They tracked him in a vehicle which could've been hit
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
...I lke the story of Mullah Omar escaping death, as a AGM was aimed at the front of the building he was in and he exited the rear door after impact.
davidbfpo
many times. IIRC, took too long to go all the way to CentCom to get a decision the guys on the ground should have made so he arrived at the house and entered before the Navy JAG Captain and Franks announced their flawed (IMO) decision. :(
That's one of the major EBO problems; it doesn't consider the second and third order effects of gross stupidity on our part...:rolleyes:
Objective Determination Article
Slapout that was a good article, and for the most part good examples of effective uses of air power. However, I didn't see any reference directly or indirectly to EBO, which is probably why it was good. :) The entire article was well worth the read, but I want to focus on objectives and endstates to further my argument against EBO (as practiced today).
LTC Wolusky, USAF writes:
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Objective determination involves deciding what to accomplish in a campaign, thereby allowing one to focus on the desired end state. A good air campaign objective is clear, concise, attainable, measurable, and directly supportive of the JFC’s and president’s national security goals.
later in the article he uses our Operation in Somalia as an example,
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The UN’s desired end state called for creating “an environment in which the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations can assume full responsibility for the security and operation of the Somalia humanitarian relief efforts.” Under this vague guidance for the political objectives, Maj Gen Steven L. Arnold, military commander of Army forces in Somalia, could neither develop discrete military objectives nor a clear exit strategy other than “to be able to eventually leave.”
Shifting directions from policy makers and a fatal deficiency of tenable objectives forced the military to improvise from day to day and just “muddle through.
In a different article, MG Fastabend made a similiar argument when he wrote,
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EBO advocates a strict planning focus on outcomes isolated from actor or method, and this in turn leads to operational planning that rapidly devolves into a ridiculous essay, a listing of aspirations: ‘let us eliminate corruption, isolate the border, prevent sectarian tension.’ Such aspirations, with no consideration of who must do what by when are worse than useless; they are damaging because they conceal the need to make hard choices.
My stance is that effects based thinking has some utility, but the effects based operations process is critically flawed exactly because it does lead to these vague ideas. Do we really have to eliminate corruption and isolate borders to achieve our military objective? If that is the case our country would have fallen years ago. Those are nice long term goals, but not for our military. What is our task and purpose? What does winning look like? What do we need to do to get there? The EBO process doesn't get us there at the operational and tactical level. I'm not yet convinced it gets us there at the strategic level.
LTC Wolusky, USAF adds, the
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Chechnya occupation, and Vietnam War are all examples of military operations without workable end states. Every party to a conflict has its own desired end state, but unless it is achievable, protracted and interminable warfare results.
GEN Mattis's memo may have been harsh, and may result in temporarily throwing the baby out with the bathwater, but at the same time we urgently need clear and useful guidance today if we're going to make progress in Afghanistan. The academics can resurface the son of EBO later, right now we need a functional warfighting doctrine.
Systems thinking is a slinky toy...
It can fall off the steps unless pointed precisely... :wry:
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Originally Posted by
slapout9
Solving a crime is recreating the past. To do that you must find and understand the history that led up to the crime or predicament.
I'd say that was arguable, partly in view of the many crimes that are solved by confessions, tips and being caught in the act or with the goods... ;)
Regardless and accepting your statement as correct, that gets us only to the present. As you further say, it doesn't predict the future. The problem is that some adherents will attempt to use EBO to do just that as you sort of point out here:
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Analyzing and understanding situations as systems is sound....predicting the future is not. What you can do is project forward in time an estimate of the situation and plan for various contingencies. Systems thinking and analysis will certainly help you do it because it is fractal, a pattern the repeats itself at all levels and situations, thus giving you a common or joint planning template for both miliary/govenment and non-government agencies, in both conflict and non-conflict environments. (emphasis added / kw)
I can agree with that last sentence -- however, only with respect to a non-conflict environment (if I correctly understand how you're using that phrase). Given conflict; i.e. an armed confrontation, you're faced with multiple variables dependent upon the terrain (human and otherwise) -- all the METT-TC factors -- and your and the opponents moves which can both range from stupid to brilliant and thus favorably or unfavorably affect each other and thus modify outcomes in unpredictable ways.
Systems thinking has a place, even in combat -- but its use must be very carefully watched lest the systems lovers get carried away and foresee things that won't occur or fail to react to those that do due to linear thinking and target fixation. On balance, EBO offers more potential for harm in ground combat than it offers benefits. Painstaking police work has solved a lot of crimes, it's also failed to solve many. Conversely, intuitive cops have some successes -- experienced and intuitive combat commanders have even more...
I agree on all counts. My suspicion is that
Mattis, as you said, is simply trying to prevent misapplication by those not in that minority you cite...
EBO/MOE/MOP--accounting dream (or nightmare?)
I submit that EBO is what a junior accountant would come up with if asked to develop a system/methodology for planning high level strategic operations. The bad news is that the system does not seem to have any Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to back it up. If it does, then either the average practitioner has no clue what the GAAP is or the body of "rules" that make up the GAAP is so dynamic as to be nearly useless as foundational operating principles. (Calvin ball again rears its head.)
WARNING: Metaphor shift ahead
Based on the accounting/GAAP analogy, I agree with Bill Moore that General Mattis has taken action to switch a runaway train on to a siding before it causes a lot of damage to the rest of the line. If/when someone is able to figure out how to keep the locomotive's governor/speed regulator/brake system from malfunctioning (create/stabilize the GAAP of EBO), maybe the EBO train will be allowed back on the main line.
(Sorry for mixing metaphors :wry:)