'The single most effective weapon against our deployed forces'
30 Sep Washington Post - 'The single most effective weapon against our deployed forces' by Rick Atkinson.
Quote:
It began with a bang and "a huge white blast," in the description of one witness who outlived that Saturday morning, March 29, 2003. At a U.S. Army checkpoint straddling Highway 9, just north of Najaf, four soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division, part of the initial invasion of Iraq, had started to search an orange-and-white taxicab at 11:30 a.m. when more than 100 pounds of C-4 plastic explosive detonated in the trunk.
The explosion tossed the sedan 15 feet down the road, killing the soldiers, the cabdriver -- an apparent suicide bomber -- and a passerby on a bicycle. Lt. Col. Scott E. Rutter, a battalion commander who rushed to the scene from his command post half a mile away, saw in the smoking crater and broken bodies on Highway 9 "a recognition that now we were entering into an area of warfare that's going to be completely different."
Since that first fatal detonation of what is now known as an improvised explosive device, more than 81,000 IED attacks have occurred in Iraq, including 25,000 so far this year, according to U.S. military sources. The war has indeed metastasized into something "completely different," a conflict in which the roadside bomb in its many variants -- including "suicide, vehicle-borne" -- has become the signature weapon in Iraq and Afghanistan, as iconic as the machine gun in World War I or the laser-guided "smart bomb" in the Persian Gulf War of 1991...
WaPo 4-part report on IED's
Snagged this off another forum.
There is no question that Gian's OpEd is correct in potential effect
and there is little question that the ending of the war would be in the best interests the Armed Forces elements now deployed in Iraq and probably of the Armed Forces as a whole. What is not addressed in that OpEd is whether that action would be in the national interest.
I believe that action would be far more detrimental to the US than it would be beneficial.
By extrapolation one can say that the killing of Soldiers and Marines by IED would not exist in Iraq were we not there. However, we are there. Whether we should be or not, whether all the ramifications were considered or not prior to commitment is really broadly immaterial at this point. One can also say with some justification that had several elements of the US government from the President through the SecDef and to include a number of agencies and the Armed Forces done their jobs a little better we might well not have an IED problem in Iraq at this time. Also immaterial. The issue is not how to stop IEDs, the issue is what actions best serve the national interest at this time.
While the recommended action would please many around the world on several levels and a large number of Americans would be quite happy, that action would leave a vacuum in the ME with even more uncertain effects than would our continued presence. It would also tacitly fulfill the expectations of many who would see it as a vindication of their belief that America has no staying power and is not to be trusted. That potential effect deserves even more thought that did the original intent to commit.
Rob eloquently makes many excellent points on the issue but I submit his final paragraph is the most critical in his comment:
Quote:
"I appreciate the article - we need those who make major policy decisions to think about the environment that war takes place in. Its complex and enduring, and there are consequences. If we decide to employ military power to achieve our political ends, then we need to think about what we want to accomplish and what the enemy wants to accomplish, strengths and weaknesses (ours and theirs), and we need to recognize that the more populations are involved the messier it will be, and the greater the role chance and probability will play in the out come when our goals depend on the people who live in a given state or region sustaining a peace - since our strategic culture reflects our own values of free will and choice."
Arguably that analysis was not applied by many to the attack on Iraq and, regrettably, in the first couple of years to our actions and efforts there. That is history. The history of World War I is really analogous in the areas of bad decisions, bad tactics and death -- it is not all analogous politically and in the context of today's ease, visual effects and rapidity of communication or of todays battlefield where effects are not local but international in ways World War I could never have been.
Given the thrust of the OpEd as it appeared, one can pretty much be assured that the "end the war" desired is our withdrawal. If the rest of the piece is considered and further comments on this board are considered, one is left with the thought that we are intruding in a civil war and can only continue to provide targets, thus removal of the targets is desired.
I agree strongly with WM and Jedburgh. I'm not sure that the OpEd serves anyone well. Gian says his is not a political or policy statement -- that will be ignored and it will be widely used as a de facto political and policy condemnation.
No sane human wants the death and destruction that exists in Iraq, we all want it to end -- but to end it on the wrong note will only lead to more and possibly greater death and destruction. History tells us that. World War I emphatically tells us that; that is the true analogy between then and now...
Ken's comment on the need for
Balance and Consistency awhile back (I can't remember the thread) got me over a hump (Ken is good at planting seeds that way). Terry telling me about what he and Frank Hoffman discussed (and then Frank's piece on the blog recently) speak to our evolving thinking on current and future threats, how they will structure themselves and what tactics they might use against us.
With all the discussion on organizational structure and doctrine in terms of our perspective, I lost sight of what I'm always saying people should not lose sight of - war is a social phenomena and as such we eventually fight where we live and live where we fight. I'm not trying to be confusing, but that helps me remember that people are involved and always have been. Perhaps because military history is not taught in the context of an engine of social change, it often is reduced to binary content where we only examine civilians in minor roles and concentrate instead on those things clearly identifiable with the combatants - until we started conducting counter-insurgency, then it became undeniable. I'm not saying that military history is devoid of such work, only that in our desire to examine military historical significance we tend to isolate it from its social roots. This is why I like reflections done where the author or theorist considers war within the context of society. I think this is important given the probabilities and possibilities of war, our political objectives given our perspective on why what happens in other places matters to us domestically, and our evolving understanding of what constitutes a threat and the social environments which create those threats (from the horrific events of 9/11 to the possibilities of pandemics and beyond).
I think this is important in considering IEDs - not only because they reflect the tactics and organizational structure of those employing them, but because they are telling of the enemy's political objectives and their will to continue its pursuit.
One side must decide that its no longer worth the effort to continue the pursuit of the original objective - either because new objectives have replaced the old ones, the original objectives have been met to some degree, or because the conditions and assumptions which gave rise to the original objectives are no longer valid.
IEDs I think offer a range of options commensurate with their type and effects. SVBIED types where 2 x dump trucks and an assault element designed to destroy a fortification, inflict mass casualties, gain public attention through the media, challenge resolve on different levels and deny the public a sense of security are high risk, high yield operations. As such they are planned out more, and if possible the enemy mitigates his own risk by conducting near simultaneous operations with his available means to diffuse our attention and create opportunities at the target. One of the best ways to target this operation I've seen is to disrupt it by desynchronizing his effort and increase his risk- and while there are ways to accomplish this, its not a given - you can do everything right, and sooner or later if they are committed enough they are going to get through to a target - unless the object in view no longer secures the commitment of the people required to carry it off, or those still committed are no longer available or no longer have the means to execute it.
As means become easier to come by and alternative ways offer similar effects at less risk, the level of commitment across the broader spectrum is easier to come by. So maybe the SVBIED into the IP station is no longer doable, but a directional EFP type IED with a high probability command detonation system in terrain that offers high yield/low risk is still a doable means of achieving the political goal even if the enemy lacks larger scale public support.
Its also important in considering how what has for sometime been one of our strengths, our ability to develop and field technological solutions to tactical problems, have been challenged by greater lethality in small packages that are hard to keep pace with, and further strain our ability to operate in the "away games". The evolution of the IED challenges the physics of deploying and sustaining a force big enough to meet the demands of securing a populace at price tag that is hard to beat. I'm a fan of the MRAP because I have no choice but to be - I want the best tech available to mitigate the easier to come by/easier to employ IEDs that result in MTBI and the BB in the beer can effect - I've seen guys in Buffaloes, Cougars, and RGs walk away from big VBIEDs and SVBIEDs where I've seen whole 1114/1151 five person crews killed and/or severely wounded.
We should absolutely do everything actively and passively technologically possible to provide the means by which our soldiers and marines can gain tactical and operational advantages. This is a long chain of stuff that includes ISR assets, force protection and Command & Control technologies - but these technological advantages are not silver bullets - they are only as good as the people who employ them, communicate through them, and analyze the information made available by them.
Technology quickly becomes dated, and because it is produced by people, its advantages are quickly identified by the enemy who will take the required steps to mitigate it. Only through agility and adaptiveness can we extend its shelf life. The shelf life might be sufficient if the objective is more military and less political, but if the objective requires greater political solvency as in the case with civil wars and popular insurgencies, then the longer the enemy will have to counter our technologies and increase both the physical and political strain on us - physical in the sense of fiscal means, R&D, production throughput on logistical burdens - political in the domestic strains which change the value of our original objectives. This is how I interpret the impact of IEDs and like technologies and tactics on the wars of today and tomorrow.
As if that were not bad enough, Frank and Terry have taken it to the next level - a smart state with sufficient resources is going to take advantage of the full curve either by developing the organic capability or through proxy and alliances. They will have a significant conventional capability while at the same time laying the ground work for a speedy transition to an Insurgency with all the middle ground covered - this all the while we question the value of our object in view (fear/honor/interest rationale) and the greater body politic exerts its own pressures. It should be understandable by the discussions we've had here how difficult it is for us to develop a force with military capabilities that counter that without a 3-5 year learning curve and strains that force us into other undesirable choices at home elsewhere around the globe.
With so much at stake I don't believe we can roll over, or become apathetic, but we must start looking at the problems differently, and making choices that provide the best long term flexibility and offer us the opportunity to be consistent in our goals through a balance we can sustain. It ain't easy, and I think we have a ways to go (maybe it never stops).
Best, Rob