Afghanistan: what happens when we leave?
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Thomas Harding, the Daily Telegraph’s defence correspondent, has returned from his 12th visit to Afghanistan since British troops deployed to Helmand province five years ago. Here, he reflects on what has been achieved.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-we-leave.html
Some interesting parts alongside the odd, well at least from this "armchair":
The odd:
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With political stability offered by Nato and Afghan forces, Helmand’s 180,000 farmers are able to sow pomegranates and carrots rather than opium poppies.
How often has this version of KLE been tried?
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The British have also been adept at fostering good relations. Brig Patrick Sanders, the commander in Helmand, invited his opposite number, Brig-Gen Sheren Shah, and the chief of police, Gen Hakim Angar, to his Wiltshire home to meet his family. Hospitality is important in Afghan society and the gesture cemented a key relationship.
The ANP:
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The police, on whom security will largely depend, are not the most trustworthy bunch. One police station had to be disbanded after officers robbed and murdered the owner of a new Shogun car carrying Ł1,500 in cash. At another station I visited with an Army officer, the reception from the commander was cordial at best. “He’s probably in the pay of the Taliban,” the officer quietly told me. “We just don’t tell him much at a tactical level.”
Level of activity:
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in central Helmand, where the Taliban is still strong in pockets, fighting can be intense. One platoon from the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment saw 21 contacts with the enemy in 27 days.
West must see the job through in Afghanistan
A slightly adapted title from The Guardian, which has an interview from the No.2 ISAF commander, Lieutenant General James Bucknall, who has just stood down:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011...nistan-warning
It opens with:
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.. the Taliban cannot "assassinate their way to power" and too many lives have been lost over the last 10 years for the west to flinch in its campaign against the insurgents.
Then and I'm sure I posted a remark on this theme recently:
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We almost owe it to those who have gone before to see the job through,...Having made this investment in blood, I am more determined. If I didn't think we could do this I would take a very different view but I am confident we can do it...
These are the two top ingredients. We have to stick together. We went in together, and we go out together. Managing a coalition in a draw down requires an awful lot more work than managing a coalition during a surge
More of the interview is on:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/de...ral?intcmp=239
Consider that the real decisions are made by politicians.
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Originally Posted by
ganulv
The courage to stay the course or throwing good money after bad? Making the distinction is an unenviable task indeed.
Further consider the sentiment expressed in your quote is not even a glimmer of an issue with said Political types and the thought in your statement is barely so.
The Generals merely try to provide some cover for their Bosses while -- hopefully -- rallying the troops... :rolleyes:
The UK in Afg: a very bad investment
Post 883 refers to the 2IC ISAF General James Bucknall being interviewed upon leaving his appointment.
Frank Ledwidge, a critic of the UK's campaign, contributed a response days later (which I missed) and some points he made have appeared here. For example:
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Prior to the British deployment in 2006 Helmand was a relatively rich, virtually conflict-free province. When our current chief of defence staff General Sir David Richards, who was at the time commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan said, "Where's Helmand? It's not important" he was right. There were very few Taliban in central Helmand or indeed anywhere else in the province and the small US garrison had suffered no serious casualties. The SAS had ranged the area for years, successfully gaining intelligence and ensuring that al-Qaida could gain no traction. Before the British got to Helmand there was no "Taliban heartland" there.
He ends with:
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It must be time now even for senior soldiers to admit that this has become a very bad investment indeed. We "owe it" to those whose lives and limbs may yet be saved to cut our losses.
Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisf...james-bucknall
Precision strike @ Nad-e-Ali
I am sure the town of Nad-e-Ali has appeared before in Afghan threads, but I don't recall this story:
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The Taliban were firmly entrenched in the Nad-e-Ali district of Helmand, with the population cowed and British soldiers confined to moving within a few hundred yards of their bases, when Lt Col James Coates took over the area. The commanding officer of 3 Para introduced a new tactic called “precision strike”, combining high level intelligence, CCTV camera surveillance and the use of precision missile attacks to wipe out Taliban command while causing minimal civilian casualties. In the coming months, the formerly fractious area will be handed over to Afghan control. British success attracted a host of inspecting VIPs. It was, said Gen David Petraeus, “a most impressive way to do business”. Precision strike is now used across Afghanistan.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...-the-year.html
Strange place for the story to appear.
A little digging found:
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The unit served as part of Operation Herrick 13 in Helmand Province between October 2010 and April 2011.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-essex-15123581
Podcast worth listening to
Ryan Evans is now at ICSR, London and was a member of a HTT n Helmand Province; he has written a FP Blog piece 'COIN is dead, long live the COIN' and is preparing:
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..an article on the specific context of Central Helmand Province and the limits of COIN operations there due to specific local political, historical, and economic circumstances.
I have just listened to a short podcast of a talk Ryan Evans and a recently retired British Army Lieut.Col. Dougie Graham, whose last posting was Helmand, which has some gems and worth listening to. The seminar summary:http://icsr.info/seminar/counter-ins...and-and-beyond and the podcast is on:http://dl.dropbox.com/u/13850824/evans%20-%20main.wma
It was notable that the Dougie Graham conceded for the locals the GIRoA was seen as the enemy and that 99.9% of the dead insurgents lived with ten mile of their last contact.
Taliban supply routes into Helmand
A laudatory article on the RN helicopters, designed for anti-submarine operations, identifying the Taliban's supply routes:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...echnology.html
What I noted was, with my emphasis:
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By tracking pickup trucks and camel trains, the Navy team of three Sea King helicopters and 43 servicemen, including engineers and analysts, have produced a map made up of millions of dots that shows the highways across the desert. The lines show 12 main routes, most going to Pakistan but at least four heading into Iran.
I am always puzzled why such technology is revealed. (Addition follows). Apparently the technology in use is a variant of well known ISR technology:
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...the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) had proved invaluable in the tracking and prosecution of enemy ground forces. ..radar is similar to the U2 ASARS radar, and collects SAR imagery and GMTI data.
Which is deployed on a UK aircraft:http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/sentinelr1.cfm
I would speculate that the routes heading into Iran are the mass movement of heroin.
General David Richards: Afghan campaign was woeful
This is the headline in the Daily Telegraph and is IMO long overdue. I cite the sub-title:
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Britain's most senior military officer has said the military move into southern Afghanistan was “amateurish” and “verging on the complacent” and accused ministers of failing to learn lessons from Iraq.
It appears that his remarks appear in a new book 'War Against the Taliban' by Sandy Gall.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...as-woeful.html
General Richards comments do not appear to answer all the critical points made here over the years, such as the six month tour of duty rotation system. Note he remains optimistic on the war in Afghanistan.
Link to Sandy Gall's book:http://www.bloomsbury.com/War-Agains.../9781408809051
How do the UK enter Helmand?
The RUSI is holding a public event on 29th February 2012, entitled 'The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005-06' and from the flyer:
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A panel discussion including Sir Kevin Tebbit and Professor Michael Clarke on RUSI's latest Whitehall Paper assessing the controversial decision to go into Helmand province, Afghanistan. In 2006, British forces entered the Helmand Province of Afghanistan in what would become one of the defining military campaigns of the decade. At great cost in blood and treasure, the UK waged a protracted counter-insurgency against a resurgent Taliban. But how was the decision taken to commit Britain to such a difficult and drawn-out campaign?
Link:http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E4F2ABF372E699
It will be curious to see how this institution so close to Westminster-Whitehall handles the issues.