Two parts of the jigsaw in 2006
Hat tip to a "boots on the ground" input on FRI, even if not supported by a document or source it probably fits well into what happened in 2006:
Quote:
I remember back in 06 and 07 when the human terrain started to shift a little. What I didn’t know then was the tide of unease flowing through the population was (in part) triggered by the arrival of the British army in Helmand. Apparently the SAS and their American counterparts had conducted a comprehensive study of the Helmand in 2005 and had come up with a really good deployment plan. They recommended to the army that it fortify the two largest towns, engage in reconstruction in those towns, leave the current governor in place even though he was a Narco Khan, and most importantly, stay out of the rest of the province. Her Majesties government instead insisted that Karzai remove the governor, focused on poppy eradication and, based on intel that there were only 420 Taliban in the province, decided they could ruck up to densely populated areas and kill them while ignoring all the other pricks milling around as if they were gliding through the ####ing matrix.
Later there is a comment, with a similar caveat:
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In ‘06 the British requested ANA reinforcement for Lashkar Gah. We deployed the Kandak’s second company, along with their ETTs and some SF guys. The British commander on site gladly accepted the ANA, but told the US troops “You lot are too aggressive. We don’t need you.” The ANA looked at the situation and told the ETTs, if you aren’t staying, neither are we.” The whole caravan mounted up and headed back to FOB Rescorla. Since when is being aggressive a bad thing in a combat soldier?
Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=4808#comments
The citations are a minor point within a wide-ranging article, the focus being the period living with the Afghans and the arrival of a contractor that contributed to living within the wire - will locate a suitable thread for that.
424 British troops killed in Afg since 2001.
Two soldiers died this week and that is the KIA figure today.
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The number of British troops in Helmand will be reduced by around 500 between September and the end of the year....to around 9,000 troops...three of the brigade’s infantry companies, which number around 150 personnel, will only serve for three months...
Bye, bye USMC:
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Meanwhile the size of the US force in Helmand will reduce from 20,000 US Marines to 7,000 by the end of October
This is "spin" or wishful thinking:
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It is understood that ISAF numbers in Helmand will be boosted by Afghan security forces and that there will be no requirement for Britain to backfill the US drawdown.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-in-weeks.html
As previous posts have discussed the UK's presence in Helmand, let alone Afghanistan, has little to do with maintaining local security. As every day passes national reputation and how to leave without giving the appearance of the Taliban winning become the deciding factors.
I remain unconvinced that President Karzai and his motley coalition will give Helmand Province the priority for ANSF deployment that first the UK - with allies did - and then the USA, with two USMC brigades.
BBC TV: Our War, new season ...
New Season of Our War is out. Episode One is now on YouTube:
Our War: Into the Hornet's Nest
Tonight - 27 Aug - 21.00 UK time - is episode 2 in BBC 3
Our War: leaves you wondering
JMA,
Thanks for locating the YouTube link. The programme was very good, yes sad and left one wondering what the infantry company was doing - diverting the Taliban from hindering highway building and becoming a bullet & IED "magnet".
A few "armchair" points: the British RoE prevented firing on vehicles carrying the Taliban into position was left unexplained. The Taliban's preparation of deserted compounds with multiple IEDs and the British ability to move at night unhindered.
BBC News articles in support of the film; a three minute clip:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19315410
Quote:
A British military operation in Helmand claimed two lives in the summer of 2010, including that of Capt Andrew Griffiths. His father, Brig Mike Griffiths, is the most senior serving officer to have lost a child in Afghanistan, and two years on, he uses his own experience of grief to advise visiting officers, whose job it is to break the news of deaths and injuries to Army families.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19243508
'Death Valley' not so grim
Last night's episode was not so grim, even if a deployment in 'Death Valley', between Gereshk and Sangin IIRC. The infantry platoons featured each took over a patrol base from a USMC company, on a tarmacked highway alongside the 'Green Zone'; initially they tried foot patrolling and had to change to vehicle-borne patrolling. The main enemy being IEDs and snipers.
The most significant segment came at the end. Following an IED killing a minibus full of locals en route to a wedding, even though it ignored signals to stop by the troops, the local Afghan attitude swiftly changed. Measured in friendly encounters and enrolling thirty military age males a day on biometrics, which IIRC led to three arrests including one prison escapee.
Oddly no there was no commentary on the accompanying ANSF, on patrol and inside the patrol bases. They appeared to be ANCOP, not ANA.
Clearing the fog of ignorance
TDB,
Yes the third episode was grim, especially as it was Lt. Mark Evison, of the Welsh Guards - whose diary was partly published shortly after his death by his mother. Three years on I just remember his criticism "mowing the lawn" and questioning the rational for their presence.
Worth reading his mother's recent interview too; she consented to the footage being shown:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...ghanistan.html
I have chosen one short passage, which is prefaced with:
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But while public support for front-line soldiers has steadily grown, ignorance lingers about just what they face in Afghanistan.
(Then she speaks) Programmes like Our War are important,even if I find them very upsetting. They show the grittiness, the hands-on aspects of the war, exactly what is going on. There is still very hard fighting in Afghanistan.
Why would anyone invest in Helmand?
Indeed, why would anyone do so? The link is to a blog on the UK DFID website by their top official in Helmand:http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/catrionalain...st-in-helmand/
It is well different and far too much "spin". Take this passage for example:
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So what makes Helmand – only one of Afghanistan’s 34 Provinces different? Well one difference is that Helmand is the largest Province by geography.
Yes, but hardly anyone lives outside the Helmand Valley, better known as 'The Green Zone'. Not a word about poppy growing.
I couldn't resist the offer to give feedback and my comment is 'awaiting moderation':
Quote:
Simple answer, no I will not invest in Helmand. Nor should my government. This campaign since 2006 has overall been a disaster for the UK and the local people – who have died in their thousands or had their homes destroyed.
Yes Helmand Province is large, but 90% plus of the people live in the ‘Green Zone’ and as recent footage has shown this means it is densely populated.
If the locals want democracy what happened in the six districts that do not have ‘simple democracy’ Which districts are they?
Even ISAF admit 90% of the Taliban fight within a few kilometres of their home; quite contrary to your passage ‘ This makes it much more difficult for the insurgency to present a credible alternative’. We may not like it, but the Taliban have become a rival government. Let alone the impact of the local, Pashtun culture and history of resistance to outsiders.
This is from DFID who spent cash on a children’s adventure park with a Ferris wheel, paid for water wells at the cost of US$100k each – after GIRoA took its fee – sorry bribes – and supplied farmers with ammonium nitrate in a chemical composition that enabled its use as an explosive.
Finally the conference in Kabul aims to ‘lock in’ outsiders, the people who will decide are the local people, who will they choose after 2014 GIRoA or the Taliban? You use the word ‘fragile’, better would be temporary.