An elusive global fraternity
Thanks to a "lurker" for the pointer to The Economist's easier to read report and with a link to the published UK government report's summary.http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasm...im-brotherhood
The report:https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...n_Findings.pdf
A fine balancing act for some, as The Economist cites the two author's views:
Quote:
In a relatively tough judgment, one of the report's co-authors, Sir John Jenkins, concluded:
For the most part, the Muslim Brotherhood have preferred non-violent incremental change on the grounds of expediency, often on the basis that political opposition will disappear when the process of Islamisation is complete. But they are prepared to countenance violence—including, from time to time, terrorism—where gradualism is ineffective.
But the report's other co-author, Charles Farr, offered a more lenient view of Brotherhood-inspired groups working in Britain. He found that "such groups had in the past held out the prospect and ambition of an Islamic state in this country as elsewhere" but went on to insist that "there was no indication that the Muslim Brotherhood still held this view or at least openly promoted an Islamic state here."
Are they revolutionaries now?
An article from The Hudson Institute, which I understand is conservative in outlook and by Mokhtar Awad (from GWU and other places).
The author earlier on writes:
Quote:
...it is important to carefully examine the relationship between one of the oldest Islamist movements in the world and violence over the past four years, and what ideological revisions have taken place. This paper will focus more on the latter, specifically related to a recent book authored by a group of Muslim Brotherhood and allied Islamist scholars, which was sanctioned by the then leadership of the organization inside Egypt, titled The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup. The book provides a critical insight into how some scholars have successfully attempted to reconcile the group’s methodology with violence.
It ends citing the book's author:
Quote:
The Muslim Brotherhood inside [Egypt] has revised itself since the beginning of 2014. It is a reformist organization that believes in the constitutional approach, gradualist reform, and participated in many elections, and so on. Then after that, the Muslim Brotherhood changed to [adopt] revolutionary thought. This change did not come overnight. This is a change that [is based] on much literature [produced] inside the group, meetings, and workshops. The revolutionary transformation is now in every Muslim Brotherhood household, in every Brotherhood Shu’ba (local branch), and no can, whomever they may be, extinguish this revolutionary thought. This is the transformation. The Muslim Brothers have indeed changed.
Link:https://www.hudson.org/research/1378...im-brotherhood
The rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood
A book review in the FT of a new book 'The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Emnity and Engagement' by Martyn Frampton, Harvard University Press and one sentence:
Quote:
His book fills a crucial gap in the literature and will be essential reading not just for scholars, but for anyone seeking to understand the ever-problematic relationship between religion and politics in today’s Middle East.
Link:https://www.ft.com/content/0fa5736e-...b-2958fde95e5e
No reviews yet on:https://www.amazon.com/Muslim-Brothe...artyn+frampton
No in the UK:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Muslim-Brot...artyn+frampton
Tactical engagement: wise words
A belated discovery of an article by Sir John Jenkins, a retired UK diplomat and co-author of an official review of the Muslim Brotherhood - that was not published. Here is a sample passage:
Quote:
But I cannot think of a single example where Western diplomatic or any other sort of engagement has produced any change in the position of any political Islamist. Deniable channels of communication may sometimes be wise, for example when we have kidnappings to resolve or to ensure the physical security of diplomats (both of which we had to do in Gaza when I was HM Consul General in Jerusalem).
I’ve seen this movie before. People sometimes say that we need to identify moderates inside such organisations and detach them by engagement from their more extreme colleagues. Again, I can’t think of a single example where this has actually happened. So-called moderates rarely represent the core of any Islamist operation. In conflict they are dominated by their armed wings. And in any case, most Islamist groups from the Muslim Brotherhood onwards have a history of expelling, not accommodating, reformists.
Link:https://www.conservativehome.com/pla...islamists.html
The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Enmity and Engagement
A video (1h 3m) of the book launch and discussion @ Policy Exchange on June 18th:
Quote:
Policy Exchange’s Co-head of Extremism and Security Dr Martyn Frampton (author), provided an overview of the charged relationship between one of the world’s largest political Islamist movements and the Western powers. He was joined for a discussion by chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee Tom Tugendhat MP and Sir John Jenkins, former British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.
Link:https://policyexchange.org.uk/pxeven...nd-engagement/
Having met Sir John Jenkins once, when I was impressed, hence he appears on the Forum at times. Not so sure about the author or MP.
Ghosts of the Past: The Muslim Brotherhood in post‑Qaddafi Libya
An ICSR report and the full title is slightly different: 'Ghosts of the Past: The Muslim Brotherhood and its Stuggle for Legitimacy in post-Qaddafi Libya'.
In Summary:
Quote:
This report by ICSR Research Fellow Inga Kristina Trauthig tackles the most important global movement of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood, and looks at it from a local perspective. It traces and explains the history of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB), before examining how the movement has tried to establish itself as a legitimate political actor with regards to its Islamic credentials in the Libyan political sphere after 2011.
Among other things, this report finds that:
- The LMB today is still haunted by the ghosts of its past, such as the decade-long demonisation of the Qaddafi regime, its exiled organisational structure and, on a related note, its impotence at failing to develop a strong social base.
- Overall, the LMB has exhibited a more hawkish policy approach and, while striving to grow in importance, has cooperated with some of the more radical Islamist groups.
- Finally, the LMB’s central attempt to represent itself as the true bearer of Islam (Islam’s vanguard) mattered little in a country where many of the political organisations operating in the country have paid lip service to Islam, resulting in no political force the LMB could effectively position itself against.
Link to full report:https://icsr.info/2019/01/30/ghosts-...qaddafi-libya/