Heh. Well, implementing that would likely make the detainee
population decline. However, I suspect the 'enemy' KIA count would suddenly climb... :D
True on all counts. Producing more KIAs would be explicitly
prohibited and the ROE would be tightened to try and make it officially difficult. Officers and NCOs would be told to not allow it and most would try to do so. However, Joe tends to ignore Leaders, niceties and rules when his survival is at stake -- as he should when Leaders implement dumb rules...
Task Force 134, Camp Bucca, etc.,
was a Rule of Law operation (treating detainees as criminal suspects to be eventually charged and tried under Iraqi domestic law), as Polarbear pointed out in post #18. In effect, our (US) forces acted as quasi-police officers.
Currently, US detainees under the Laws of War (all under Common Article 3, 1949 GCs) are those held at Gitmo and some held at Bagram. So, be careful about applying Laws of War to the Iraq situation - clearly, US Laws of War applied to members of the Iraqi armed forces detained in 2003 during the course of major combat operations (those being EPW under 1949 GC III).
The issue, of course, is whether Task Force 134, Camp Bucca, etc., were effective in at least neutralizing detainees who were released. The 2008 article re: Task Force 134 (cited by PC at post #17) was impressive in its apparent conversion of most all releasees.
But, in following up, I came on this Kings of War article from 1 Jun 2010, US detention ops: whatever happened to COIN ‘inside the wire’?:
Quote:
Around two years ago, several articles and blog-posts appeared detailing the hard work of Gen. Douglas Stone, then the commander of Task Force 134 and in charge of detention operations in Iraq. The attention converged on the change of strategy within the Task Force, previously known mostly for its implication in various prisoner-abuse scandals. Under the command of Gen. Stone, the focus changed toward something more akin to the counterinsurgency principles of separating extremists from moderates, and of working with the latter to curb the influence of the former. To that end, each inmate was given an ‘initial assessment’ to determine his political orientation, religious beliefs and social concerns. The point was to engage with the prisoners’ motivation for violence, both within the prison and upon their release. It emerged that whereas some were hellbent on killing Americans, or other Iraqis for that matter, others were simply disillusioned, angry, acting out of revenge, or had no other prospect than to pick up a gun and become an insurgent.
Based on these assessments, Task Force 134 tailored a range of measures to deal with the inmates on the basis of their individual situation rather than as an undifferentiated whole. These measures included educational courses for those uneducated or of school age, vocational training for lower-risk inmates, religious courses (deradicalisation) for Islamist extremists, and psychological help for particularly traumatised inmates. The detention facilities held 140 reviews daily to assess inmates’ threat level. Those granted release were placed in front of an Iraqi judge to discuss their future and sign a binding pledge to renounce violence. While Gen. Stone said he did not envisage turning ‘radicals’ into ‘choir boys’, the Task Force apparently experienced a significantly reduced return rate (maybe 3-4%). Within the prisons, moderates had even launched a backlash against the extremist elements that had previously used the facilities as insurgency training grounds.
This astonishing work first gained my attention as part of some research I was doing on political reintegration in Iraq (the result of which will soon be released in paper-back). Since then, I admit to having lost the thread somewhat, so I was surprised and dismayed to read in The Guardian last week, that according to Iraqi Major General Ahmed Obeidi al-Saedi, a full ‘80% of prisoners released from US-run Camp Bucca have rejoined terrorists’ (H/T Jeff Michaels). Just a week earlier, another senior Iraq Army officer, Major General Qassim Atta, put forward a similar charge, noting that ‘the majority of the detainees who used to be inside US prisons went back to work in crimes and terrorism’ and that ‘many of them occupied leadership positions in Al-Qaeda’. (more in article, comments and links)
The two articles outlining the May 2010 Iraqi claims on ineffectiveness were:
Iraq prison system blamed for big rise in al-Qaida violence. "General claims 80% of prisoners released from US-run Camp Bucca have rejoined terrorists." (Featuring Major General Ahmed Obeidi al-Saedi).
Iraq says prisoners released by US rejoined Qaeda. (Featuring Major General Qassim Atta).
Now, I'm not saying that we should believe the Iraqi generals over our own. I am saying that it would pay here to make haste slowly in suggesting a scenario that is counter-intuitive to many of us.
Regards
Mike
The Sarposa Prison Break (2008)
The Sarposa Prison Break (2008)
Entry Excerpt:
The Sarposa Prison Break (Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2008) by Captain Nils N. French, Canadian Army, Canadian Army Journal, Summer 2008.
"Prison breaks have been used as an insurgent tactic on other occasions. Examples from the last few years include the release of 23 prisoners from a jail in Yemen in February of 2006, 33 prisoners from a prison in Muqdadiyah, Iraq in March of 2006, 49 prisoners from a prison in Cotabato, Philippines in February of 2007, and 300 freed from a facility in Chattisgarh, India in December, 2007."
The Sarposa Prison Break (Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2008).
The Rules - Detaining HVTs and Others
This thread is a non-identical twin to the thread, The Rules - Engaging HVTs & OBL, which deals with the kill aspect of neutralizing the enemy. This thread deals with the capture (detention) aspect of neutralizing the enemy. It also can tie in with the convert aspect of the tri-part neutralization concept (kill, capture or convert).
Two reasons for the thread are (1) the apparent uncertainty within the ICRC concerning the rules of capture and detention in non-international armed conflicts (to the US, Common Article 3 situations); and (2) the definite uncertainty in what US law will be as the President and Congress work toward (or away from) a common detention and trial framework in the National Defense Appropriations Act (NDAA; see Lawfare over the last few weeks).
As to the ICRC's issue, we have from Lawfare, Red Cross Conference Acknowledges “Gaps” in International Humanitarian Law Governing Detention (Lawfare 3 Dec 2011; by John Bellinger, who is a partner at Arnold & Porter LLP. Prior to that, he was Legal Adviser at State [2005-2009], and previously was Legal Adviser to the National Security Council (NSC) [2001-2005]):
Quote:
The 31st Quadrennial Conference of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent closed on Thursday in Geneva with the adoption of a resolution inviting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to study whether existing international humanitarian law is adequate, or needs to be strengthened and clarified, as applied to persons detained in armed conflicts. The Quadrennial Conference comprises the 194 States Party to the Geneva Conventions and all the national humanitarian aid societies that are part of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The resolution, and the ICRC reports that preceded them, constitute a candid and remarkable acknowledgment that — contrary to the adamant assertions of some observers — international law in general, and the Geneva Conventions in particular, do not in fact provide clear guidance to states engaged in detention activities and instead have some legal gaps.
Although the next steps are not clear, it appears likely that the ICRC will convene some kind of working group, in coordination with states, to examine the gaps and how to fill them. In an interview on the Conference website, an ICRC expert says “One possibility would be to negotiate a new treaty on detention issues. But other possibilities would also have to be considered, because some States may not see the need to adopt new treaty law. One of these, for example, would be to use more “soft-law” instruments – i.e. detailed rules that provide guidance without being legally binding. Or we could state more precisely what constitutes good practice.”
The ICRC prepared two important background reports for the conference:
Report on International Humanitarian Law and Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts
Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed Conflicts
The ICRC has conducted a two-year internal survey to consider whether the GCs are "relevant" to present-day armed conflicts. I would suggest that the issue is not whether the GCs are "relevant" (a fairly low bar); but whether they are "material" (and if so, to what extent).
In any event, here is Bellinger's assessment of the present ICRC position on a number of key issues:
Quote:
While international humanitarian law contains detailed rules on conditions of detention in international armed conflicts, this is not the case in conflicts not of an international character, especially those governed by Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, the minimum norm applicable in all non-international armed conflicts. There is a need to elaborate specific provisions on the various elements that make up a detention regime with a view to ensuring that detaining parties, whether State or non-State, ensure that those who are in their power are treated humanely.
The relevant rules of customary law are by necessity formulated in general terms, and thus do not provide sufficient guidance to detaining authorities on how an adequate detention regime may be created and operated.
In contrast to the Fourth Geneva Convention rules governing international armed conflicts, there are no international humanitarian law treaty provisions on procedural safeguards for internment in non-international armed conflicts.
Customary international humanitarian law prohibits arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but does not provide criteria for determining what is “arbitrary”. Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions contains no provisions regulating internment, apart from the requirement of humane treatment. Internment is, however, clearly a measure that can be taken in noninternational armed conflicts, as evidenced by the language of Additional Protocol II, which mentions internment in Articles 5 and 6 respectively, but likewise does not give details on how it is to be organized.
Given the evident challenges faced by persons who might have reason to fear for their safety if they are transferred to another State, it is absolutely necessary to provide legal guidance to detaining authorities in such cases. The lack of legal provisions in the humanitarian law governing non-international armed conflicts suggests that it would be highly advisable to provide for a set of workable substantive and procedural rules that would both guide the actions of States and non-governmental armed groups and protect the rights of affected persons.
Some of the gaps in the existing applicable law require the preparation of new legal solutions.
Bellinger and co-author Vijay Padmanabhan recently addressed a similar set of concerns, “Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law.”
The most extensive practice in the area of detention lies in the US Courts (primarily the DC Circuit and District judges), as we have seen in individual cases discussed in this thread, Crimes, War Crimes and the War on Terror.
Regards
Mike