Making the Kremlin believe it’s more advantageous to cooperate is quite difficult
Thanks to a "lurker" for this interview of a Riga, Estonia based SME on hybrid warfare, Russia and more. It starts with:
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The West has to understand the way of Russian military thinking in order to be able to respond to the Kremlin’s moves. Russia is unlikely to invade the Baltic states, however, it will be worth it to pay attention to Belarus this year. Although “hybrid warfare” is the most commonly used term for referring to Russian activities in Ukraine, there is no agreed definition of the terms related to it. In your recent study, you stated that “hybrid is wrong” and New Generation Warfare should be used instead. What is your argumentation?
Link:http://visegradinsight.eu/new-generation-warfare/
Russians in Estonia: A Case Study in Offensive Structural Realism
From Cody Zilhaver at The Strategy Bridge: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-br...ctural-realism
Introduction:
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Russia’s power politics, demonstrated through its nationalistic tendencies, have the biggest influence on Estonia’s national security. Russia maintains a capability to influence a quarter of Estonia’s population who speak Russian, most of whom are disenfranchised by the government and are highly susceptible to Russian coercion through modern mainstream media emanating from Moscow. Due to these circumstances, Russia is in a position to cultivate Russian nationalism and influence Russian speakers in Estonia, who can elect leaders that will return Estonia back to Russia’s sphere of influence and undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. An alternative view is that Estonia’s NATO membership provides enough security to dissuade Russia from exerting its influence in Estonia. In rebuttal, I offer that Russia’s potential to leverage Estonia’s democratic process to enact laws and policies sympathetic to Russia, renders Estonia’s membership in NATO irrelevant and incapable of mitigating this threat.
Highlights:
- Estonia highly vulnerable to Russian dominance due to its proximity to Russia, its history as a former Russian/Soviet subject and its large Russophone minority that includes a large marginalized component.
- Russia’s behavior in Georgia and Ukraine is exemplar of “structural offensive realism as described by Mearsheimer: “it makes good strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible”.
- Russia believes that consolidation of power is necessary to protect its territories from a surprise attack such as in 1941.
- NATO competes directly with Russia for security through a structural realist system, described by Posen as the “anarchical condition of international politics”.
- As Jervis explains, “a security dilemma exists when a state tries to increase its security by decreasing the security of others”.
- Estonia is caught in the security struggle between Russia and NATO.
- Russophones comprise 25% of the Estonian population, although 2/3 of these don’t speak Estonian. Only 1/3 have Estonian citizenship and speak Estonian, with the 2/3 divided between half who are citizens of Russia but not Estonia, and half who are stateless. These latter two groups are very open to influence by Russia and are able to participate to some extent in Estonia's democratic institutions.
- Although NATO protects Estonia from the Russian military, Estonia is very susceptible to non-military measures such as using legitimate democratic political processes to advance Russian interests.
Baltic Standoff Highlights Cold War ‘Lite’ Between Russia and NATO
From the Jamestown Foundation: https://jamestown.org/program/baltic...e-russia-nato/
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 88
By: Pavel Felgenhauer
June 29, 2017 04:26 PM Age: 13 mins
Introduction:
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has completed its plan, announced last year (July 9, 2016) at the Alliance’s Warsaw Summit, to deploy four multinational battalions to Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania as a counter to the apparent Russian threat on its eastern flank, in the Baltic region. Speaking from Brussels a week ago (June 20), NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced, “NATO has fulfilled its promise to deploy the four battalions to defend our Alliance, deter aggression and keep the peace. The deployment is now complete, and they are fully operational.” A day earlier, the last allied combat contingent—from Canada—arrived in Latvia. Overall more than 4,000 soldiers from 15 countries—Canada, Albania, the United States, Spain, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Norway, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France and Romania—have been deployed (Militarynews.ru, June 20).
- Stoltenberg exaggeratingly refers to these multinational battalions as “NATO battlegroups”
- The U.S. has increased its combat presence in Europe from two brigades to three
- The increase in forces remains at the level of a tripwire and the multinational aspect is a handicap operationally, but it signals to Moscow that an attack on the Baltics would start a war with most, if not all NATO members
- Moscow is also increasing its capabilities by creating 20 new military units in the WMD and 40 new bases
- The WMD has more than 30 ready Battalion Tactical Groups, and readiness has increased 2.5X since 2016
- The Russian military is deliberately exaggerating the threat from NATO in order to increase its funding and social status, but this is causing a costly standoff
- European countries are increasing their defense spending and readiness, but the Russian military-industrial-intelligence complex seems to desire this contest
- The Russian people, however, do not fear NATO as a threat so much as the U.S., and because of Russian propaganda about Russia’s military prowess, they believe that they are secure (whereas in 2015, more than 2/3 feared an imminent foreign invasion)
- The Kremlin will struggle to bridge the gap between public perceptions of the threat and its own alarmist rhetoric
It is a fire-rushing, not a swastika sign!
This picture does not appear to be on a public building, however distasteful and the cited source / report starts with:
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During the festivities, Saldū was decorated with a building, which caused confusion among the inhabitants. The council, on the other hand, is comforting - the rules are not violated, because the creepy dcor is a fire-rushing, not a swastika sign.....this year the owner of the ornament decided to give preference to the ancient Latvian folklore sign of fire - ugunskrustam," explains Dina Neimeta, a social and international relations specialist of the Saldus District Council.
For more images of thehttps://ztzks.wordpress.com/perkona-zime/ symbol:
Strange to some I agree, I have no doubt there will be offensive displayed symbols elsewhere.