Counterinsurgency vs. Anti-insurgency
Gen. Flynn's article brings to the forefront a core discussion that has been moving under the radar screen since 2007. It highlights the core difference between anti-insurgency which is focused on kill/capture and the elimination of IED cells/networks or true counterinsurgency which focuses to a high degree on population control and security.
It is interesting that FID and unconventional warfare which were the bread and butter of Special Forces from their inception to the early 1970s was forced into extinction by the big Army as they drove to disband Special Forces who had to rebrand themselves as the "Strategic Recon types" in the 80s/90s in order to survive. This rebranding cause internal problems for SF when they discovered the need to shift back to FID/UW.
Now we are back to FID and unconventional warfare and big Army went left in Iraq and that is now not working in Afghanistan which went right and is a true insurgency with characteristics of a full blown phase three guerilla war. It is refreshing to see a Spad called a Spad.
Now just maybe big Army can focus in learning just what is insurgency, what drives an insurgency, and how does that insurgency evolve--and not learning it out of the COIN FM or from CTC scenario rotations. It is amazing that many in the old guard (Vietnam vets) have pointed to key lessons learned about FID, but were brushed off and now there is the sudden interest in books written about FID in Vietnam--lessons learned though from the Special Forces CIDG program seem on the other hand to still be ignored. One of the most important books written in the early 80s "Silence As A Weapon" written by retired COL. Herrington goes along way in describing the use of silence by an insurgency in the control of populations.
Since Gen. Flynn has gotten some attention on the MI side maybe attention should be paid to a concept developed by John Robb called "open source warfare" (2004/2005) and just recently scientifically verified by the Nature magazine article "Ecology of Human Warfare". For the first time via computer research one can make specific outside changes/impacts to the insurgency environment and see the results on the insurgency movement without having boots on the ground. And it goes a long way in explaining the media impact of their operations which can be verified by the impressive increase in video releases on the part of the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2008.
A Cross post from the HTT Thread . . .
Here
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve the Planner
Something about intelligence theory is basic. The more you know and learn, the more you can know and apply.
Professionally, I would rather use data (scrounged and verified by any sources) to cross-check against field verification and systemic consistency (smell test)) in sets, and update those sets with field changes on as real-time a basis as possible. Then, use that knowledge base to fill in gaps for people while they fill mine. If it isn't engaged and actionable, its just another contract..
Question is: What is needed?
You are correct with the last question--what is needed. We answer that question by knowing what the mission is IMHO and that brings us around to the discussion of the MG Flynn CNAS report.
The breakdown occurs in my opinion when one moves from position "the more one knows, the more one can know" (which is fine) to the position "the more one can know, the more one must know."
I'm not at all convinced that simply because we can know, for example, that the soil 10 feet below the surface at UTM grid LC 1234554321 consists of a specific form of clay that we usually need to know that. If I am planning to build another Burj Kahlifa I might need that knowledge, but I doubt it is important if I'm trying to decide where to erect my TACSAT antenna.
Those last few posts sort of summarize the problems...
Though I'd suggest that while Bob is correct on the tactical versus the strategic focus, he and the problem seem to forget that our political system is not conducive to long term strategies. That said, he is correct that our threat-centric intel focus is just really dumbb -- with two 'b's. :mad:
Ergo, a policy reform is required...
Entropy is correct in that many 'intel' errors are a result of lazy thinking and counterporductive (i.e. excessive classification, parochialism and turf battles, political expediency among other facets) actions by some analysts and many Bosses.
Seems like a policy reform might help...
Steve's quote from Night Watch has this gem:
Quote:
"Its weak point is that implementation relies on the same people who failed, twice."
Yet another case of a policy error IMO. Fire a few "pour l'encouragement d'les autres..."
Lastly, WM hits a nail squarely:
Quote:
"The breakdown occurs in my opinion when one moves from position 'the more one knows, the more one can know' (which is fine) to the position 'the more one can know, the more one must know.' "
There is no policy that explicitly says do that, rather, our policies -- and our Congress -- lead us to do that because the system has developed numerous rules and even laws to protect itself from accountability. Our deeply flawed budgetary process leads to a winner takes all approach and a 'go along - get along' attitude and set of turf allocations all too often that create a series of very discrete stovepipes that foster the idea that more is better when we should instead establish and encourage competition between agencies and units to produce meaningful intel. Reward those who get it right to spur the competitors to better efforts.
There's little doubt in my mind that sharp analysts in many agencies are delivering good product to their Bosses. The problem is they are being constrained by politically (in all senses of that word) oriented supervisors and / or units or agencies who do not want their Honcho to get upset by hearing things he or she would prefer not to hear.
That too would seem to indicate a needed policy change -- fire about half the senior people in order to get the rest to do what they should be doing instead of what they think the Boss might want.
And foster competition. While centralization will always be more efficient it will also always be less effective. In my view, effective intel trumps the 'efficient' production of something that is not really intel but is instead all too often platitudinous garb -- er, information -- of marginal value...
The Major Is On To Something
Pete:
In civilian life, I do court testimony as an expert.
I'm currently preparing muy reports and testimony for a very complex government case that has been going on for ten years, so I am sitting here going through mountains of records, evidence, underlying court rulings, and trying to develop a deep and richly-supported analysis against the realization that whatever I write or testify to will be grilled to death by two economics professors on the other side armed by the largest law firm in the world.
All kidding aside, the case is about money and government authority---no lives on the line whatsoever, and, ten years from now, no one will ever remember it.
It really is incredible that, where lives are on the line in such a complex circumstance, the so-called warfighter support is so poor.
I have written (or should I say: overwritten factual inaccuracies) in Wiki too often to know the limits of some of the electronic sources.
What's really funny to me in expert testimony matters, too, is that increasingly I see opposing counsel working from electronic research in regulatory cases. The applicable regulation comes up one section at a time despite that a regulation must be read across its entirety. So often, the next section alters the intent and meaning of the last, and they miss that.
E-lawyers versus the old guys that review a printed copy of the entire regulation, which they read cover to cover before developing any positions.
Oh, Brave New World!
Two "boots on the ground" comment
'Babatim' has commented on MG Flynn's report, as an "on the ground" commentator and outside officialdom worth reading IMHO: http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2479
Quote:
(My added emphasis)This white paper is full of good things but all good things must come to an end and at the end of this paper there are no good things which I can detect.
He then adds a comment by a regular poster on the blog, by an in-country US intelligence analyst:
Quote:
I read MG Flynn’s paper as well, and while he makes some excellent points, he failed to mention that part of the reason our intelligence sucks is that all our collectors are mostly stuck on the FOB. That’s why we’ve become so hooked on technical intelligence. The kind of relevant intelligence that Flynn yearns for comes from meaningful interaction with the populace, period. In my experience with Afghans, especially Pashtuns, if you suddenly roll up into their village with your MRAPs, Star Ship Trooper suits, and “foreign” interpreters (even if your terp is from Afghanistan, if he’s not from the neighborhood, he’s “foreign”), they will tell you two things: jack and sh*t. We are reminded constantly that Afghanistan is a country broken by decades of war; no one trusts one another. But trust is only obtained by building meaningful relationships with people, and our current force protection policies make the process of building rapport impossible. As I sit here at my desk, on an unnamed FOB in Regional Command East, I would dearly love to grab a few of my soldiers and head out to the local market to see what’s going on in town today. Perhaps I could report back to my leadership that local farmers are concerned about a drought next year because of the light snowfall this winter, or that the mullah down the street is preaching anti-coalition/government propaganda. I’d get this information from shop keepers and kids that I’ve built a relationship with over the past few months. But I cannot just walk off the FOB because that would be the end of my career. Instead, I’m going to check out BBC.com, call a couple guys I know like Tim, and continue to be disgruntled that I have NO idea what’s going on outside my FOB.
I think relationship building has featured before on many Afghan threads.
As have excessive Force Protection measures,
The one precludes the other. You'd think someone would tumble to that simple little fact...
Excellent catch, David.
More from the Tom Ricks Blog
The following comments on the Flynn report are by Adam L. Silverman, Ph.D., a civilian analyst who was imbedded with the 1st Armored Division in Iraq:
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I have sat in meetings dealing with this issue where the question was repeatedly brought up: "how come we don't have any information from this area?" Looking at the part of the map being referred to the simple response is that there is no military presence in the area, which means no PRT, no CA, and no HTT there either. Provincial Reconstruction, Civil Affairs, and Human Terrain members work very hard, but even they can't bring back primary source data from places that no one is operating in.
Quote:
My second concern is that the military in general, seemingly derived from military intelligence, has two negative reinforcing dynamics: if you needed to know it you already would and if I know it and you don't, then I'm more powerful than you. Operationally relevant knowledge management will never be effective, regardless of the system that is put in place, until or unless this dynamic is broken! My third concern is that aggregation and collection of data into a centralized location, is still not going to solve the problem. The operational side of the House, whether hungry for information for non-lethal operations or intelligence for lethal ones must be fed!
The entire piece can be read using the link below.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...feed_the_beast