Seabee, just so you'll know
Casey was not fired, he was promoted and is currently Chief of Staff of the Army. Shinseki was not fired, he retired on his normally scheduled retirement date and is now the Secretary of Veteran Affairs in the Obama cabinet.
Plenty of Generals indeed have been fired for mouthing off -- MacArthur and MG John K. Singlaub come to mind...
Military-Press Relationship
The way I see it the relationship between the Government and the press is a case of different principles that are in conflict with each other. The ones I can think of, and there are probably others, are as follows.
1. Freedom of the press, like the Constitutional amendment on freedom of speech.
2. The laws regarding the disclosure of classified information, and whether persons should suffer a penalty for leaking it outside of Government channels.
3. The need for all people and institutions in a country involved in a war to "pull together" and be on the same team, if necessary putting aside their personal and organizational interests.
4. Optional wars, when the famous statement by Clausewitz on the relationship between politics and war leaves many people either indifferent or actively hostile to the war.
Let me tell a war story. The Pacific Stars and Stripes used to have a tradition of having its content censored and controlled by higher headuarters. Stories that the command thought would unsettle the troops, such as anti-American protests in Korea, were kept out of the newspaper.
As an Army E-4 my late dad joined the staff of the Pacific S&S in around December 1945. He ran the composing room of the paper in the basement of the U.S. headuarters in the Dai Ichi building in Tokyo, where MacArthur had his penthouse on the top floor. (Mac's son Dougie, a kid around 8, used to visit the composing room. Dad said you could tell back then he'd turn out to be gay, which he did.) Anyway, around December '45 or January '46 there were protests in the Philippines and Japan by G.I.s against being kept in uniform after the war had ended. Pacific S&S ran brief stories on the protests. A few days later the newspaper was directed through command channels to publish an overwrought story by a civilian newspaperman who denounced the guys who wanted to be sent home and cited all the guys he had seen killed and bleeding to death on various islands in the Pacific Theater.
The response of the enlisted G.I. staff of the newspaper was to sign a petition and hold a press conference for the Associated Press and United Press correspondents in which they said that the command in Japan was interfering with the editorial content of Pacific S&S, which meant it wasn't a G.I. newspaper anymore. Dad told me that within weeks of the press conference he and all of the other G.I.s on the staff of Pacific S&S received orders to go back to the States for discharge.
Four decades later, around 1985, DoD reconsidered its policy regarding censorship of the Pacific S&S. Dad's old friend and colleague, Phil Foisie, Army officer combat veteran, former foreign editor of the Washington Post and editor of the International Herald-Tribune in Paris (also former Louisville C-J reporter in the '50s), was contracted by DoD as a "distinguished journalist" to evaluate the situation and submit his recommendations. When I last saw Mr. Foisie in around 1987 he was a bit pissed that DoD had granted editorial freedom to the Pacific S&S before his report recommending it had been submitted in final draft. (It was one of those bureaucracy things, DoD made a decision, had a study done to justify it, and announced its decision before the study had been released.)
Well, that's the end of the war story ... and it's no shi*, as far as I know, I know this message won't settle this dispute but perhaps it might give some insight into the issures that are involved.
Washing the dirty linen of a dirty conflict in public could actually save lives
This article 'Washing the dirty linen of a dirty conflict in public could actually save lives' by Max Hastings, a journalist and military historian, gives a seasoned UK viewpoint and is quite pithy:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/ar...ave-lives.html
Opens with:
Quote:
To understand how the White House feels about yesterday’s massive leak of 92,201 documents about the Afghan war, think how Downing Street would have felt about the same sort of disclosures during the Northern Ireland troubles. We might have learned about Blair’s talks with the IRA, SAS ambushes in Armagh, British intelligence penetration of the Dublin government, claims of torture of suspects, fire-fights in which the wrong people got killed, paramilitary links with politicians - the dirty underclothes of a dirty conflict.
Ends with:
Quote:
Yesterday’s Wikileaks ‘revelations’ made a bigger splash than they deserved. But they will serve a useful purpose if they concentrate minds at the top. If we wait for military success before starting a political negotiation, a lot more good people will die uselessly. It is time to talk, and start packing.
Stanley McChrystal: Listen, learn... then lead
Stanley McChrystal: Listen, learn... then lead
Entry Excerpt:
Via TED: Four-star general Stanley McChrystal shares what he learned about leadership over his decades in the military. How can you build a sense of shared purpose among people of many ages and skill sets? By listening and learning -- and addressing the possibility of failure.
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McChrystal and Aides Cleared by DoD
McChrystal and Aides Cleared by DoD
Entry Excerpt:
Pentagon Inquiry Into Article Clears McChrystal and Aides by Thom Shanker, New York Times. BLUF: "An inquiry by the Defense Department inspector general into a magazine profile that resulted in the abrupt, forced retirement of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has cleared the general, his military aides and civilian advisers of all wrongdoing."
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McChrystal took the fight to Bin Laden
Media perspectives following Bin Laden’s death have been good, bad and ugly. Many great organizational and individual efforts have been forgotten or overlooked with regards to their contribution in getting the world’s top fugitive. I’ve decidedly avoided being overly political or military in my blogging, but today, I’ll take a brief moment to discuss an unsung hero in this week’s events.
General Stanley McChrystal brought the world’s greatest military unit, Joint Special Operations Command, to the pinnacle of its existence. Over the past ten years, U.S. Special Operations Forces have dominated every battlefield they have touched. While GEN McChrystal bore the brunt of what appears be unfounded allegations in Afghanistan, he should be recognized for developing an unprecedented military capability in world history.
Common narratives of the Iraq “Surge” paint a picture of nation building and cultural engagement leading to stability. I argue instead that the decisive point (tipping point for civilians) in the Iraq campaign was McChrystal’s annihilation of terrorist and insurgent networks. McChrystal’s JSOC dismantled al Qaida in Iraq and other insurgent groups providing the operational space for the more commonly known counterinsurgency strategy to take root.
GEN McChrystal enabled the force that executed this week’s legendary raid on Bin Laden. The techniques discovered during his tenure allowed JSOC to continually improve and achieve the most daunting mission. His leadership transcended his tenure and for this the United States should be forever thankful.
I began this post two week’s ago after watching GEN McChrystal’s TED Talk on leadership. I watched the video on the way to work. By the time I got off the train, I was prepared to quit my job and reenlist. GEN McChrystal didn’t dwell on his recent fate, throw himself into politics or take this public opportunity to vindicate himself. Instead, he did what he has always done: inspired the next generation, provided an example for others to follow and led the way….gallantly prevailing this time for a new audience.
So, today, a shout out to GEN McChrystal for being a key leader in one of our country’s greatest victories. In the military, officers often seek to emulate certain famous generals storied in TV and print media. I, however, found my greatest inspiration in the quiet professionals. While I no longer serve in uniform, I am still inspired in my current profession to emulate those that make transformational change by empowering their subordinates. I never wanted to be Eisenhower. I wanted to be a GEN Downing or GEN McChrystal. Thank you for inspiring me and so many others.
Clint Watts
SelectedWisdom.com
Listen, learn, lead: Gen. Stanley McChrystal on TED
Listen, learn, lead: Gen. Stanley McChrystal on TED
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Gen McChrystal Shares Insights about Campaigns
Gen McChrystal Shares Insights about Campaigns
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What is Stanley McChrystal sharing?
The thread's title is a slight variation on General McChrystal's book title 'My Share of the Task: A Memoir'.
Earlier this week Dave D. added a post on SWJ Blog, referring to a book review by Gary Hart, a former US Senator, which had appeared in The National Interest:http://nationalinterest.org/bookrevi...l-way-war-8149
Dave cited the review in part:
Quote:
Unlike Tolstoy's families, uninteresting books are uninteresting in their own way; interesting books all operate on several levels. Retired U.S. Army general Stanley McChrystal’s My Share of the Task operates on three levels: first, the level of military memoir; second, as a detailed, even intimate, inside perspective on the concurrent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; and third, and perhaps most important historically, as an account of the U.S. military’s transition from traditional wars between nation-states to the unconventional and irregular insurgency warfare of the early twenty-first century...
It would be a great surprise if this book does not become required reading at U.S. (and perhaps other) military academies and even more so in the network of command and staff colleges for rising officers. There is much to be learned here about strategy, tactics and doctrine, as well as the necessity for their adaptability in often rapidly changing circumstances. This is especially true as our military has been transitioning into an era marked by increased integration of services and commands and the rise of special operations...
I enjoyed Gary Hart's review and now cite McChrystal's own words on Afghanistan:
Quote:
I had a nagging feeling that a whole world of Afghan power politics . . . was churning outside our view. I felt like we were high-school students who had wandered into a mafia-owned bar, dangerously unaware of the tensions that filled the room and the authorities who controlled it.
(Later). I’d watched as a focus on the enemy in Afghanistan had made little dent in the insurgency’s strength over the past eight years and, conversely, had served to antagonize Afghans. Not only was Afghans’ allegiance critical, but I did not think we would defeat the Taliban solely by depleting their ranks. We would win by making them irrelevant by limiting their ability to influence the lives of Afghans, positively or negatively. We needed to choke off their access . . . to the population.
IIRC SWC has been rather critical of him in the past, judging from the title of the threads: An Open Letter to McChrystal (started July 2010), McChrystal did it on purpose (started July 2010), vietnam mccrystal (RFI for his 1987 thesis), Obama Angry at McCrystal Speech (July 2009) and McKiernan replaced (by McChrystal in May 2009)
I have not read his book, although one Amazon reviewer compared it to the memoirs of Grant and Slim. Link:http://www.amazon.com/Share-Task-Gen...ley+McChrystal
A Conversation With Stanley McChrystal
A lengthy interview in FP and has some interesting passages, notably on the development of SOF in Iraq:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discus...kill?page=show
McChrystal on ISIS: his tips
Following on a CNN interview a previously unheard blogsite provides four tips to defeat ISIS, using excerpts, to read more follow link:http://www.havokjournal.com/national...ht-terrorists/
The CNN interview cannot be readily id'd.
The four tips are:
Quote:
1.The effectiveness of a group is not its numbers, it’s how effectively it’s connected.
2. Killing the individual (leader) almost never solves the problem.
3. You have to get after the people who get things done.
4. You go after the idea that makes people want to be a part of it.
The last tip is the most important - from my armchair - so I cite a liitle more:
Quote:
Only by giving them an idea they care more about, whether that is an idea that gives them a better vision for the future, or one that gives them a bleak outlook if they hold on to one they currently have, we’re not going to make positive permanent change if we neglect the ideological battle.