
Quote:
"Counter insurgency is impossible there - the local people have cleared out and the soldiers get hit almost as soon as they leave the base."
Why should that make counter insurgency impossible? If the local people are gone and the insurgents present and aggressive, wouldn't that be an ideal environment to engage and defeat insurgents without imposing civilian casualties?
Or is it assumed that "counter insurgency" consists by definition of winning hearts and minds...?
Background reading & a little greed
The occasional, perceptive bloggers at al-Sahwa score again with this article on Kandahar and what is reality on the ground.
Link:http://al-sahwa.blogspot.com/2010/08...-kandahar.html
Yes, the article is critical of AWK, his brother in Kabul and that good governance for too many Afghans is making money, peddling influence etc.
Foust's Atlantic Article on Arghandab
Disclaimer: The assessment provided is the author's alone and does not necessarily reflect my opinion nor the views of the SWC.
How Short-Term Thinking is Causing Long-Term Failure in Afghanistan
Quote:
"In Afghanistan, second and third-order effects are largely overlooked," Morgan Sheeran, a Sergeant First Class who teaches at the Counterinsurgency Training Center in Kabul, told me. The result, Sheeran said, is that decisions are often made in the moment without understanding their long-term consequences.
The men of Tarok Kalache were enraged by their homes' destruction. "These dudes were extremely angry," Captain Patrick McGuigan, a subordinate of Flynn, later told Stars and Stripes. "The elder (of Tarok Kalacheh) wouldn't even talk to me for three weeks, he was that [angry]." Some compared the U.S. force to the Soviet occupiers. But leveling the village was just the beginning.
Taliban suicide assault team strikes Kandahar police, kills 6
This is one of many on the growing TTP. VBIED, then SVIED and then RPG/MG Assault team on ANSF.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archiv...ide_assa_4.php