Avoiding Apocalypse on the Korean Peninsula: Diplomacy is not appeasement
From Rajan Menon at TomDispatch, published at War Is Boring: http://warisboring.com/avoiding-apoc...ean-peninsula/
Selected excerpts:
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So far the coercive tactics Trump has used to compel North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and cease testing ballistic missiles have included sanctions and asset freezes, military threats, and shows of force...
By now, this much ought to be clear, even to Trump. North Korea hasn’t been cowed into compliance by Washington’s warnings and military muscle flexing.
Clearly, the North’s leaders reject the proposition that American approval is required for them to build nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles.
Indeed, from Pyongyang’s perspective Trump may be the unpredictable one.
Many Americans know about the bombing of Dresden, Berlin, Hamburg, Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the deliberate targeting of civilians in an attempt to break their morale. But few know what happened to North Korea in the early 1950s.(edited to final passage)
In his haunting book On the Natural History of Destruction, W.G. Sebald writes that Germans did not discuss the wartime bombings because Nazi crimes made them hesitant to cast moral judgments on other states, no matter what they had done to Germany. There has been no such repression of memory or reticence by the state or the citizenry of North Korea.
A Sampling of Opinions Following North Korea's July 4th ICBM Test
Robert E. Kelly at the Lowy Institute (Australia): Learning to live with a Nuclear North Korean ICBM (July 11, 2017)
There can be no preemptive attacks on North Korea by the U.S. because South Korea and Japan would “veto” such a decision due to the retaliation from North Korea that they would face. Were the U.S. to attack without consulting South Korea and Japan, these countries would probably withdraw from their alliances with the U.S. In addition, a U.S. attack may cause a shooting war between it and China. The U.S. has “learned to live” with Russian, Chinese and Pakistani nuclear weapons...
Recommendations:
- Continued sanctions: these measures have retarded North Korea’s development of a credible nuclear deterrent capable of reaching the CONUS, and sanctions relief offers leverage if North Korea ever decides to negotiate as Iran did for the JCPOA
- Working with China: given China’s decisive economic leverage over North Korea, cooperating with China is crucial. We should pressure China to do more and search for “smarter sanctions”
- Missile defense: although missile defense may be “expensive”, it is necessary, and Japan and South Korea should cease “whining” and work with the U.S. to construct “layered” missile defenses including Patriot BMD, Aegis BMD and THAAD, which are “defensive systems…they signal no offensive intention”
Richard Fontaine at the Center for a New American Security: Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea (July 7, 2017)
The U.S. needs to dispense with various illusions now that North Korea can theoretically strike Alaska and will probably soon have the capability to strike the CONUS with a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile:
- China Will Solve It: China will not pressure North Korea into denuclearization as this could cause that state to fail and remove a convenient buffer between China and U.S. and allied forces in South Korea
- South Korea and Japan Will Solve It: both countries have tolerated a direct North Korean threat for decades, and any nuclear-tipped ICBM would be targeted toward the U.S. and not them. Neither has the capability to remove the North Korean threat to them without the risk of unacceptable losses due to retaliation
- North Korea can be Wooed with the Right Balance of Incentives and Disincentives: North Korea only fears foreign intervention and has reportedly cited the fates of Qaddafi and Hussein who abandoned their WMD programs. North Korea believes that a credible nuclear deterrent is is “fundamental security guarantee and will not be induced into trading them away”. A more “realistic goal is a freeze in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and, more ambitiously, some rollback of them”
- Military Force Can Work: North Korea holds populations in South Korea and Japan at risk. In addition, there is no guarantee that the U.S. could secure escalation dominance and keep a war restricted to disarming North Korean nuclear and missile forces
The U.S. should pursue a strategy of deterrence based upon North Korea’s “essential rationality – or at least its survival instinct”
Recommendations:
- Missile defense
- Covert action: sabotage of North Korean weapons programs
- Sanctions: current sanctions on North Korea are “minor compared to those applied to Iran as it enriched uranium”. Sanctions should target the North Korean elite and those Chinese individuals and entities conducting business with them (“there is much more the U.S. can do unilaterally”)
- Information warfare: bombard North Korea with information detailing the state’s human rights abuses, encourage defections and sow distrust
- Trade-offs: do not appease Chinese or Russian aggression due to a myopic focus on North Korea, such as ending joint exercises with South Korea, which are essential in the event of conflict
John Nilsson-Wright at Chatham House: North Korea Missile Test Exposes How Trump Has Overplayed His Hand (July 5, 2017)
Recommendation: The U.S. could dispatch a senior diplomat to negotiate with Kim Jong-Un, and offer concessions such as a U.S. liaison mission in Pyongyang and “asymmetric conventional force reductions on the peninsula”
Mark Fitzpatrick at International Institute for Strategic Studies: Could a ‘double freeze’ be viable path to peace on Korean Peninsula? (July 5, 2017)
The Sino-Russian proposal for a freeze on U.S.-South Korean military exercises for a freeze in North Korean nuclear and missile tests has "upsides":
- Without flight testing, North Korea cannot develop a missile reliably capable of striking the CONUS
- “Most observers believe that rolling back the nuclear-weapons programme is unattainable for the time being”
- Discussing the proposal is a precondition for China to participate in pressuring North Korea further
- A ban on exports by North Korea of nuclear technology could be added
- A freeze would involve the return of IAEA inspectors
- Return to the failed 2012 “Leap Day Deal”
Loren B. Thompson at Lexington Institute: The Only Answer To North Korea’s Missiles That Won’t Make War More Likely (July 6, 2017)
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It seems there is only one step the Trump administration can take that would not increase the likelihood of war and materially improve the safety of the American homeland. That step is to accelerate and expand the modest missile defense system called Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) that operates interceptors in Alaska and California.
David Santoro at Center for Strategic and International Studies: Don’t go ballistic! The least bad agenda after North Korea’s ICBM test (July 5, 2017)
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There is no reason to think that deterring and defending against a North Korea armed with nuclear-tipped ICBMs can’t work...
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Treating North Korea’s ICBM test as a game-changer is also counterproductive, for three reasons. First, that characterization suggests to Pyongyang that it is capable of deterring the United States…Second, the rhetoric of strategic game-changer suggests to Pyongyang that anything short of ICBM development is de facto acceptable, or “more” acceptable...Third, it is counterproductive to regard North Korea’s ICBM test as a game-changer because it suggests to regional allies, South Korea and Japan, that Washington only worries about North Korea when the US homeland is threatened.
Recommendations:
- Forward-deploy U.S. tactical nuclear weapons
- Strengthen sanctions
- Pursue dialogue with North Korea to negotiate limitations on its arsenal
Jonathan D. Pollack at Brookings Institute: North Korea has tested an ICBM. Now what? (July 6, 2017)
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Calls for preemptive military action or outsourcing the issue to China are simply not credible…At the same time, widespread calls for renewed U.S. negotiations with North Korea make little sense.
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The only viable path is one that acknowledges the reality of the North’s nuclear weapons and missiles while explicitly denying any political legitimacy or implied permanence to these programs, and raises the costs to Pyongyang for its actions. We cannot expect to fully understand Pyongyang’s calculus of risk, but measures explicitly designed to heighten the pressures on the regime are essential.
Commentary from CNI on North Korea
These are the final opinions that I will be posting. Curiously, Heritage and RAND have been notably silent on how to address the July 4th "firework"...
Harry J. Kazianis from the Center for the National Interest at The Week: How America should handle the frightening North Korea problem (July 5, 2017)
Kazianis argues that a “defiant China” and “rogue North Korea” should be the top priority for the U.S., and that all other threats and issues, from Russia and Iran to the ongoing wars in the MENA region to counter-terrorism, should be secondary.
He refers to China as “the biggest foreign policy and national security dilemma of our lifetime”.
Recommendations:
- The U.S. should ensure that the Asia-Pacific region “should get the bulk of America’s attention”, rather than references to “pivots” or “rebalancing”
- The U.S. should make it clear that it will penalize China for supporting North Korea, and that at the minimum, China should pressure North Korea to cease testing and release the three American hostages
- More military assets need to be brought into the region, and the military expanded with more attack submarines and more missile defenses
- There should be no talks with North Korea given its treatment of Warmbier and as long as it holds hostages
- Crippling sanctions need to be imposed on any entities in any country transacting with North Korea
Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter on "CNN's State of the Union" (July 9, 2017)
On his and former SecDef Perry's 2006 calls for a preemptive strike on North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs: "that was a very different circumstance"
On American preparedness for a North Korean nuclear attack:
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Of course. Of course. We've -- we've been -- we've been at this since 1953. I personally have been at it since 1974. We have consistently improved our military capabilities. South Korea's capabilities have improved. We have deployed missile defenses, both short-range and long-range, consistently in -- in advance of what we anticipate the North Koreans will be doing, so that we always stay one step ahead of them. So, we're very prepared. But I think it's important not to take the idea of military action on the Korean Peninsula or war lightly. And this is a situation in which we need to get North Korea and China in a corner, and not put our president in a corner.
Technical Analysis of North Korean Capabilities by 38 North
John Schilling: What is True and Not True About North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM: A Technical Evaluation (July 10, 2017)
Introduction:
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After the frenzy of technical speculation over the successful launch of North Korea’s Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the dust seems to be clearing and the emerging reality is that the North has an unreliable missile that can reach Alaska or Hawaii with a single nuclear warhead, and would be lucky to hit even a city-sized target. However, with a year or two of additional testing and development, it will likely become a missile that can reliably deliver a single nuclear warhead to targets along the US west coast, possibly with enough accuracy to destroy soft military targets like naval bases. In perhaps five years, North Korea may be able to incorporate a modest suite of decoys and penetration aids to challenge US missile defenses. Let’s hope US missile defenses are up to that challenge.
- The Hwasong-14 cannot carry multiple warheads or penetration aids at present, but probably will be able to carry the latter in several years. Multiple warheads would require at least a decade of nuclear and other tests to achieve
- The Hwasong-14 is new, but is based upon several previous North Korean missile designs, including the older Hwasong-12 and 13
- It can deliver a 500-600 kg nuclear payload with limited accuracy (similar to a U.S. Atlas and Thor ICBM) to targets on the U.S. west coast, with a CEP of a few miles
- More concerning than future MIRV possibilities are decoys and penetration aids to defeat U.S. missile defenses, which currently only work half the time during tests
- Although North Korea cannot built more ICBMs than U.S. interceptors, they can maintain a credible deterrent with a dozen decoys per ICBM
North Korea will probably try to imitate the UK’s Chevaline Program from the early 1970s, albeit while settling for less decoys per missile
Various: North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility: Probable Production of Additional Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons (July 14, 2017)
Introduction:
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Thermal imagery analysis of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center indicates that from September 2016 through June 2017:
- The Radiochemical Laboratory operated intermittently and there have apparently been at least two unreported reprocessing campaigns to produce an undetermined amount of plutonium that can further increase North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile. This suggests batch rather than continuous processing of spent fuel rods from the 5 MWe Reactor during the period of analysis.
- Increased thermal activity was noted at the Uranium Enrichment Facility. It is unclear if this was the result of centrifuge operations or maintenance operations. Centrifuge operations would increase the North’s enriched uranium inventory; however, based on imagery alone, it is not possible to conclude whether the plant is producing low or highly enriched uranium.
- The thermal patterns at the probable Isotope/Tritium Production Facility have remained consistent, suggesting that the facility is not operational, or is operating at a very low level. This means, the facility is likely not producing tritium, which is an essential isotope used in the production of boosted yield nuclear weapons and hydrogen bombs.
- From December 2016 through January 2017, the thermal pattern over the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) was elevated. While that might indicate that the reactor was operational, the likelihood is low since the pattern does not appear in subsequent imagery over the last six months. It is possible that there are alternative explanations for the elevated pattern, for example, short-term activity at the ELWR such as the heating of pipes to prevent freezing. Regardless, any activity at the ELWR is cause for concern and bears continued monitoring.
- The 5 MWe Reactor has either been intermittently operating at a low-level or not operating. The notable exception to this was during December 2016 and January 2017 when thermal patterns suggests a higher level of operations.
North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear weapons, U.S. analysts say
From The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world...=.c9578fd409ad
Introduction:
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North Korea has successfully produced a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can fit inside its missiles, crossing a key threshold on the path to becoming a full-fledged nuclear power, U.S. intelligence officials have concluded in a confidential assessment.
The new analysis completed last month by the Defense Intelligence Agency comes on the heels of another intelligence assessment that sharply raises the official estimate for the total number of bombs in the communist country’s atomic arsenal. The U.S. calculated last month that up to 60 nuclear weapons are now controlled by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Some independent experts believe the number of bombs is much smaller.
The findings are likely to deepen concerns about an evolving North Korean military threat that appears to be advancing far more rapidly than many experts had predicted. U.S. officials last month concluded that Pyongyang is also outpacing expectations in its effort to build an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking cities on the American mainland.
The secret to North Korea’s ICBM success: an engine
In Post 61 in JUly 2017, citing Michael Ellerman, ex-DoD and now IISS, amidst the linked report were two passages:
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Elleman, the former Pentagon missile expert, believes that North Korea’s newest missile engine has a similar past. The designs were most likely obtained years ago, through rogue scientists or on the black market, only to surface recently as part of a newly energized missile program.Elleman is preparing to publish an analysis comparing the engine used in the Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14 with the Soviet-era RD-250, using photos that highlight nearly identical features, including cooling tubes, exhaust nozzles and the four auxiliary engines that steer the rocket.
Today IISS has circulated a short online commentary by Mr Ellerman, that starts with:
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North Korea’s missile programme has made astounding strides over the past two years. An arsenal that had been based on short- and medium-range missiles along with an intermediate-range Musudan that repeatedly failed flight tests, has suddenly been supplemented by two new missiles: the intermediate-range Hwasong-12 and the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Hwasong-14. No other country has transitioned from a medium-range capability to an ICBM in such a short time. What explains this rapid progression? The answer is simple. North Korea has acquired a high-performance liquid-propellant engine (LPE) from a foreign source.
Available evidence clearly indicates that the LPE is based on the Soviet RD-250 family of engines, and has been modified to operate as the boosting force for the Hwasong-12 and -14. An unknown number of these engines were probably acquired though illicit channels operating in Russia and/or Ukraine. North Korea’s need for an alternative to the failing Musudan and the recent appearance of the RD-250 engine along with other evidence, suggests the transfers occurred within the past two years.
Link:https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voice...m-success-3abb
An oil embargo probably wouldn’t work
Nothing like a "cold shower", an IISS commentary available via the newly discovered Survival Editor's Blog:http://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20an...l-embargo-883b
It ends with:
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North Korea imports Chinese oil for the same reason that Germany imports Russian gas: because it is convenient (that is, economical) to do so. Would it be good news for North Korea if the oil stopped flowing? No. Is it likely to cripple the economy and force the government to change course on their foremost strategic priority? No. There are ample hydrocarbons in North Korea to substitute for those it imports from China, though maybe not 100% overnight. Overcoming Chinese opposition to an oil embargo, in other words, is unlikely to solve the larger problem.