Yep, I've noticed that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Pete
...When non-Infantry types suddenly find themselves unexpectedly in combat odd things happen, like Jessica Lynch's Ordnance unit in 2003.
One of our many training flaws -- thankfully, that one's been fixed at least a bit for the kids today.
Marshall was full of more BS than Ferdinand. Met him once, nice enough guy but none of his books stand close scrutiny. :wry:
That's the theory -- and it's dangerously wrong
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Pete
...after the initial burst of suppressive fire one needs to orient onself as to what is going on and assert some sort of fire control. If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.
First, not an Officer's job -- they're supposed to be doing more important things like figuring out what to do next. Plus there are not enough of them around to provide 'instructions' to the Troops who should be too dispersed for even their Squad Leaders to really control their fire. Officers who try to interject themselves into the brouhaha often do as much harm as good and are not doing what they get paid for. So do some poorly trained NCOS do a bit of damage in that effort... :eek:
METT-TC of course applies.:cool:
The theory is -- and the doctrine says -- that the NCOs will control the fire. That is sometimes possible and it even happens occasionally. More often, there is an initial free for all and Joe has to KNOW what to do and nobody controls anything very well. The flaw is that only after he gets to a decent unit will someone possibly teach him what to do. Or he can partake of two or three firefights and figure out most of it. If he goes to a poor unit, no one will teach him and as the institution did not do it, he'll have a rough couple of fights initially. My estimate is that about half or more of the Troops did not really know how to react until they'd been in fights. Used to be that most didn't understand all they know about what they were doing. May be better now but I wouldn't bet on it...:wry:
Good units train on it and work at it and get a good system of individual fire discipline and control operating; the poor ones never do. There are a lot of poor units out there, thus the reputation of the US Army and Marines for being trigger happy. I enjoyed watching units from both organizations fire at each other a lot of places in the world. Fortunately, the fire was usually so poorly aimed that only rarely did anyone get hurt...:D
We simply do not train as well as we should. Our training and much of our doctrine is residual from WW I with a WW II overlay. The lessons of Korea and Viet Nam -- and Afghanistan and Iraq thus far -- are not allowed to move the Ark of the Covenant that is "mobilization of a big Army oriented training." Even though we don't have that large an Army...
I can't personally attest or improve ...
on this:
Quote:
from Pete
If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.
but I do have a little vignette from Bill Lyman's history of the 1/117-30ID which illustrates Pete's point (.. "it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on..."). The "take charge PFC" is probably something that Ken and other combat vets here have seen more than once.
The tactical situation is from 2 Oct 1944 (breach of the Siegfried Line, where C-1/117 was the tip of the spear), which I described in this post, Mathematical models & reality, in another thread. While Charlie (and an attached HMG platoon of Dog) were the spear's tip, that tip was blunted by accurate German arty and mortar fires. The net result was that Charlie (coy +) sustained about 50% TOE casualties and its attack stalled out at the little river and railroad just West of the pillboxes.
The two platoon leaders (1 Johnson & 3 Stanley) at the river and railroad tracks managed to reorganize what was left of their units (27 soldiers) - 2 & 4 (weapons) platoons were knocked out of immediate action. Meanwhile, Baker was swinging South to attack the north flank of C's pillboxes and Able was advancing to join Charlie in a direct assault. The options for Charlie 1 & 3 were to sit and wait for the other two companies, or do something.
At this point, we join Bill Lyman's rendition; but first we need to meet a PFC (later SGT), Frank C. Brakefield, Crab Orchard, W. Va. - jd 7 Aug 1944 (Mortain, No. France), WIA 24 Dec 1944 (Ardennes); Ind. - CIB, PH, SS (2 Oct 1944). His conduct testifies that, in "Arms and Man" (Arma virumque cano), Man is the more important component by far.
Quote:
Heavy shell fire continued pouring on the depleted Company C platoons on the railroad track. The units were also receiving crossfire from two machine gun nests, one situated in the 119th sector at the right flank and the other close to the nearest pillbox at the left front.
In this situation, a First Platoon man performed in an exceptionally heroic manner. Private First Class Frank C. Brakefield asked Lieutenant Johnson, "Why don't we go up and take that pillbox where the machine gun fire's coming from?" The lieutenant explained that the platoon did not have enough men and equipment and also there was no way of knocking out the MG in the 119th's area.
"Somebody's got to get that pillbox," Brakefield persisted. Lieutenant Johnson continued to explain the folly of attempting it and pointed out that the outfit already had more than enough casualties for the day.
Despite the continued discouragement, Brakefield borrowed an extra grenade, wished everyone luck, and proceeded forward alone. Initially, he ran across the railroad track and paused for a moment in a trench there. Then he dashed out in the open and raced a couple of hundred yards to the pillbox. He threw a grenade in the embrasure, rushed to the rear door and found the structure empty !
He went back outside and, from a covered position, wiped out the MG nest that had been giving trouble. Inspired by Brakefield's action, the rest of the platoon moved up to the pillbox. Soon someone noticed fire coming from what appeared to be a barn nearby. Spearheaded by the indomitable Brakefield, a group moved forward to eliminate the fire and found the barn to be a camoflaged pillbox. It was captured with a combination of grenade and rifle fire and a number of prisoners were taken.
Now, all of this was only a small part of the 1/117th's attack on 2 Oct 1944; and it is quite possible that Able and Baker would have still breached the pillbox line, even if the remnants of Charlie 1 & 3 had huddled at the RR track. What we know is not the possible speculation, but the actual reality.
The net result (via Bill Lyman):
Quote:
The First Battalion's assault on the Siegfried was exceedingly significant. Curlew was the only lead battalion in the division to accomplish its mission the first day. The outfit cracked the Westwall for the entire XIX Corps.
Cheers
Mike
A twofer. Maybe a threefer...
JMA:
Quote:
So we see that no matter how poor Marshall's methodology was he has been unfairly criticised by people who have seized upon only half of what he said (that being that soldiers don't fire their weapons).
Nope. There are those who do not fire, no question -- the issue is in fact only the percentage who do not. Marshall may or may not have been correct for the units he interviewed, we have no way of knowing. He did upgrade his number considerably for Korea and even more for Viet Nam (It happens that my then Battalion was one he visited in writing 'Battles in the Monsoon.') . There are a slew on military studies -- citing the FBI is a pointless Apple to Baobab comparison. Google 'US army volume of fire studies.' There are several studies in those hits; if that's too much work, here's a good little synopsis of some collected results, not directly related but some bearing on the issue. LINK.
Marshall did some good, no question but he also did a lot of harm. In addition to "Men against fire," he also wrote a number of columns in the late 40s and early 50s for the Detroit Free Press newspaper for whom he was military correspondent and for other US publications. The result was that US Army leaders bought his flawed tale and developed 'Trainfire' (discussed in Pete's link above). Trainfire accomplished its mission of getting more people to shoot more -- unfortunately, it taught them to pour a large volume of fire at short range easily seen targets. It did not teach them to shoot accurately. Worse, it did not teach them to locate obscured or difficult targets, to estimate range, to have their fire controlled and several other important things. There was supposed to be a Field Firing function and Range Estimation exercise that accompanied the range firing but it got ignored more often than not.:mad:
Fortunately, the new Outcome Based Training methods in range firing fix many of the problems. (LINK), (LINK) That last says firing is limited to 300m, that's temporary due to a combination of ammo available and range limit, both are to be fixed and the intent is to go to 600m. Better late than never, I guess...
You asked this:
Quote:
It is said that this comes with combat experience. So why then do modern armies continue to send raw troops into battle when there are other options?
Because modern Armies have their training designed and approved by people who've seen little or no combat.
Pete:
Just four quotes from your link:
Quote:
Army assumptions that combined arms, crew-served weapons, and the infantry battalion's six organic snipers would dominate the infantryman's half kilometer have not proven true in recent mobile expeditionary warfare.
Close-quarters combat rifle courses of fire can be conducted on existing 25-meter zero rifle ranges that are universal on Army posts.
The Soldier's perceived limited effectiveness with his rifle has spawned the requirement for the Objective Individual Combat Weapon to compensate.
The historic U.S. eight-man infantry squad was issued 384 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition for their M1 rifles (six 8-round clips per soldier. The traditional round count remains at 384 for today's MI6 or M4 match)...
In order:
The so-called Army assumptions are just that -- assumptions made by random Generals who thought they knew more than 200 years of experience or dozens of fairly good studies that produced sensible data. Anyone who thought along the lines of that first item had little to no front line infantry combat experience and predicated his or her assumption on idle hunches. Not one of those items is in any sense a substitute for fire in infantry combat.
Anyone advocating 'close combat courses of fire on a 25m range is foolish. The KD stuff he advocates will work -- it is not the only way but it does work -- and then a field firing course is needed. We used to what JMA above called the "Drake/Cover Shoot" with semi to fully concealed silhouettes out to 600m and beyond -- but Willard Wyman and his minions sold 'Trainfire' -- which destroyed Army marksmanship. Trainfire dumped the old Field Fire Course (three days of it annually...). The location of concealed targets and determination of their range is a critical infantry skill. It is not taught in institutional training at all well mostly because it is difficult to teach and, far more to the point, has a low "Go" rate -- that makes Trainers and units look bad, so they avoid it. Benning is not the Army Infantrymans friend...
He touts the OICW "to compensate" -- that's the American way :rolleyes: : "...we have a significant training shortfall; lets spend a little money and time so we fix it" "NO! We can't do that, we need to improve the technology, Congress will buy stuff, they won't fund more training..." Not if you don't ask them and make a valid case they won't. :mad:
The killer is the last item. The eight man squad existed right after WW I up until WW II only, been nine or more since -- and we're still issuing ammo predicated on something that's been gone since 1942 :eek:. One more example of my oft repeated comment that our training is based on WW I models and we've 'upgraded' it only incrementally if at all.
So the author was out in left field. Not to knock AMU that hard, they have some good people and their mission is NOT to improve Army training...
You said:
Quote:
This is mainly a unit training issue, not one to be to be taught at TRADOC schools, although the schoolhouse could help by developing and distributing generic Programs of Instruction for units in the field.
Wrong. It is indeed a unit training issue but it also must be taught in the schoolhouse. It is a basic soldiering and survival skill and the TRADOC institutions have the resources and responsibility to teach it, not least because if they don't, it will get only lip service in poor units -- and, by definition, 50% of the units in the Army are less good than the top 50%. TRADOC has a responsibility to train the trainer. They could do a much better job of that.
The POI you suggest out there right now for the required training, so TRADOC did their development thing -- then washed their hands of it. It is not getting done and a large part of that is the NCOs and LTs who should be teaching it don't know how because no one -- guess who failed to do their job -- trained them...
It is yet one more item in the long list of shortcomings in our Officer and Enlisted initial entry training -- and PME...
True. However, while times and terms change the basics of combat do not.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Pete
Times have changed a bit, so we're not completely locked into the past:
That's an excellent example of a timeless and valuable technique and the training and drills required for units to do it almost automatically being eliminated due to obsolete terminology. Thus we cater to to perceived rather than actual obsolescence.
Happens when your doctrine writers -- and leaders -- don't understand all they know about what they're doing.
It's like the terribly flawed conversion to Trainfire; instead of using available increased knowledge and simply improving the wheel, we insist on reinventing it. Those square ones don't work too well...
All so some General can get credit for being innovative.
Scroll through the first 30 or so pages of Chapter 3.
It's still doctrine. Problem is few units teach and use it. We get in a real war, they will...
LINK.