I agree with the policy - but with the caveat
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Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
I think Steve was suggesting that there's nothing wrong with getting rid of the government and leaving. If they replace their government with a worse one, we take it out again. That would be preferable to nation building.
In Iraqi we've already removed the government, so leave and return if the new boss is same as the old boss.
It made sense to me. Less KIAs, less time, less money: probably more chaos, but Steve's willing to pay that price. (Me too.) Gian eats soup with a spoon. You get to see your kid a little more often.
that the action MUST be based on the specific situation. There are times when a reinvasion would be more costly to everyone including us that would a bit of nation building. In war there just is not a 'one size fits all' model.
Take Iraq. We leave and a clone rises to power. I don't think the US is quick enough to react immediately and remove the clone -- and said clone isn't really the issue, its what that nation has been or is doing that creates the problem that causes military action -- and thus, the clone gets to cement his power and build up his forces (conventional or IW is immaterial). The reinvasion will almost invariably be harder than was the initial invasion.
The question is then will that reinvasion be more costly in net terms than would departing and returning if necessary. If it is to be more costly, then it makes little sense to leave, knowing you will have to return.
Take a nation other than Iraq in the future. Ideally, before going in we'd decide on what needs to occur. If a an incursion and immediate redeployment can teach a lesson, then that's what we should do. OTOH, if it is likely to do little more than raise the hate and discontent level and probably will have to be repeated, then a more lasting effort should be undertaken. Too many variables to adopt a policy that says "We will always do this" -- though there is nothing wrong with a policy that says "If you do X, here's what's probably going to happen..."
Absolutes in geopolitics are dangerous...
I agree. Not necessarily in that order...
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Originally Posted by
SteveMetz
I've probably spent as much time pondering that precise question as anyone on earth. I think it was a combination of:
- We were surprised at how badly busted Iraq was when got there
- Chalibi and his crowd were revealed as frauds once we got there
- The President was persuaded by Powell that the US had a moral obligation to fix the place (credit to Don Snider for this observation)
- The President was seduced by Cheney/Wolfowitz/Feith/Kristol et al argument that with a bit of effort, it would be relatively easy to fix the place up and make a shining example of it
Feith's recent claim that the plan was to be in and out and it was torpedoed makes me want to gag. I'm just a lowly worm and not a senior official, but it sure seems from my perch that that would be the kind of thing that someone should have thought through
before the 3rd ID was manning checkpoints in Martyr's Square. I guess former administration officials will gravitate to the "Gee that never occurred to us" explanation if the "we were stabbed in the back one" doesn't get traction.
I think the last item on your list was the driver but that the other three were certainly a part of the problem. Those are all the apparent motives, there may or may not be anything else. If there is, I'd bet it related to the neighbors. It'll come out eventually...
Feith was and is dangerous but I'm inclined to believe most in DoD thought it was to be a quickie and wanted it that way (for a number of vastly different reasons). I suspect the decision to stay lay between Bush, Cheney, Powell and Rice. Whatever it was, the first weekend in May did it. Bremer went in and the rest is history. Sadly.
You are, of course all too correct in that most of what happened was totally predictable and I'd add that much of it could have been prevented or deflected. 'Nough egg on this one for everyone's face including those who were behind 20 plus years of ignoring some needed skills in the Army and several Generals who should have been more forceful in their surfacing of problems. The scary thing is that so few understand the nuances that the wrong lessons can be 'learned.'