The Poppy and The Greenback
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009...est=latestnews
"U.S. Debating Payoffs to Afghan Poppy Growers
Obama administration is considering whether to pay off Afghan farmers to stop them from growing heroin poppies on contract for the Taliban, senior officials told the Associated Press. "
The article goes on to express concern that farmers will take the cash and still grow their poppies. It would be stupid to grease their palms with cash and ask them not to grow, rather let them plant and before the crops near maturity, pay them high market value then destroy the crop(s). The taliban then has to extort money from the farmers and that makes them like us.
Civilian deaths in A'Stan
Can't have metrics without strategic goals
I think the metrics argument puts the cart before the horse. Yes, we need better metrics to assess the situation on the ground. But the problem is that in the absence of a solid strategic framework the metrics become the strategy -- maximizing the "good" stuff you choose to count becomes progress, minimizing the "bad" becomes a cause for concern.
Now, in truth, an a priori determined set of metrics would be better than what we were doing in the early days of Iraq, which was essentially letting ideology determine whether we were winning regardless of facts on the ground.
But nevertheless, until we can get the administration to do better than define success in Afghanistan as "we'll know it when we see it." Any exercise at developing metrics is premature.
--BF
Afghanistan's imperfect democracy
National Post
8/20/09
We wish Afghanistan's society were more like our own. We wish that there weren't so much corruption, that the domestic military and police were more competent and professional, that death sentences were no longer issued for Muslims who convert to other faiths and that laws permitting wife-beating weren't passed.
Then again, if Afghanistan already were a stable, humane and modern democracy, there would have been no need for our troops to deploy there in the first place.
(snip)
Steve Coll's short column
Steve Coll's taut piece on the arguing over Afghanistan: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...tml#entry-more
Note the links to General McChrystal's guidance -v- Rory Stewart's critique.
davidbfpo
Well, if the CFR consensus is that it is a war of choice, it almost certainly is not.
If the foreign policy establishment is looking in one direction, it behooves someone to look in several others. Their track record isn't too good...
Actually, the war in Afghanistan is of course a war of choice. That, however, does not preclude it also being a war of necessity. It need not have been but it became and it is now necessary. Contrary to what Haas says, it was not necessary in the first place -- Foreign Policy errors led to the attack that led to Afghanistan -- but it is now necessary. So he has it exactly backwards.
Haas says that the Korean War and the Persian Gulf war were wars of necessity. Went to the first, stepped back and allowed a son to go to the second -- neither was a war of necessity in any sense until we committed to them. Then they also became necessary. Same Son has also been to the current two and seems to think they were wars of choice that became necessary. As he said to me once "We either finish it now or we'll be back in ten years." I made much the same comment about the 1991 war -- pillars of the foreign policy establishment didn't agree...
Haas misses the point that the secret is to not commit to such wars unless they are truly necessary lest such commitment become a matter of displaying national integrity and responsibility in finishing what one started. Prating about the national interest should consider that it is in our interest to avoid unnecessary conflicts but if engaged we must do our very best.
I am reminded of one pillow (sic) of our Foreign Policy Establishment and her asinine quote leading to the foolishness that was Kosovo. “What is the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if you can't use it?”
Haas also says this:
Quote:
"...no one should forget that doing more in Afghanistan lessens our ability to act elsewhere, including North Korea, Iran and Iraq. There needs to be a limit to what the United States does in Afghanistan and how long it is prepared to do it, lest we find ourselves unable to contend with other wars, of choice or of necessity, if and when they arise."
While certainly a case of stating the obvious -- to an extent that is both inane and patronizing, a difficult feat -- it also shows the banal and short sighted outlook of that foreign policy establishment.
And to make things even more difficult...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bernard Finel
I think the metrics argument puts the cart before the horse. Yes, we need better metrics to assess the situation on the ground. But the problem is that in the absence of a solid strategic framework the metrics become the strategy -- maximizing the "good" stuff you choose to count becomes progress, minimizing the "bad" becomes a cause for concern.
Now, in truth, an a priori determined set of metrics would be better than what we were doing in the early days of Iraq, which was essentially letting ideology determine whether we were winning regardless of facts on the ground.
But nevertheless, until we can get the administration to do better than define success in Afghanistan as "we'll know it when we see it." Any exercise at developing metrics is premature.
--BF
...any metric you can measure change in within a 4-year period IS NOT STRATEGIC.
Perhaps this is why we muck around in strategy-less tactics; they may not be taking you anyplace you want to be, but at least you can measure how fast you are getting there!