Saw that but am searching for more depth
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Originally Posted by
selil
Ken in the previous article the author discusses the addition of a BAR to each squad and the removal of the carbine. The idea appears to make a squad with heavier weapons and more fire power, but remove the flexibility.
in his rationale. The BAR was not an ideal solution to the problem but it was what was available at the time due to Ordnance corps failures to push the envelope. It worked and adding one to the squad was beneficial.
The Carbine was a good and reliable weapon, functionally and it was light and handy -- unfortunately, it was not a man stopper due to an inadequate cartridge. Shame, really but it did need to go on that basis. Those comments are based on using both weapons at one time or another.
I'll forego comment on the 5.56... :mad:
If that's what he said, he was wrong.
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Originally Posted by
selil
Then we're likely in fair agreement then Ken. An Army Major told me something the other night and that was that the BAR actually took three to run. One to pull the trigger, one to load, and one to carry/replenish ammo. Hope I haven't mangled that. Seems like the squad automatic weapon was an attempt to reach the ultimate of having BAR/M60 like capability with a single troop carrying/deploying it. My preference though is for flexibility and sustainability with standardized ammunition, weapons in the squad reinforced as needed by other heavier weapons.
The BAR used 20 rd magazines, the BAR man needed no help in loading. No one routinely carried extra ammunition for the BAR though it was done on rare occasions (METT-TC again). The BAR Man had a BAR Belt. One model that carried 20 magazines, 400 rounds plus one in the weapon for 21 mags / 420 rounds, more than enough for most situations, another that carried 12 mags but that was issued with two six mag bandoliers for a total of 24 mags / 480 rds -- the idea was that the bandoliers could be carried by Riflemen in the squad; said Riflemen quickly figured out the solution to that was to lose their bandolier.... Links:
LINK.
LINK
The two imperatives were that the BAR Man be a little guy (harder to hit) and that if he got hit, the nearest man took the weapon and ammo to keep the weapon in play.
Agree with the rest of your comment.
Belt feds, like all weapons, have pluses and minuses.
For the Infantry platoon, the negatives are bothersome, not least that the weapons are heavy and unwieldy -- and they fire up too much Ammo in different packaging (the two biggest problems). The Model 1944 Johnson was a good compromise in all directions but was doomed by politics. Having worked with everything from the BAR through the M1919A6, the M14E2, M60 (several variants), M240, an experimental M16 w/ heavy barrel and the MG 3 and a couple of exotics, a heavy barrel AR that has adequate mag capacity would be ideal. The 249 is not great but slides by.
The Ultimax has merit, so does this LINK -- it fires semi-auto from a closed bolt and full auto from an open bolt, ala the FG42 and the Johnsons.
2 Squads: 1 for fire suppression; 1 for the assault.
I began re-thinking the way infantrymen should be organized to fight and which battle drill techniques should be used in various combat situations a little over 12 years ago, when one of my colleagues -a LtC at the time- sent me a report prepared for the U.S.Army's Command and General Staff College on the Russian-Chechnya War (about 1994).
The Russians were tied to their vehicles. They rode those vehicles until they triggered an ambush by the Chechnyas. The Chechnyas did not have the weapons to match the Russians of course; but they deployed a mix of semi-automatic riflemen and rocket-propelled grenadiers quite effectively.
The Chechnyas used the RPGs to frighten and disrupt the Russians. They didn't seem as concerned with scoring direct hits on the vehicles (once first and last had been immobilized), as they were with making noise and spreading shrapnel. The riflemen took careful aim to shoot the leaders and soldiers as they tried to move. Apparently, the ambushes were set up so that the kill zones were more than 200 meters away from the positions taken up by the Chechnyas. This meant that the Russians could not easily "assault" their way out of the kill zone to break up the ambush; and their "5.something" ammunition could do no more than "spray and pray" in the general direction of where the fire was coming from.
This got me thinking that infantry units must be able to pour intense effective and well-aimed fire on positions 400 meters or more away; and at the same time infantry must be able to assault positions with high intensity short-range automatic weapons as well. I eventually came up with a 48-man platoon, divided into a 22-man "firing squad" with 7.62mm MGs and semi-automatic rifles, a 22-man "assault squad" with 5.56mm assault rifles and 40mm grenade launchers, and a HQ unit of 4 (PLdr, PSgt, 2 RTOs). (I realize now that these would be more properly called "sections" rather than "squads".) On the move and in firing positions, the teams within these squads (sections) would be blended by the PL, just as MGs were blended into the infantry squads by PLs in days gone by.
The "firing squad", equivalent to 2 German infantry squads of the 1940-43 era, would be capable of all the tasks traditionally assigned to infantrymen over the past 70 years, including the assault. But the weapons mix would be more effective at 200+ meters than the small caliber weapons which became standard in the post-Korean War era. I have read that some U.S. infantrymen in Iraq have used heavier caliber weapons when clearing buildings, because 5.56mm ammunition cannot penetrate doors or ceilings. So, even at close quarters larger caliber rifles can give the infantryman some advantages.
I realize that this discussion is intended to focus on the composition of the squad. But, after reading the reports from places like the Korengal Valley in Afghanistan, the city of Falluja in Iraq, and many other places, it is hard to look at the squad of 8-13 men as capable of winning any of these confrontations alone, without incorporating more soldiers and more weapons in the fight. And I still cannot figure out how anyone gets out of a HUMVEE under fire without getting hit by fire.
Viewpoints and criticisms welcome!
METT-TC rules - but reality can impact even that...
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Originally Posted by
AGBrina
...I realize that this discussion is intended to focus on the composition of the squad. But, after reading the reports from places like the Korengal Valley in Afghanistan, the city of Falluja in Iraq, and many other places, it is hard to look at the squad of 8-13 men as capable of winning any of these confrontations alone, without incorporating more soldiers and more weapons in the fight. And I still cannot figure out how anyone gets out of a HUMVEE under fire without getting hit by fire.
One could organize any echelon from the Squad upward to best accommodate the fight of the moment and the terrain and enemy at hand. However, doing so significantly complicates equipping and training the force to a possibly unacceptable degree. Not least due to the fact (present today in both theaters) that a low intensity fight can turn high intensity in a few minutes with disastrous consequences unless units are flexible enough to cope.
Better therefor to have a fixed organization that offers flexibility to adapt to circumstances and most current organizations do that well enough. Not perfectly -- well enough. and that's okay.
Multiple weapon calibers at Platoon level can be accommodated but are a burden. That burden is sustainable in the current two major theaters at current conflict levels but would not be supportable in a major war or even a short but high intensity conflict. Even four calibers (9mm, 5.56mm, 7.62mm, 40mm) push the envelope; for Afghanistan and Iraq add two more (.50 cal, 40mm High Velocity) and it's still bearable due to the low intensity but in a big moving war, it would be a tremendous burden and the likelihood of shortfalls in supply could be potentially disastrous. A far better solution would be to minimize caliber proliferation by a better multi-purpose round plus a grenade of >25mm.
On the HMMWV question, depends on the type. If it's an open truck, just hop out (not getting hit probability 65:35 * ); if it's Armored, it'll take longer to get out and you're more likely to get hit but the same technique is used after opening the door; just hop out (not getting hit probability 55:45). A better solution is to not get caught under fire (not getting hit probability 95:5). Not always easy but doable more often than not if one knows what one is doing and trusts one's instincts.
Best not to hold our breath on a single effective caliber...
* All probabilitiy estimates by author, YMMV.
Once upon a time I was told by a good and
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
......and here lies the problem! People tend to listen to highly respected and experienced old war horses such as yourself, and this is a problem for chaps such as myself, (never been in a serious war) when it comes to tracking down the source of your dissatisfaction, or attempting to apply method and logic to platoon doctrine. If decisions are based on observation and anecdote, then there is no chain of evidence or discovery to track and error check. Almost always there is a disconnect between the observation and what testing shows. This is the problem.
experienced training developer that the most dangerous thing in the world was "an old sweat..." True and your comment illustrates why. I would submit however, that in the case of the M1/M2 .30 cal Carbine cartridge there's enough anecdotal evidence of multiple round hits that did not stop a charging pumped-up adversary to show validity. Admittedly, a much large number were stopped by the Carbine. Whether the issue becomes critical thus, I submit, depends upon whether your Carbine shots were successful or not...
I swapped your second paragraph and the first:
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As an ad hoc measure, I can see the sense, but I submit it compounded the problem in the long run because Marshall's reasoning was faulty.
All war is ad hocery to the tenth power...
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so would it be a mistake to have a GPMG squad? In a 30 man platoon you might have 4 x 5 man "Rifle Teams" and 2 x 5 man "GPMG Teams".
In my opinion, yes. Machine guns work best when controlled by experienced leaders and crews, in pairs and in laying down a heavy volume of long range (on occasion), accurate suppressive fire. To get there requires training and a separate regimen and even mental outlook form the "Go get 'em" attitude required in an Infantry Squad / Section or Platoon.
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Mk48 is now the 7.62mm Minimi, and very promising. Of course you could just go and get the HK 21E for about half the price!!
Problem with both those weapons is overall reliability in an infantry at war environment -- that is a very harsh environment in a great many respects, unlike the SOF DA envirionment with a far higher standard of training and a far smaller exposure to constant rugged conditions over extended periods. I submit that both are too lightly constructed to endure in an infantry at war environment; they were purposely lightened to save weight and the flaw, for the infantry GPMG role, is that such lightening encourages the use of the MG as an AR substitute. My belief is that neither is rugged enough to survive proper usage in the infantry.
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Care to add detail? This is intriguing and if you have spoken to this before, then it passed under my radar.
See the comment above re: training and employment; add supply / resupply of ammo; the need for a heavier caliber / more range than is required for assault elements; and the predilection of humans to misemploy things unless structural bars are emplaced to preclude or at least impede such misuse.
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I see a role for belt fed 7.62mm GPMGs in the platoon, but only one or two. I still see no role of a 5.56mm belt fed weapon.
OTOH, I see a role for two GPMG (.338??? ;) to go with the Co Sniper section...) per platoon held and trained in a Company level MG platoon with adequate ammo bearers but agree totally on no 5.56 belt fed for the infantry. SOF and some mech / MP uses for such a weapon possibly exist though perhaps not enough IMO to justify the logistic problems of another weapon system.