The realm of the hypothetical is a marvelously flexible place.
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Alternative history leads to really dangerous fantasies... :mad:
As does cherry-picking historical analysis to find one opinion that you happen to agree with.... Especially these days, when every two-bit joker with a blogspot account is suddenly considered an expert...:wry:
of Vietnam (about a decade after the fact) is found in his forward to Infantry Magazine (Garland), A Distant Challenge:
Leaving aside the rhetoric, GEN Westmoreland came to see Southeast Asia (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) as the prize, which Vietnam helped to preserve from communism.Quote:
A Distant Challenge: The U.S. Infantryman in Vietnam, 1967-1972
Infantry Magazine
LTC Albert N. Garland, USA (Ret.)
Foreward
Indeed, history may judge that American aid to South Vietnam constituted one of man's more noble crusades, one that had less to do with the domino theory and a strategic interest for the United States than with the simple equation of a strong nation helping an aspiring nation to reach a point where it had some reasonable chance to achieve and keep a degree of freedom and humanv dignity. It remains a fact that few countries have ever engaged in such idealistic magnanimity; and no gain or attempted gain for human freedom can be discounted.
Although in the end a political default, it is now clearly evident that there was an ironic strategic dividend to our presence in Vietnam; namely the impact of the American military "holding the line" for ten years against communist pressures on Southeast Asia thus provided for the Asian countries (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) a shield and hence a breathing spell toward development of greater political matrurity and self confidence as nations. It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world.
William C. Westmoreland
April 1983
PS: We won the Southeast Asian War Games.
Regards
Mike
So Mark Moyar's argument that the war in Vietnam kept Indonesia non-Communist (incidentally causing the deaths of nearly a million people in Indonesia) was originally a Westy canard? Good to see he was still trotting out the domino theory even in the 1980s.
Canard = An unfounded or false, deliberately misleading fabrication, a false report, rumour or hoax.
What specific language in Westmoreland's 1983 piece is a canard ?
What variant of the "domino theory" do you assert that Westmoreland was following in 1983 ?
His description of SE Asian geopolitics appears to be more like such:
Attachment 1252
Should we call this the "almost domino theory" ?
It reads:
"It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world. Bold emphasis in original, underline added by me / kw)"
Agree with JMM -- no canard there. If you choose to think '"...events in Indochina..." refer solely to the Viet Nam war, your prerogative. Throwing out the Russians was due to the USSR attempting to muscularly support the PKI to the exclusion of Sukarno who disagreed with that idea. The PKI and the Confrontation were more significant catalysts to the 1965 coup regardless of Westmoreland's statement -- which may or may not be what he really thought. Those two items and Suharto's desire for power mean Viet Nam was really only a peripheral event.
There is plenty of literature about the Vietnam War.
Despite that, can any of you readers of SWJ recommend works (books, articles, etc) concerning the Vietnam War historiography with a specifically focus on COIN and how the American decision makers viewed and applied between COIN versus conventional warfare during the conflict?
I am very interested in the different positions in the historiography.
Thanks in advance.
This is actually something of a "bone of contention" among historians at the moment. One of the more balanced treatments, even though it is older, is Palmer's The 25 Year War. Nagl's "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" is interesting mainly for the way it examines how the Army learned (or failed to learn) from Vietnam. It is NOT a history of the Vietnam War, but rather an examination of organizational learning. Krepinevich and "The Army in Vietnam" takes an opposing view, seeing the war as mostly a COIN-type effort that was ignored by Big Army.
My advice? Start with Palmer and then work your way around.
somewhat akin to the 1000 lawyers in chains sinking to the ocean floor. :)
Palmer's book is, however, written from a high level, starting at an O-5 & O-6 level in the early 1950's when he was at the Army War College (with an excellent analysis then made by him and others re: the Indochina War and the relative unimportance of Indochina in the larger US-scheme of things). It mostly deals with the O-7 through O-10 levels.
Here are four SWC threads with links to a number of resources.
Resources on the French defeat in Indochina?
CIA Vietnam Histories
CORDS / Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future
McCuen: a "missing" thread ?
This stuff may or may not help - it depends on what you are looking for.
Cheers
Mike
My Vietnam book collection is limited, but I do commend two books: 'Victory At Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam's General Vo Nguyen Giap' by Cecil Currey (Pub. in the UK 1997) and a much older 'America in Vietnam' by Guenter Lewy (Pub. in the USA 1978).
Lewy is decent, but also relies heavily on a legalistic view of the war. He's also considered one of the "old" generation of commentators on the war, and thus thought suspect by newer authors.
If you're looking for a battlefield view, Kieth Nolan is really hard to beat. He spends almost no attention on COIN considerations, though. Bergerud does, but his analysis gets thin when he tries to extend observations from one province to all of South Vietnam. Moyar and Prados are both quite political (although on opposite ends of the spectrum), and it's worth keeping that in mind when you look at their books.
on the "village wars": Bing West, The Village and Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province.
I'd echo Steve re: take all with a grain of salt - and check the foornotes and original sources.
For another (slightly lower-in-grade) Palmer's view, Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective.
Tim Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam, interests me because of his ideas - again, not a "bible".
Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam, gives a decent overview of CORDS-Phoenix and other aspects of Vietnamese Pacification.
Make sure you take a look at Tran Dihn Tho, Pacification (freebie), for the South Vietnamese viewpoint.
A wealth of RAND publications from the 1960 are freebies on line. Online and offline North Vietnames articles and books are in Ed Moise, Vietnam War Bibliography: Writings by and about Important Communist Leaders. His Vietnam War Bibliography is much larger - mucho original doc refs in one place.
Cheers
Mike
Large collections (many online links) in two areas that seem to fit your subject matter request:
Vietnam War Bibliography: Theories of Limited War and Counterinsurgency
Vietnam War Bibliography: In the Villages: Pacification
Cheers
Mike
I'd recommend Why Viet Nam: Prelude to America's Albatross by Archimedes L.A. Patti. Patti headed the OSS operations in the area in the later stages of WW2 and was among the first Americans on the scene in the aftermath. Fascinating day-by-day account of a critical and largely overlooked period in the story.
Much like the Americans on the scene in China who reported that Chiang was finished and Mao was going to win, Patti - whose opinion was that the French were toast and Ho Chi Minh was ultimately going to be the ascendant factor in the country - was widely reviled as anything from a pinko commie to a naive young man who fell under the spell of Ho. While the book was certainly written with some hindsight, it doesn't really make him sound like either.
If we are going back to pre-US involvement, The First Vietnam War by Peter Dunn, is the best book I have read (Pub. 1985). That weird period after the Japanese surrender in and around Saigon, as the British Empire intervened before the French colonial rule returned.
What are opinions on Lewis Sorley's book? I liked it and his conclusions made sense, but I'm not an expert on Vietnam by any means.
A good start for your study would be Bernard Fall's excellent books :
Street Without Joy
Hell In A Very Small Place
Our Own Worst Enemy by William J. Lederer was pretty good.
Our Own Worst Enemy - Amazon link
William Lederer - Wikipedia
I recommend the following:
Robert A. Divine, "Revisionism in Reverse," Reviews in American History, 7:3 (September, 1979): 433-438.
Robert A. Divine, "Vietnam Reconsidered," Diplomatic History, 12:1 (January 1998): 79-93.
Gary R. Hess, "The Unending Debate: Historians and the Vietnam War," Diplomatic History, 18:2 (April 1994): 239–264.
Andrew J. Birtle. "PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal." The Journal of Military History 72.4 (2008): 1213-1247.
might be of use.
It probably should be read in the context of Lewis Sorley's "A Better War," since IIRC it tends to quarrel with some its (Sorley's) claims.
OC
The Birtle article was the subject of a Gian Gentile article and some SWJ posts here:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...provn/#c005780
Agreed that it was a thought-provoking article by an excellent scholar.
Also, Phil Ridderhof contributed this to SWJ about DoD's critical assessment of III MAF Pacification efforts (the CAP program) in the same vein.
1) For the war between ARVN and PAVN after US disengagement, you might wish to see Col William Le Gro's Cease Fire to Capitulation..Col Le Gro ran intel at the Office of the Defense Attache, Saigon, 1973-5..The entire work is available on-line.
2) Take a look at David "RAND" Elliiott's pentateuchal (in size, not sanctity) work on the war and social change in the Mekong Delta, exerpts of which appear on-line from time to time...It offers many useful insights (among which, the shocked realization of the study's veteran communist protagonist that by liberation --1975, the majority of the populace even in seminally revolutionary Dinh Tuong Province, had been successfully seduced by US-induced modernization and no longer supported the Revolution.....)
3) Bergerud is important for a feel of the situation on the ground in one province, but I concur precisely in Blair's cautionary admonition. Also several of his conclusions are non-sequiters but the narrative is probably an essential read... Don't know what prior experience you bring, Mr. Jensen, but as you can see, if you are coming to the project with tabla rasa, it can be difficult to discriminate amongst the many opinions voiced.
4) Re: Granite State on Sorely: I'd recommend this book because so few others cover the final years. The author sees near defeat of the enemy by 1970. I concur strongly, as would most of my old adviser colleagues, particularly those who experienced both the before and after phases. But ascribing the near win to a dramatic shift from enemy-centrism to territorial security overstates the case, IMO. (....since I have come to the conclusion that at least during my tenure (1971-5), the enemy center of gravity within RVN reposed in the PAVN units in the in-country base areas....Significantly, during the unilateral US withdrawal period ('71-Jan '73), remaining USARV units in MR-III were targeted against those units in those sanctuaries.)...This is not to denigrate the critical nature of territorial security--or the 100% male mobilization after Tet, which enabled effective raising of territorial forces and turned virtually every rural family into RVNAF dependents.
5) Finally, if I had only one book to recommend, it would be a work of history--Government and Revolution in Viet Nam, by Dennis Duncanson, OBE. Oxford Univ. Press, 1968. The author served with his longtime colleague Sir Robert Thompson on BRIAM (British Advisory Mission to VN) through the early '60's; the perspective is that of a COIN practitioner...Thompson recognized Duncanson as the team's preeminent historian and VN expert. The depth of scholarship is impressive, as is his uncommon grasp of the nuances of Vietnamese society. The book's fault is it ends in 1967.
Cheers,
Mike.
The other day a thread touched upon the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968. On the Tom Ricks blog I stumbled upon this link to MACV's unclassified report of significant events in February 1968. It's interesting reading.
So, is there one? And what should be on it?
Not for the SAMS students (Althougth their input is welcome), but what should the recomended reading list for the average company grade officer and NCO contain? I'm sure this issue has been covered before, but evergreens are everpresent for a reason.
Background: Twice recently I have witnessed people (OK, guys) asking about specific Vietnam Wars books at my local public library; They were both asking about widely distributed works of literary merit. Needless to say, my local public library does not own either one.... (OK, I have issues with them).
So, what ten books (Fiction/Non Fiction) are most useful to understanding Vietnam in the context of American History? Let's go for a maximum of four Fiction and the rest non fiction.
And ten books is optimistic; then you have to select five that will engage the average buck seargeant....
I would recommend Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press), 1966.
I have often wished for a literature cannon. Seems like it would have a much greater impact than simply telling someone that they need to read a book. (Sorry, couldn't resist!)
I am very interested in seeing some recommendations here.
I'll take a stab but with a two caveats. First, it's virtually impossible to find a book about Viet Nam that is not biased in one direction or another or about something -- however, a reasonably diligent reader can filter most of that out.
Second, this is A list -- there are hundreds of others that are just a valid. I make no apology for this one and believe it's fair and as balanced as most and do not plan on entertaining futile arguments about it. It is not an Academic's or General Officer's list or one of which most would approve, it is the list of a a working Grunt. It's offered, accept or disregard as you wish. :wry:
None of these are perfect or, IMO, error free, they all have omissions and biases but most are pretty good and reasonably well balanced. I start with The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Vietnam War by Phillip Jennings. It is biased -- as stated it is politically incorrect -- but does a decent job of dispelling a number of myths (some of which appear often on this Board :rolleyes: ). Some of its contentions are problematic but that's true with all books. In any event, it sets the stage for the other books, which are:
Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall
Why Vietnam by Archimides Patti
The Vietnamese War by David Elliot
How We Won the War by Vo Nguyen Giap
The Twenty-Five Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. by Bruce Palmer Jr.
The Killing Zone by Frederick Downs, Jr.
The Irony of Vietnam; The System Worked by Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts
Backfire by Loren Baritz
Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays (Major Problems in American History) by Robert McMahon and Thomas Patterson {tedious but informative... / kw]
I don’t know enough about the topic to claim how any readings would rank in terms of a canon, but I have enjoyed everything I have read and seen by Pierre Schoendoerffer. I found the article below to be well written; it might be of particular interest to members of the Special Forces.
Salemink, Oscar. “Mois and Maquis: the invention and appropriation of Vietnam’s Montagnards from Sabatier to the CIA.” In Colonial situations: essays on the contextualization of ethnographic knowledge, edited by George W. Stocking, 243–84. Vol. 7 in History of Anthropology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.
The Vietnam Literature Cannon - JMM limited edition:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...0&d=1274888764
:)
Usually, for me, Vietnam sources = stuff re: the US civilian-military policy interface (e.g., "Pentagon Papers"); Pacification in SVN (e.g., "Military Struggle" and "Political Struggle"); and the PAVN view of conventional and unconventional warfare from 1944 to the end in 1975 (e.g., the unity of the "Military Struggle" and the "Political Struggle").
The following references do not follow that pattern. They look much more to the personal side of that conflict - of which, each person had a unique and different vantage point.
I don't define an "average company grade officer or NCO". The latter group (including buck sergeants) could include such people as William Manchester and Gene Sledge - both very articulate in painting word pictures of their war.
Here are eight "Vietnam" books (links to Amazon pages, with reviews - check Amazon "used") written by folks who were company grade officers or NCOs in the Vietnam War:
Brennan's War: Vietnam 1965-1969 (Matthew Brennan, 1985)
One Soldier (John H. Shook, 1986)Quote:
Review by RC
Matt explains what a lot of us went through. This book should be one used in schools to teach about the War in Vietnam. I was in the Blues of A Troop 9th Cavalry in 1966. Very well done, Matt.
Once a Warrior King (David Donovan, 1985)Quote:
Review by B
What puzzled me about "One Soldier," John H. Shook's autobiographical account of his experiences in the Vietnam War, was that it wasn't as popular or widely praised as other famous war-autobiographies (such as Ron Kovic's "Born on the Fourth of July"). I found myself unable to put this book down. Shook begins telling his story from the very moment he receives a draft letter and takes us to boot camp, to Officer Candidate School, and then to the dense, hellish jungles of Vietnam, all without turning his story into one big cliche`. I felt like I was having an intriguing conversation with a veteran, hearing his story, being able to understand where he was coming from. A flawless accomplishment. It's disappointing that Shook's "One Soldier" isn't as highly praised and recognizable as other war stories.
Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Combat (James R. McDonough, 1985)Quote:
Review by RB
I was stationed in Duc Pho, Southern I Corp, and spent over 8 months living in a remote village with my platoon during 1969 and 1970. I saw so very much and understood so little. This book brought back the conflicts that haunted me for years and helped me come to grips with the most significant year of my life. Fear, anxiety, exhaustion, isolation, and confusion blended into an environment that this book describes like none that I have read.
Only War We Had: A Platoon Leader's Journal of Vietnam (Michael Lee Lanning, 1987)Quote:
Review by RJM
Lt. McDonough writes of his experiences in Viet Nam in such straight forward language with little embellishment and an honest and humble attitude. This is one of the best written depictions of combat I've ever read. His experiences commanding a platoon in the heart of VC country surpass anything that has been portrayed by Hollywood in terms of the difficulty of the mission and the horror of day to day survival in a combat situation. This is one gritty and tough account of day to day life in the Viet Nam war that should be widely read. Ranks right up there with Philp Caputo, Michael Herr, Tim O'Brien and Tobias Wolff as a contribution to the definitive written record of grunt life in the war.
The 13th Valley (John M. Del Vecchio, 1982)Quote:
Review by AC
The thing that sets this book apart from others like it is the fact that it is the author's personal journal from his tour as a platoon leader in Vietnam. It lacks the "story-telling" quality that most other personal accounts of the Vietnam War have. Often it is not well-written or completely coherent, but that only serves to help the reader understand the conditions under which the entries were made. The entries are sopplemented by the author's reflections upon preparing them for publication. The events in this book were recorded as they occured - not years later - and that's what makes its special.
Vietnam-Perkasie: A Combat Marine Memoir (W. D. Ehrhart, 1983)Quote:
Review by REW
Although "The 13th Valley" is a novel, it is based on a very real operation conducted by the 2/502nd, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, temporarily assigned to th 3rd Brigade near the end of the "Texas Star" operation. At that time, the U.S. was in gradual withdrawal from Vietnam. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st and 3rd Marine divisions had already left I Corp leaving the 101st to manage an area 4 times their previous area of responsibility. As a last push into the famed A Shau Valley area, the 3rd Brigade was heavily involved in a siege at Firebase Ripcord. Surrounded by an estimated 12,000 NVA regulars, this battle was longer and claimed more casualties on both sides than occurred at "Hamburger Hill". The Battle at Firebase Ripcord remained a secret for many years. Both armies not wanting to publicize the battle as we were disengaging from the war and the NVA took thousands of casualties. the 3rd Brigade defenders were lifted out without being captured. The 2/502nd "Strike Force" gained some level of revenge by attacking the 13th Valley and leaving the NVA Headquarters and camp in shambles. As a former member of the 2/502nd in Vietnam, I have reread this great book many times and can attest that, although a novel, most stories are based in fact on true events of the 2/502. I highly recommend this great book and encourage those interested to also read about "Firebase Ripcord".
The Village (Bing West, 1972)Quote:
Review by DK
Bill Ehrhart's work for too long has been neglected. VIETNAM-PERKASIE is one of the most memorable first-hand accounts of the war which America loves to forget. This memoir is gritty, real, and vastly underrated. It should be made into a film.
(cont. in part 2)Quote:
Review by DF
This is a wonderful book. It tells the story of 15 marines assigned to defend a hamlet, working with about the same number of Popular Force militiamen. Of that original band, 7 are killed in the first half of the book, most of them in a single firefight when their "fort" is over-run. (The PFs suffer losses at roughly the same rate.) But they love the work, get along fine with the villagers, and exact an even higher toll on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units sent against them.
Moreover, so as to immediately break the ten-book limit, here are four oral histories (two general, and two more specialized); all presenting a more generalized set of personal experiences than the eight "autobiographical" books above:
Everything We Had: An Oral History of the Vietnam War (Al Santoli, 1981)
To Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and Its Aftermath in the Words of Americans and Southeast Asians (Al Santoli, 1985)Quote:
Review by LR
There are actually two false war stories in this book, those of Thomas Bird ("Ia Drang") and Mike Beamon ("The Green-Faced Frogmen"). Mr. Bird apologized to the author after the book's publication. He did serve in Vietnam, not in combat, and the POW story is a complete fabrication. Mr. Beamon did not even serve in the US military, never mind the SEALS or Vietnam. At the time the book came out, 1981, it was difficult to get veterans to discuss the war at all, never mind insist they verify their stories. Mr. Santoli, who I knew personally, was as disappointed as any of his critics that he had been taken in by these accounts. Still "Everything We Had" is a monumental work, from the days before the Vietnam Wall. Then the popular culture wanted nothing more to dismiss the war completely and held the men who fought there in contempt as losers or criminals. The feelings of Santoli's real contributors are still a compelling read today, twenty years later.
Bloods: Black Veterans of the Vietnam War: An Oral History (Wallace Terry, 1984)Quote:
Review by JMDV
I first read To Bear Any Burden when it was originally released in 1985. This has been a 'must-read' classic of American involvement in Southeast Asia since it was published. For it, Santoli interviewed, in depth, 47 individuals representative of that involvement from 1945 into the 1980s--Americans, Viet-Namese (communists and anti-communists), Cambodians and Laotians. The book is so artfully compiled as to flow like a single narration; yet the 'cast of characters' are separate in time, space, culture and social rank--an entire spectrum from ambassadors to villagers, soldiers to politicians, in one volume. No one's education about the Viet-Nam War is complete unless they've read this book.
Survivors (Zalin Grant, 1975)Quote:
Review by RJR
This is similar to Santoli's book regarding individual experiences in the Vietnam conflict. You definitely get a feel for the Vietnam experience, and it is very readable. The narratives portray the unique challenges of this experience, along with the added dimension of the race issue. The range of assessments of the racial issue was amazing and educational for me; some of the vets had active civil-rights values and even revolutionary values before getting to Vietnam, and some had little or no opinions regarding race relations despite the turbulent times. The great range of views regarding whites and the dominant U.S. culture, including government, was intriguing. The attitudes toward the Vietnamese, both North- and South-, also held great range, and was fascinating. This leads me to feel that the strength of this memorable book is the common experience conveyed simultaneously with the diversity of experiences and attitudes.
Finally, to set a chronological framework - and presenting a different picture of the Vietnam War in the eyes of the author (a Marine grunt and later an officer in the Aussie Navy):Quote:
Review by AC
Zalin Grant did a masterful job weaving together oral interviews of seven of the twelve survivors of one of the worst death camps run by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. There were 11 deaths from disease and starvation, plus one killed attempting escape during the time period covered by Grant's book. After the unsuccessful Son Toy raid on an empty POW camp in North Vietnam, the Viet Cong moved their southern prisoners by walking them to Hanoi. The journey took six months, but ultimately all of Grant's survivors were released in Operation Homecoming in 1973. This book is must reading for the serious researcher on POWs, or anyone who wants to know how difficult it was to survive jungle captivity. Also recommended is a brand new book by survivor interviewee Frank Anton "Why Didn't You Get Me Out?," which includes most of his experiences covered in Grant's book, but adds Anton's observations about MIAs seen in Laos on his way to Hanoi, plus Anton's concerns about the plight of MIAs written off by the US government many years ago.
Unheralded Victory: The Defeat of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army, 1961-1973 (Mark W. Woodruff, 1999)
I found Woodruff's book very interesting - "winning" the warfare, but "losing" the war.Quote:
Review by CS
Hello, I feel very strongly about this book. I feel quite inadequate to write a review of other peoples personal experiences in vietnam.
I served in Republic of Vietnam from 1967 through 1969 as a fresh butterbar (2nd Lt., then on as XO and revolving platoon leader (casualties for 2nd lts was always quite high) for the company I served with, then on as Platoon leader for a second tour then serving briefly as CO of company for a grand total of 3 days until I got wounded by mortar fire.
While I feel this book is a bit too right wing it clearly shows a significant amount of popular media of that era and today is frankly nonsense. A fact that no one seems inclined to reinterpret. Many people don't like this book, because if doesn't fit into their very very simplistic broad general view of a very complex civil war(take a look at vietnamese history the vietnamese have fought a handful of civil wars and wars of conquest) involving two superpowers selling their brand to the the world, Period. Vietnam just happened to manifest itself perfectly as the testing ground much to the pain of the vietnamese. It's coke or pepsi with a pistol to you head and that's that.
The entire strategic goals of the vietnam war and the way it were fought were obviously completely flawed, I highly advise everyone to read "A bright shining lie" along with "dirty little secrets of the vietnam war"; a bit of a cheesy title, and a bit simplistic but spot on with Facts about the conflict with only a very slight sense of favoritism towards the USA. The truth lies flat in the middle of these three books and is frankly much simpler than most would lead you to believe.
I served in highly populated areas my first year in country, there was definently "accidental" death of civilians from all manner of reasons (out at night after curfew triggering ambushes, random artillery fire). It was dangerous to be a civilian in vietnam and they suffered greatly regardless of their political stance. My second year was spent mainly fighting NVA in terrain with almost no civilian population.
This book should be taken with a grain of salt but there are many many facts in this book that highlight directly how much horse puckey and COMPLETE DISTORTION OF FACT was used for dramatic effect both then and now.
I feel competent to say this as I am currently typing this from my home in Vietnam. I speak vietnamese fluently, am married to a Vietnamese woman who's fathers side of the family was Viet Cong and her mothers ARVN.
Along with my unique experience as well as getting a real earful of communist propaganda, most of the references the author makes towards Hanoi's political and propaganda machine are easily found here in print by Vietnamese publications. I strongly urge people truly interested in learning some amazing and not often, if ever talked about facts to READ THIS BOOK.
You probably won't like its point of view, (I had a real tough time swallowing alot of" a bright shining lie" but the author does make a very strong and factual arguement). So does this former marine. Get this book and the others and stop kidding yourself about how much you know about Vietnam because you watched Platoon and Full Metal Jacket...
Regards
Mike
John Prados and Ray Stubbe, Valley of Decision.
Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie. (Books I-III are perhaps all that is necessary.)
Robert Mason, Chickenhawk.
Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War.
Perhaps more tangential to the intended point of the original query, but a fun read nonetheless (the early Vietnam reporters - Halberstam, Sheehan, Arnett et al - through the coup that toppled Diem): William Prochnau, Once Upon a Distant War.
Speaking of Halberstam, I have actually never read either, but do/does The Best and the Brightest and/or The Making of a Quagmire merit inclusion on this list?
And speaking of books not read, here is a book only partially read by me, but which (I think) is thought well of, an assessment I find to be a justified one: Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An.
Regards
OC
I can only offer one, and that is Frank Snepp's Decent Interval.
Since JCustis mentioned Snepp's Decent Interval, I'll add two other books regarding April 1975:
David Butler, The Fall of Saigon.
Larry Engerman, Tears Before the Rain.
Incidentally, Harry Summers was at the American Embassy helping to conduct the evacuation, I think, which made me think of his On Strategy.
Regards
OC
"Slow Burn" by Orrin DeForest-excellent book on Intelligence and Interrogation (the way it should be done) for Vietnam.
Buck Sergeants will definitely love Brennon's War:)
by Douglas Pike. Powerful thesis on the inability of the west to come to grips with the pol-mil strategy of the Peoples' Army. I thoroughly enjoyed the book when it was first published in the 80s. I understand that it has come under some academic criticism in the meantime.
My personal theory is that we are still on the road to victory in VN, and that General Electric and General Motors will prevail where General Westmoreland and General Abrams failed. (I stole this line from somewhere, but as usual, can't remember where.)
Response.....
And helps me clarify my thoughts on the question. And a new one... (Later).
Actually, there are two educational goals,
1. What memoirs. etc will help the strategic corporals (buck Seargeants) do their jobs better, and avoid reinventing the wheel. (The old joke, we fought in Vietnam for one year seven times, or something like that).
2. What really was the broad picture there? How did we get into that mess, and why did it end so badly?
There does not seem to be a version of the Ricks/Woodward first draft of history out there.
A good example is the US Military institutional bias against Body Counts;
The weekly casualty reports on the six PM news is unlikely to have been the subject of family reminiscenses around the dinner table.
Sasquatch:
Meant respectfully: If the goal is to, then for said purpose, why limit the query to Vietnam? Obviously how the US entered the Vietnam War is Vietnam-specific, but helping the strategic corporal would not seem to be. Perhaps books regarding Korea, to take one example, or just as well other conflicts, might be equally (or even more?) useful for said goal?Quote:
help the strategic corporals (buck Seargeants) do their jobs better, and avoid reinventing the wheel
Regards
OC
Link to the final and complete 7,000 page history of Vietnam published for the first time without any redactions.....and it is free:)
http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/
Regarding prong 2) of Sasquatch's prompt - i.e., the "big picture" and the proffered example of a fixation on body counts - I consider James Wirtz's article "Intelligence to Please" (Political Science Quarterly, 1991) to be excellent. It examines the discrepancy between MACV and CIA estimates of the enemy Order of Battle.
Regards
OC
Vietnam is worthwhile in this context because it is noted for "burning up" an entire generation of NCOs. As far as memoirs go, it's hard to find good ones that deal exclusively with NCOs (in my opinion). VN memoirs tend to focus heavily on junior officers and draftees. There are a handful that cover NCOs, but they tended to come out earlier in the memoir cycle (say the early 1980s).
There are also theme cycles you have to be aware of when looking at literature about Vietnam. There are some interesting and strong bias swings. One of the interesting things about Kieth Nolan's books is that you can almost follow that cycle in his writing (although it's not strong bias as much as it is a slight shift in focus).
If you read Lanning, be sure to read both books.
I'd second Ken's list, with the addition of "Ringed in Steel" by Michael Mahler and just about any of Kieth Nolan's books.
And just to make an observation about one of JMM's books, "The 13th Valley" isn't about Ripcord. Kieth Nolan has a good book out about that situation, but DelVecchio's book (which I consider one of the finest novels about Vietnam, if not the finest) deals with a later fight.
"Vietnam is worthwhile..."
I realized after I posted that that there is absolutely nothing wrong on any level about creating a Vietnam-specific canon, and that said post therefore really was not warranted. I guess the lesson for me is, Think before posting.
Regards
OC
Yeah, I'd like to see some documentation on the burning NCO issue.
We also have to ensure that we don't hijack the thread. If there is specific fodder for the canon on the NCO issue, fire away!
I disagree with that place to the extent I won't even link to it -- but since it's you, I 'll tell you where documentation can be found. ;)
I'll also defer to Steve Blair who's historical documentation knowledge certainly exceeds mine. My recollection is that overall VN KIA rate was about 1% while that for NCOs was 2.5% mostly SGT / SSG. That doesn't count the 1,400 or so fragging incidents, 80 some odd Officers or NCOs killed...
However, just for grins, the fact that NCOs were being burned out is amply shown by the simple existence of the NonCommissioned Officer Candidate Course -- and the fact that their KIA rate was over 5%.
For the other NCOs, the burnout came from a year in Viet Nam doing pretty much the same job (few promotions or incountry rotations for NCOs as opposed to Officers and Troops) and about 10 months in the States before returning to the SEA Follies. That was unsustainable so by 1968, third tours coming up and still shortfalls in mid and senior grade NCOs (and Officers, many of whom resigned -- the NCOs could not) led the US Army's fine Battalion Commanders by sheer necessity to lean on new LTs and SGTs and thus reinforced and enhanced micromanagement as a life style. :wry:
I know many NCOs with five tours all in combat units but I know few officers with more than two. Of course, I also know some NCOs who served in the period with no tours -- tankers and support folks, mostly -- and I know an Officer with six tours (one in Laos and one in [theoretically]Thailand). It was simply a function of the system and times. We do it a little better today, I hope...
The evidence of that burnout lies in the immediate post Viet Nam Army which suffered from a significant dearth of NCO leadership. Most were too tired to care. :(
NCO burnout in Vietnam was focused heavily in the senior NCO ranks ("in the rear with the Sergeant Major, the beer, and the gear"). Remember that during this period most (if not all) of the Army's SNCOs had combat time in Korea and even World War II. It wasn't a problem initially, but by mid-1968 the Army was relying more and more on "shake and bake" NCOs (guys who were a handful of months or maybe a year older than the men they were supposed to train and lead). Older NCOs were either getting out or using their connections to get rear jobs.
Again, this trend accelerated as the war went on. It wasn't so much a factor of KIAs as it was repeat tours and (likely underestimated) a major "generation gap" between the Regular Army NCOs and a mostly draftee force fresh from the impact of the counter culture.
Within the canon, most of Kieth Nolan's books touch on the NCO issue in at least some way, since his writing focuses for the most part on the period after 1968. It's touched on to a degree in some of the SOG memoirs, but like I mentioned before the memoirs tend to come from either the junior enlisted or officer ranks. Shelby Stanton talks about it in "The Rise and Fall of an American Army" as well. "Self Destruction" also gets into it.
I'd like to second Old Eagle's addition of Pike's PAVN to the list. I think it's worth mentioning that among other useful insights, the book presents a succinct and lucid explanation of what occurred in RVN during the period--1969 onward--about which less has been written.
PAVN employed a methodology to convince the populace of its implacability, and attempted to raise the level of violence (now perceived to be unending) toward an unacceptable threshold. A steady rhythm of assassination, indirect fire and sapper attacks, punctuated by "high points" of greater violence proceeded, despite great cost, even during the period of greatest US/GVN success (1970-71). The calculation was that the Vietnamese majority, who were not in the enemy camp, including those alienated by PAVN/VC overreach; the many ethnic Southerners in whom disgust at all Northerners, whether Communist or Catholic was an ingrained trait; and even the Northern Catholic denizens of the urban slums who had come South as refugees from Communism, would find submission to new, unsavory overlords preferable to endless bleeding. And in 1971 it had become clear that the Vietnamese would be bleeding alone--that the US was indeed withdrawing. Other grievances were eschewed, PAVN psyops concentrated on exploiting the war weariness.
The lesson to be drawn, Pike points out, is that in any society that is not totalitarian, there is no effective counter to the prospect of "the fifty year war."
Cheers,
Mike.
Obviously it depended on the time frame and who you asked, but a reasonable number were either race- or drug-related. Fragging became a recognized issue after mid-1968 or so, and accelerated after 1969. It's also worth nothing that fragging was quite often a rear area phenomenon...and that wasn't helped by the practice of combat units "dumping" their problem children on the rear areas (be it battalion, brigade, or some other echelon). In some cases a fragging could be traced to a reaction to a "hard-line" career NCO or officer, but there were other cases where it was drug dealer retaliation or a more random event when some stoned trooper tossed a grenade in the general direction of someone who pissed him off.
Vietnam is also complex in that such things weren't necessarily tracked in previous wars, and that combined with the fallout from social changes in the US created an interesting situation. Fragging wasn't common in front line units, though, leading to speculation that lack of mission focus and clear purpose in the rear areas accelerated the incidence of fragging.