Roughneck One Nine by Frank Antenori
Frank Antenori was the "Team Sergeant" of an an American Special Forces "A Team" which deployed to the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq during Gulf War II. He wrote a book about his experiences titled Roughneck One Nine. Of possible interest to this thread is that the "A Team" went to war mounted in light, unarmored trucks. However they carried an amazing amount and variety of weaponry and electronics in their unarmored light trucks. They practiced relentlessly on firing ranges with all of their weaponry from pistols to very expensive missiles.
They were so confident in their weapons and equipment that prior to going overseas they determined in the event of making contact with Iraqi conventional forces that they would not run. Instead they would stand and fight (an "Alamo") and "pile them up". And indeed they did so. In an incredible fight against enemy tanks, motorized infantry and artillery. Now the "A Team" had incredible close air support. This, of course, counts for a lot. But just the same their battlefield accomplishment against a much larger and heavier force commands, in my opinion, respect.
Indeed it seems that the days of a conventional force successfully standing against and fighting a much smaller, Western military formation (supported by aircraft) are over. On the other hand if we look at what Islamic insurgent infantry (@ 3,000 in number and armed in the main with WWII technology and drawn from a part time militia) did to the IDF in southern Lebanon we may see the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam. (See Drudge for links to Israeli papers wherein this campaign is still discussed by IDF veterans.)
It may be that Western infantry may at first have to fight essentially vehicle based battles against enemy conventional formations. These initial engagements may thenbe followed by extended foot engagements against enemy insurgent infantry.
Regards
Richard W
IDF in Lebanon - Policy Issues
re: last Richard W posting
This post is limited to the following:
"On the other hand if we look at what Islamic insurgent infantry (@ 3,000 in number and armed in the main with WWII technology and drawn from a part time militia) did to the IDF in southern Lebanon we may see the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam."
Some SpecOps guy, with combat experience, would have to address the rest.
I have read through this thread, your profile (which says naught) and your other posts. When IDF Lebanon "X" was on, every day I watched it on the 3 cable news outlets I have, followed it in Ha'aretz and the Post (Jerusalem), and read many analyses by Israeli and other commentators. That area of South Lebanon is of interest to me because of various events and characters from the Crusader Era.
But (and a big one), I have not been on the ground there; nor have I led an IDF or any other unit into combat. I will try to keep this to my perception of policy decisions.
A major component of that operation was agitprop offense by Hez; and agitprop defense by the IDF. The basic Hez line seemed (to me) to be something like this: "We are the protectors of So. Leb.; we are strong, dug-in and ready; we can beat the IDF man to man; and we are willing to die." Think Iwo Jima from the Japanese viewpoint ?
The Israeli policy (strategy ?) confused me. There was the massive "strategic" air campaign, hitting targets which might have been fine if the nominal Leb. government were the center of gravity ! Part of that (in stated IDF policy) was to cut the Hez supply and re-inforcement lines. Perhaps, but it also screwed up the escape routes for refugees (leaving a lot of "collaterals" in the OA); and hit a few villages which had to explained away.
On the ground, the IDF seemed content with targeted intrusions (which were generally successful in their limited objectives); but the media impression (to me) was not of the IDF doggie fighting upfront "man to man". It was of a lot of heavy IDF stuff blasting at the "poor", "patriotic" defenders of the villages - and of the Faith. There seemed a real IDF aversion to seeing its casualties appear on TV (except for those hit by the Hez rocket attacks, which were a sideshow).
Maybe, doing it "on the cheap" was also a factor - if so, the return rate on the savings account was pretty negative.
Perhaps, the IDF would have been better off (from an agitprop standpoint) by adopting a policy something like: "We are going to take on Hez man to man, regardless of casualties; we are in a battle for survival.". That would be the agitprop impression sought.
The reality, I suppose, might be to dismount the infantry; slowly move through the defensive posions; fix the Hez in their bunkers, and hit with close-in air and heavy stuff; bury them with demolitions and armored bulldozers (lots of combat engineer stuff).
Someone with combat experience and knowledge of IDF capabilities would have to comment on thit one - feasible or no ? It seems it could be a policy leading to very intense, but localized combat. An OA where you probably would not have too many media types ! :)
I don't see that the Lebanon incident, in its military aspects, has much to do with "the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam", as you put it.