This is one of my rare disagreements with Bill Moore.
To go back to Bumperplate:
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Why can't we train our more conventional forces to take on some of those mission sets that are on the edge between conventional and unconventional?... But, let's face it, it's not magic - it can be taught and developed. In order to do so, our conventional forces must stop being the 'ugly american' ... rather than just trying to please your rater/senior rater, is where I see the greatest disparity in my limited time being in joint environments with conventional and unconventional units in the same AO...This is not meant to be a probing question, but is there that much of a difference between some of our conventional units and SOF units in terms of executing some of these COIN and CT missions? For example, if 20 or so people are to go to a village and execute a raid in order to roll up some HVI, why can't those 20 people come from the 101st, as opposed to 2/75, or an ODA, etc?
In a word -- Turf.
Prior to the Viet Nam fiasco, conventional units trained for and could do those missions -- all of them. SF (there were few SEALs, no CAG, no 75th) was relatively small and focused on IW in an offensive mode. Initial US Troop deployments in Viet Nam were by units that had trained for SFA and that could and did do all Bumperplate suggests and did it pretty well.
Then the Personnel system took over, the one year tour was established and rotations began. In 1966 what I've called the Second Team came in and they weren't as competent at the basics for the environment because they had trained exclusively for European deployment; they weren't quite as capable so SF was expanded. In 1967, the Third string arrived and things started downhill. To cut this short, the 'conventional' force became less and less competent and so was cut out of the more exotic stuff. Didn't need to happen and should not have but it did...
Fast forward to 1987 and USSOCOM was established (an interesting tale unto itself... :rolleyes:), By that time the big Army had bought into a very flawed Task, Condition and Standard training system which was designed to train marginal recruits rapidly to minimum skill levels -- it did that and, with no war on, that seemed okay. This system did not produce units that could reliably do the more sophisticated and complex missions and, as USSOCOM was looking for missions to justify themselves, they migrated direct action missions into the folder. It was more complex than that and there were other factors but that in essence is why conventional units don't do that stuff today. Most cannot due to marginal training and -- turf... :(
Bill Moore:
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What makes SOF special beyond the personnel selection? In my view it is their organization (very flexible) and special tactics.
Heh. I'll grant selection, add training (and money therefor...) and the organization's flexibility. OTOH, the tactics aren't special based on my experience and that of a currently serving Son, his friends and another couple of relatives including one currently deployed CIF type ;).
Most -- not all of those TTP -- are things any decent infantry battalion should be able to do (and have done and almost certainly will again if we have another war on the scale of Viet Nam or Korea, much less WW II) and most used to be able to do at least some of those things (good units could more than others but that never changes and is still true today). That was back in the Pleistocene era as shown in the attached picture (XVIII trained for light roles and SFA; II Corps trained for Europe and the ME, both on the basis of 80% primary mission / 20% the other mission).
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But still, E7s and LTs making tactical decisions without Bn and Bde oversight! Simply unheard of.
In your time -- not prior to 1970. Different world back then. Risk aversion was killed quickly if it raised its ugly head (today it seems to be encouraged...). PSG /SFCs and LKTs who wouldn't seek responsibility and independence of action got fired in many units. I ran Recon Platoons, Airborne and Armored Cavalry off and on for seven years, less than two years total out of that with a Platoon Leader (counting all five, from one month to 10 at various times. Did that in peace and war (both combat deployments without a PL and had some interesting and independent missions far away from the flag pole). I assure you there were many other SSG and Platoon Sergeants who were acting platoon leaders and who were as well or even more trusted. Viet Nam killed that and the smart guys that rebuilt the Army foolishly left trust building (among other things...) out of their repertoire...
Shorter that - you're right for now; didn't use to be that way; can be fixed; will have to be with a big commitment. ;)
Back to Bumperplate -- Turf -- and training. Units aren't trusted to do things like that because our training doesn't embed the basics of the trade at all well. Lack of training breeds lack of capability, one cannot or at least should not ask people to do things they have not been trained for.
Today's individuals are, across the board, better trained than were those in the days of that picture -- but the units can't do half what those units could do then. If I were a conspiracy theorist, I'd think it was by design to limit the missions on which the Army might be employed but I suspect it's a Hanlon's razor thing. I hope that's all it is...
I'm not sure it's that simple
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
We transitioned from a liberating force that supported the NA and the Afghan people to an occupying power in the eyes of the Afghans.
However, the good news is my spies tell me that we're going back to a variation the 2001-02 policies with a couple of added hookers after being Americans and trying every conceivable alternative... :D