The Brigading of Regiments
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rifleman
Let's assume that's true. I don't know if it is, or isn't, but if it is.....
Since the division is now acting more like a corps why not go the final step and organize permanently into big separate brigades commanded by a brigadier? The brigadier could have one or two colonels under him in case something smaller was needed for a specific mission. They could command ad hoc combat commands (or something similar to a Marine Corps MEU designed to fit the Army's needs) of one or two battalions for a specific mission.
Tradition and heraldry could still be maintained. You could still have the 82nd Airborne Brigade, etc. In fact, a lot of historic division shoulder patches that haven't been worn since WWII might have to come back for brigade HQs. The National Guard does that now.
You could also divide the U.S. into brigade districts. This would probably meet our needs for "tribalism" and a sense of primary group somewhat better than the British regimental system. A soldier from a particular region could still serve with his region's combined arms brigade even if he did not want a combat arms MOS. Not so for a single branch regiment drawn from a particular region.
And if you don't like those ideas.....we could always call them legions and subdivide them into cohorts! :eek:
Strength and honor! :D
Rifleman, you have articulated something that I have been thinking about for some time now, which is the idea of returning to the old system of brigading regiments. Now, the exact composition of such brigades would obviously depend upon their role. For example, I'd like to see an Armoured Brigade composed of 2 Regiments of Armoured (mechanized) Infantry and a Regiment each of Armour, Artillery, Engineers, and a Recce Battalion (at least),et al , bumping brigade back up to the level that it had in the US Army prior to McNair's Triangular Division (but not necessarily dispensing with the triangular arrangement, let alone return to the old Square Division, unless that proved to be tactically better). Division in turn would likewise be bumped up back up to the same level as it had pre-c.1940, and Corps in turn would displace Field Army; "Army Group" would simply be what you find in NATO (a multi-national group of army corps). Think about; in the entire US Army, their would be at most 2 corps commander slots, and that's including both Active and Reserve Components.
There's something oddly satisfying just imagining the howls and screams emanating from the galaxy of the stars as 2-,3-, and 4-star types fell from their lofty heights with no inflated formation structures to "justify" their holding of excessive rank. It feels kind of good:cool:...until Ken comes along and administers the usual dose of grim, depressing reality:wry:.
P.S.: While I'm still dreaming, I'd like an Infantry Brigade of 3 Regiments of Infantry (foot), a Regiment of Artillery, and a Battalion each of Armour, APCs, Engineers, Reconnaissance, etc.; basically what the good old-fashioned regular infantry divisions used to be, but much better-led and -trained.
All right, dreaming over.
All true and I did mean an organization of
Tanks, Infantry and the recon guys (all ours are too small and IMO, not as well trained as they could be -- that from an old 19D [among other things :D]...). Attachments and OpCons have their uses but the more limited they are, the better. That building block process unquestionably works but units with organic power that train and live together operate far more effectively.
The maintenance and training aspects as objections are vastly overstated and are pretty much parochialism distilled to protect spaces for branches.
Did I ever mention replacing Branch loyalty with unit loyalty... ;)
I'd also add, for big war purposes, an organic FA Battery, realizing todays Batteries have the firepower of WW II Battalions. We can centralize the effects of fires from some distance today.
A .50 is all you want, put a bigger weapon
on it and the tendency of some commanders (vehicle and unit) is to think they have a light tank and misemploy the vehicles. That's why I said APC and not IFV... :)
The IFV was IMO always a very bad idea. Norfolk is correct in that the Ram conversion to the Kangaroo was a great idea.
(Which means y'all could convert your Leopard C1s to APCs... ;) )
Door's big enough; ramps are only handy if you want to haul cargo -- again, tending to set the vehicle up for misuse. The only real advantage is to load casualties (misuse, IMO *) I suspect the Israelis will have tracked and Armored ambulances nearby and as evacuating casualties is not the Infantry Squads job -- nor should it be -- the need for a wide entrance is at least arguable.
* Of course, I'm a Dinosaur, trained by folks who'd been in WW II and who told me that the only thing I was to do to a casualty was take his ammo and chow -- and if the BAR man, also his weapon -- and never the water or field dressing. So I made the folks who worked for me in both Korea and Viet Nam do the same thing. Others mileage today may vary; we are a kinder and gentler world. Which is probably a good thing -- if it stays that way, if not you may want to resurrect the Dinosaurs...
Yes, there are compromises to be made...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
Rex, but the rear doors on a lot of IFVs aren't much better, except for those that have ramps. I rembmer all too well trying to get in and out of the LAV-1 which has two rear doors, and somehow (because of that stupid lip at the bottom) it usually ended up with guys piling up on top of one another as someone invariably tripped. But an increase in protection is utterly necessary, as the infantry need to get as close to the enemy positions as possible - even 200-300m away may too far for infantry squads/sections to go before enemy fire inflicts crippling losses or the infantry simply have to go to gournd, and lose all momentum - disastrous. Whenever and wherever possible, infantry should dismount no more than 100 metres away from the enemy position, and the assault position should not have to be more than 50 m away from the enemy, or the assaulting troops may suffer too many losses even before rolling into the trenches.
This means that APC must have the same protection as MBT (I think Gen. Don Starry wrote quite a bit about this) or they probably won't make it close enough to the enemy defences to get the infantry to their attack positions (both suppression and assault) without exposing themselves to heavy losses. First off, IFVs at typical infantry dismount ranges (up to 300m from enemy position) are vulnerable to both light anti-tank weapons and heavy machine guns. Only recently have some IFVs been armoured against Soviet 14.5mm AP fired by KPV HMG as close as 200m on their sides; closer than that, and the IFV's are toast as enemy dismounted HMGs fire into their sides and rip them and their passengers apart. Needless to say, autocannons on defending IFVs will do the job even better, and even the heaviest IFVs are only protected against 30mm APFSDS along their frontal arcs, and some IFVs now carry 40mm cannons. Only MBT-level protection can handle that.
Also, most infantry light anti-tank weapons are not very effective against MBT-level protected vehicles (a few like RPG-29 are on areas not covered by composite armour), and the heavier stuff has be be several hundred metres behind the front lines to work effectively both in order to arm and to "capture" targets, not to mention have enough distance between themselves and the front line so that the tanks don't get them right away. Tanks lead the APCs/IFVs and are tasked with destroying or suppressing enemy tanks and ATGMs on the way in. These are some of the reasons the Israelis have opted for the Nammer (et al) instead of IFV to replace M-113. Nammer, of course, also carries a full (if small) infantry squad of 9 men and most IFV carry only 6 or 7.
As for the 50-cal (and the 7.62 as well), that's a compromise. The Israelis have correctly identified that the primary point is to get the infantry as close as possible to the enemy position so that they can close with and destroy the enemy, without suffering such losses on the way in that either they can't complete their attack, or even if they do succeed, their losses are such that they can't beat off the inevitable enemy counter-attack. An HMG is a very powerful weapon, and paired with an MMG is very useful in all sorts of conditions. Very smart of the Israelis to have chosen what they did for the Nammer.
The problem with light cannon is space. Ideally every APC or IFV would have an autocannon that would allow them to suppress or destroy ATGM launchers out to at least 4,000m - maybe the 40mm can do that; and be able to take out anything short of an MBT at at least half that range. But an autocannon, the turret basket, its fire-control systems, ammunition bins/stowage, tools, etc., take up a lot of space, and when that means you can't carry a full infantry squad/section anymore, it's just self-defeating. Besides, the larger autocannons don't allow for very much ammo to be carried anyway, undoubtedly effective as they are. You can carry a lot more MG ammo for the same ammount of space and keep fighting.
As it is, the tanks are supposed to be providing the heavy firepower, and the IFVs/APCs the infantry to clean up in their wake. HESH fired by tank (rifled, not smoothbore) guns is vastly more effective than autocannon rounds of any persuasion; even one of the new multi-purpose rounds for smoothbore tank guns are more effective than several rounds of scarce autocannon ammo. If space in the infantry's vehicles are taken up by cannons and their ammo, there's not enough infantry to do the job, even with all the added suppression (Gen. DePuy might have disputed this point, maybe Tom or Fred can weigh-in with a contrary view here).
I have two standard recommendation I gave and
give young officers. When they get to be Chief of Staff, they should:
Change that part of AR 600-200 that says a NCO selected by the central board will be promoted unless his Commander writes a letter to remove him for cause to read "he will be promoted only if his commander writes a letter concurring." The rationale is simply that commanders do not have time to write letters to remove marginal people but they will find time to write letters for their really good people.
Nuke the Hoffman building.
BTW, I understand that HRC, concerned over the possible misapplication of their initials by someone and the potential for the word 'Command' to be seen as not in keeping with the COOP ideal of egalitarianism has considered a name change to 'Human and Unit Resources Liaison' or HURL.:D
Ken, we'll just hunker down together in the 'Glades...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
wm
Talk about...Norfolk's need to find a good covered and concealed position after his faux pas about the airborne on the
About Airmen thread is nowhere near as great as your need will be when the TRADOC branch school leaders and MILPERCEN (oh excuse me, Human Resources Command) assignment folks find out what you want to do to their fiefdoms. :D
and let the gators get 'em when they come for us - I understand the gators down South are lately acquiring a taste for two-legged delicacies:rolleyes:.
I wish we could convert the old Leopards to HAPCS, but like the US Army, we have to support the folks at General Dynamics to keep jobs (including those of politicians and their staffs) in Ontario and Alabama. That said, the Leopard, while a very nice piece of kit, was a little thin-skinned for my liking. But as long as it was just Armoured Toads who were going to suffer, I'd didn't much mind; after the tanks'd stopped burning, we infantry would have stripped the machine guns and anything else useful or amusing from the wrecks...have I just managed to spur yet another branch community to scream for my blood?:confused:
Nah, no hunkering. They don't know where or when
we'll strike. It is better to give PTSD than to receive. :D
The C1 could be up armored, sans the turret, plenty of power -- however, I hear you on the keeping GD and the Carlyle Group from going to the poorhouse... :wry:
Leftenant General Bragsalott
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You don't suppose fear of that independent action led to the demise, do you?
Wot? Independence? Can't have that...
Next the lads will be thinking
And that would be dangerous, wot?
Tell them to pull (not squeeze) the trigger every time their left boot hits the ground...
Eyes front...
No thinking...
Tighten up those ranks you slovenly bastards...
Now that is soldiering, Ken!:cool:
Tom