Conventional and Unconventional Wars
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Originally Posted by
Infanteer
"Clear, Hold, Build" makes sense as a general concept of ops - I wouldn't say it is a novel novel; didn't we have to do that to the Germans in Paris in 1944? "Small war" and "big war" just refers to how many players and how much lead is moving around.
One of the big differences between conventional wars such as World War II and the ones going on now is the considerable reduction in the role of fire support. This is done to avoid collateral damage and the effect it has on winning "hearts and minds."
The role of infantry described below is from the Paul F. Gorman monograph "The Secret of Future Victories" in the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It might even arouse some people from their holiday torpor. :p
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In 1971, Lieutenant General W.E. DePuy, in a lecture at Fort Benning, took issue with the standard formulation of the mission of infantry pointing out that in World War II, per his recollection, what an infantry company really accomplished on any given day was not to 'close with and destroy the enemy,' but rather to move its artillery forward observer to the next hill. His views were not well received by his audience, but he was accurately reflecting the fact that the most important success of the U.S. Army in World War II must be attributed to its artillery ordnance and technique.
I'm aroused from my holiday torpor...
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Originally Posted by
Pete
One of the big differences between conventional wars such as World War II and the ones going on now is the considerable reduction in the role of fire support.
Not collateral damage avoidance, scarcity of targets. Different wars entirely. Little WW II experience in NW Europe is relative outside NW Europe...
"but he was accurately reflecting the fact that the most important success of the U.S. Army in World War II must be attributed to its artillery ordnance and technique." The flaw in much of that statement by DePuy is that it stuck in the minds of many young impressionable CPTs who later became Flag Officers and who proceeded to fight major land wars in Europe while actually confronting far different enemies with very different TTP and cultural attributes (yes, culture matters in wars other than COIN fights) in such diverse places as Korea, Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq. How did that work out for us?
Every war is different and formative experiences need to be carefully winnowed lest they lead people -- even entire Armies -- astray.
Which brings up a question. I know why FOs were Officers in WW I and even WW II -- because they could read and count. Why are they being wasted as FOs today?
I'm aware of that, honest.
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Originally Posted by
Pete
Ken, the U.S. Army was all but out of the Vietnam War when DePuy said that in 1971.
I'm also aware of the fact that we really misused Artillery in Viet Nam. Badly. All of which elides the fact that DePuy was guilty of selling snake oil.
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We've had enlisted forward observers of MOS 13F for several decades now.
I'm also aware of 13Fs (Fire Support Specialist; and their predecessor MOSC, 2705 IIRC) -- they were around before I retired, in fact they were around when I was in Korea and in Viet Nam. They were even around in WW II...
That still doesn't explain why THE FO is still an officer even though the NCOs on the FIST or COLT or JTAC can do it as well or better than most of the 2LTs. Could it possibly have something to do with Branch Officer Strength? Thus future promotion opportunities...
It was an academic question in any event -- the new JTAC AGOS courses will aim for 13Fs and some 18 series. So we're finally getting a bit smarter. My intent was to point out we used to ride to work on elephants but we no longer do that. The corollary is that Officers as FO were needed in WW I, possibly desirable in WW II and have not really been necessary for effective functioning of field artillery since then.
Point being that we change but we change too slowly because people don't like change and they get stuck in the past -- and they try to carry what worked in one war forward to do the same thing in another war (that seldom works well...).
That and that the Personnel system is screwed up...
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During the First World War battery commanders or other battery officers were the forward observers, the old "command observation post."
Initially, others were added by late 1918 and WW II saw Officers as Forward Observers everywhere. Initially because they had math skills and they've been around ever since. Waste of Officers...
Overwatch predates DePuy by many years.
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Originally Posted by
Pete
When DePuy was at TRADOC he did a lot for the infantry, such as defining the infantry movement techniques of traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch.
I was taught overwatch movement techniques as a 15 year old NG Pvt by a bunch of WW II vets, got to practice it as a Marine in Korea where it was SOP for all movement. Cavalry and Infantry used overwatch for years, centuries even, before DePuy was born
The best thing DePuy did at TRADOC was consolidate the three different Track Vehicle Mechanic Schools and insist the new school at Knox teach all tracked vehicles. Most of the rest of his 'reforms' were tacking names on things and standardizing training literature. Needed to be done but it was not innovative. DePuy was a good commander (not least because he relieved inept subordinates -- much to PersCom's chagrin :D) and he did good at TRADOC -- but he was formed by WW II in NW Europe and he never let it go. He was and is not alone in that shortfall...
Lind doesn't know what he's talking about, as usual...
That quote from him is wrong on virtually every level. That generation of warfare foolishness will get more people killed than will lack of fire support. His allegation is true with respect to some commanders but most know better; most infantry can operate quite well with their own mortars and do not need or want Arty or Air unless it's really bad. That "Firepower conquers, the infantry occupies." dictum is as bad as DePuys comment; there's a time and place for artillery and there are times and place where it is superfluous. I'd like to see Lind in a fighting hole and watch an average Rifle Platoon from the 82d move through...:D
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Inevitably, its casualties will rise, and it will often lose engagements.
The first statement is correct -- goes with the job; more patrols, more contacts. The second is TBD; my bet is that it's wrong more often than not (all US units are not equal :( ).
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Originally Posted by
Pete
in any event I think both were exaggerating to make a point.
Invalid point, IMO. Poorly stated in both cases as well. However, I suspect both believed what they said. Pity...
In 1973, TRADOC and FORSCOM were activated.
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Originally Posted by
Pete
The monograph I added the link to in my message above includes a discussion on how infantry training changed in about 1973. Perhaps it's what you were speaking of the other day.
They immediately started to wake waves so their initial Commanders could make an impression on their watch. Some improvements were made in OBC and the Career Course at the Infantry School.
The training process I cited was developed in the mid-70s and TRADOC foisted the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) and the FM 25 series with that Task, Condition and Standard dumb-down in the late 70s and it was fully implemented Army wide by the early 80s. Unfortunately.
Note the name, Battalion Tng Mgmt Sys -- that's because a lot of Bn Cdrs in Viet Nam discovered in the 1968-73 period that they had few Captains and few Senior NCOs but a slew of 2LTs and SGTs (who were mostly NCO Candidate Course graduates). They were all great and smart kids, would do anything you asked them to -- but they didn't know much tactically, so the two LTCs who commanded the typical Bn for a year in VN learned to micromanage. The training system they then developed reflected that micromanagement. Dumber than a box of hammers. They should have better trained the 2LTs and SGTs...
As I haven't seen one, I find it difficult to be impressed.
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Originally Posted by
Pete
I gather then that you weren't overly impressed by the "Revolution in Military Affairs"?
There is no revolution, war hasn't changed a bit -- but warfare always changes due to technological and societal changes. That change is always incremental. Been that way for over 5,000 years.