Common misinterpretation of COIN and people focused
I have been tempted on several occasions to jump into this thread, but I resisted the urge only because sometimes these organizational culture issues seem so much like tilting at windmills. As a general rule, large bureaucratic organizations change slowly over time in response to its environment and needs of its constituency. I see the Army as no different for better or worse.
What prompted me to enter the fray was Wilf’s characterization of avante guarde COIN concepts. People-centric operations is commonly misconstrued as operations conducted solely in support of the people. This is not entirely the case, so at the great personal risk of looking silly due to over simplification…
It is fair to say that at least in the short-term – a population’s willingness to actively or passively support an insurgency comes at a price. Life does not immediately improve for the Average Joe when “Mr. Insurgent” is running around creating havoc and confusion. So why does Average Joe allow Mr. Insurgent to swim in his sea. Clearly there is some root cause/grievance that resonates with Average Joe – and he makes a bet on the come-line that his lot will improve with the removal of the current regime, and this makes the short-term “inconvenience” bearable.
If I as the counter-insurgent understand: Average Joe’s root cause/grievance; who Average Joe holds accountable and expects to fix his problem; and I understand how Mr Insurgent will leverage Average Joe’s problem; I now stand a chance of predicting in some sense what Mr. Insurgent will do. Hence my actions become proactive rather than reactive. I take the “fight” to the insurgent, Average Joe become less willing to allow Mr Insurgent to swim in his sea because I deny Mr. Insurgent the ability to portray his solution as a credible alternative.
If I view the environment through the eyes of Average Joe, the precision of both my kinetic and non-kinetic operations improves. If I foster conditions that deny Mr. Insurgent the freedom of movement and demonstrate (from Average Joe’s perspective) the folly of Mr. Insurgent’s vision of the future, I win.
Live well and row
Good post, Hacksaw. But. (he said...)
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Originally Posted by
Hacksaw
I have been tempted on several occasions to jump into this thread, but I resisted the urge only because sometimes these organizational culture issues seem so much like tilting at windmills...
Ain't that the truth... :wry:
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It is fair to say that at least in the short-term – a population’s willingness to actively or passively support an insurgency comes at a price. Life does not immediately improve for the Average Joe when “Mr. Insurgent” is running around creating havoc and confusion. So why does Average Joe allow Mr. Insurgent to swim in his sea. Clearly there is some root cause/grievance that resonates with Average Joe – and he makes a bet on the come-line that his lot will improve with the removal of the current regime, and this makes the short-term “inconvenience” bearable.
That is correct -- in some cases -- in others (and this can and does occur in the same insurgency / nation / time) he allows him to swim because he's afraid (terrified, literally on occasion...) and so reluctantly not only allows him to swim but will and even scout, warn, feed and fetch and carry for the swimmers. Obviously, if the swimmers bring money and the local economy has need of an infusion of coins, the reluctance to help is dissipated to an extent. There are variations on all three themes. My observation has been that the fear quotient is usually a greater determinant than is the grievance factor which in turn transcends the economic aspect (with some local variations). I submit this is true today in both Afghanistan and Iraq and while I don't know enough to address the Philippines, my sensing is that it is true there as well.
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If I as the counter-insurgent understand: Average Joe’s root cause/grievance; who Average Joe holds accountable and expects to fix his problem; and I understand how Mr Insurgent will leverage Average Joe’s problem; I now stand a chance of predicting in some sense what Mr. Insurgent will do. Hence my actions become proactive rather than reactive. I take the “fight” to the insurgent, Average Joe become less willing to allow Mr Insurgent to swim in his sea because I deny Mr. Insurgent the ability to portray his solution as a credible alternative.
True, more true if you add in the removal of the fear factor. Acknowledging that factor is harder to un-leverage...
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If I view the environment through the eyes of Average Joe, the precision of both my kinetic and non-kinetic operations improves. If I foster conditions that deny Mr. Insurgent the freedom of movement and demonstrate (from Average Joe’s perspective) the folly of Mr. Insurgent’s vision of the future, I win.
I'd add:
"and provide good assurance or evidence that you can remove or severely constrain the fear factor and at least some assurance it will not easily return."
Coersion is a mighty motivator
Ken,
I concur with all regarding coersion, my only caveat is that I acknowledged upfront that I was going to offer an overly simple arguement...
I would note that from a counter-insurgent perspective that Mr Coersive Insurgent is probably an easier problem to solve than the charismatic insurgent with a vision, since its hard for even the most irrational mind to see a future in decapitation.
However, I would agrue that getting in front of Mr "I Cut of Heads" Insurgent is still best accomplished by viewing the situation as it is through the eyes of Average Joe, than it is through any type of shaping of the situation. If I know the enemy is using coersion, then I can best anticipate his actions and interdict/kill/capture by determining what pressure point he is using to coerse Average Joe.
Again over simplification, but...
If as a first step in the plans/ops process, we, the counterinsurgent, understand the environment - and most importantly view the environment through the eyes of other actors (both the fish and the sea) - and set aside (at least initially) our proclivity to try and shape/bend the environment through the force of our actions... The relevance of our COIN Ops to their intended purpose will improve (significantly).
My good friend Gian, and he is a good friend, usually gets stuck here. I don't want to put words in his mouth - but here I go - this is viewed as somehow a passive form of operations because we are not imposing our will on the enemy...
Reader Advisory...I'm about to go on a stream of consciousness riff...
This confuses speed/violence with OPTEMPO. OPTEMPO is getting inside the oppornents OODA loop. To do that most effectively, our actions must have a detrimental impact on the opponents ability to operate coherently. Since I love poor analogies... I equate this to toughman competitions. The brawler you see in toughmen competitions who throws haymakers by the second but connects with nothing are not forcing a skillful opponent to do anything - especially if the opponent is adaptive - rather the brawler is just wearing himself out to only his own great satisfaction. Or put another way, a not so wise GO once told me that the 101st makes decisions at 140 mph (while discussing plans for Korea) -- to which the inner dialogue inside my head said "we also get our a$$ in a crack at the same rate".
whew... talking gibberish is exhausting...
and Gian that was just to see if you have dug yourself out of the snow on the banks of the Hudson.
Live well and row
Thanks for the good reponse.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Hacksaw
...I would note that from a counter-insurgent perspective that Mr Coersive Insurgent is probably an easier problem to solve than the charismatic insurgent with a vision, since its hard for even the most irrational mind to see a future in decapitation.
I think that's rather situation dependent. In many cases, it's true, in some societies it will not be. The vast majority of people in any case will always really just want to be left alone and thus will hew to a vision only as far as it suits for the moment. Head Chopping is more durable and leaves a more lasting impression so the degree of force and method of application will be the determinant.
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However, I would agrue that getting in front of Mr "I Cut of Heads" Insurgent is still best accomplished by viewing the situation as it is through the eyes of Average Joe, than it is through any type of shaping of the situation. If I know the enemy is using coersion, then I can best anticipate his actions and interdict/kill/capture by determining what pressure point he is using to coerse Average Joe.
Agree -- but would point out that the pressure point determination is the wild card.
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If as a first step in the plans/ops process, we, the counterinsurgent, understand the environment - and most importantly view the environment through the eyes of other actors (both the fish and the sea) - and set aside (at least initially) our proclivity to try and shape/bend the environment through the force of our actions... The relevance of our COIN Ops to their intended purpose will improve (significantly).
Totally agree. Now, about that proclivity -- and the one year tour with successive tours in different AOs... :D
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My good friend Gian, and he is a good friend, usually gets stuck here. I don't want to put words in his mouth - but here I go - this is viewed as somehow a passive form of operations because we are not imposing our will on the enemy...
Gian is a good guy and I agree with him on many things but sometimes in order to impose your will on the enemy you have to know where he is and what he's doing and in some cases, particularly in COIN, that's not as readily apparent as it is in more conventional combat. I agree with the structured application of violence, I just think one has to know where to apply how much with some exactitude.
Quote:
Reader Advisory...I'm about to go on a stream of consciousness riff...
That's always a good thing... :D
Quote:
This confuses speed/violence with OPTEMPO. OPTEMPO is getting inside the oppornents OODA loop. To do that most effectively, our actions must have a detrimental impact on the opponents ability to operate coherently. Since I love poor analogies... I equate this to toughman competitions. The brawler you see in toughmen competitions who throws haymakers by the second but connects with nothing are not forcing a skillful opponent to do anything - especially if the opponent is adaptive - rather the brawler is just wearing himself out to only his own great satisfaction. Or put another way, a not so wise GO once told me that the 101st makes decisions at 140 mph (while discussing plans for Korea) -- to which the inner dialogue inside my head said "we also get our a$$ in a crack at the same rate".
whew... talking gibberish is exhausting...
Not gibberish; makes total sense to me and I very much agree -- and I'm not a Gibber. Er, well, I don't think I am. We need not ask my family or friends their opinions... ;)