MG Flynn on the State of the Insurgency
Hat tip to KOW for picking this up, a ppt by Major General Flynn, entitled 'State of the InsurgencyTrends, Intentions and Objectives' (Unclassified) and the link is:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/fly...+(Kings+of+War)
KOW has a summary and I cannot improve on it.
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Then he drops what might be the biggest bomb in the entire deck: 'The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely' at least in terms of arms and ammunition, funding, and recruits. Now, that is a pretty grim portrait. Of course, the Taliban are not supermen, they have weaknesses and, according to Flynn, they are not yet a popular movement throughout the country. (moving on)
But he does make it clear what he is thinking: 'Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum requires protecting the population and changing perceptions'.
Seems sound to me. The rub, of course, is trying to turn that good advice into action and then reality.
I am surprised SWC did not pick this up earlier, although the ppt is dated late December 2009. One of the four comments raises issues that have appeared in many threads: end state sought, objectives etc.
A matter of perspective...
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Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
It seems to me that it is entirely possible that neither side can win: that the international community cannot defeat the insurgency or build a stable, functional, Afghan government that can assure security and exercise effective control over large parts of the country, while the Taliban cannot (given both their ethnic and sectarian opponents, as well as rivals within the Pashtun community) capture Kabul as they did in September 1996.
I think I've made this point before, the real risk—from an Afghan perspective---is that this become the prolonged reality. The international community slowly disengages from a COIN fight is can't win, but throws enough money and guns at the ANA/ANP, the ex-Northern Alliance, southern warlords, and others (including Iranian support to Hazara militias) to stalemate the Taliban. The Taliban, on the other hand, consolidate practical control over parts of the country, while fighting a continued civil war.
The depressing model here is Lebanon, 1975-90. Everyone (Israel, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the PLO, Iran, etc.) simply threw resources at local clients in such a way to prevent their opponents from 'winning."
And perspectives drive priorities, which in turn shape the nature of engagement.
When one defines 'victory' what perspective, exactly, are they assessing that from? Even in politics we describe these things in terms of one particular candidate or party "winning" and the other "losing." What of the populace? How did the populace fare? Did the people win or lose or really have no change in their lives from the perceived victory or loss?
This goes to what I have described as "Government-Centric engagement" (where one commits themselves or their country to the preservation of a particular government or even form of government over some other); or "Threat-Centric engagement" (where one commits themselves or their country to the defeat of some particular threat) with little regard to the impact on the very populace that is either governed by that government you seek to sustain (or take down, for that matter); or from which the threat one is hard-set to defeat emanates from.
I believe we see a bit of both of this in Afghanistan. We can say we are conducting "Population-Centric COIN", but that is really describing TACTICs, not the strategic/operational focus. At the strategic/operational level we simply cannot seem to wean ourselves from making our priority the preservation of some form or particular man in government; or from the defeat of some particular threat.
This is the phenomenon that I attempted to address in the two papers that I published regarding what I termed "Populace-centric engagement." (Thread and links on SWJ). Suggesting that in the emerging information age with vastly empowered populaces and corresponding evolving perspectives on "sovereignty" that now, more than ever, it might be far more effective to worry less about preserving or defeating governments; or defeating "threats" in the pursuit of national interests; but to instead focus on designing engagement that builds relationships with the very populaces of the world as well.
In reality this in simplest terms is a shift of priority. We state that the Defeat of the Taliban is NOT our priority in Afghanistan. We state that the preservation of the Karzai Government is NOT our priority in Afghanistan. We state instead, that enabling stability, good governance, and a positive relationship with the PEOPLE of Afghanistan is our priority.
This puts Mr. Karzai on notice that we are not here to protect, preserve or even support HIM. He is expendable. He must lead, follow, or get out of the way.
This prevents us from painting ourselves into an "exit strategy-less" corner that makes "defeat" of some particular threat the measure of success, when in fact, that threat may well hold a portion of the answer.
This prevents us from designing a scheme of engagement that may appear to make headway in preserving governmental stability in a country, or in quelling threats to that government, but does so on the backs of the very populace that government is supposed to support. I believe far too much of our Cold War and post-Cold War engagement in the Middle East in particular falls into this category. And I believe it is this very form of engagement that forms the existential threat to the U.S.; not the governments or threats that draw so much of our attention currently.
I never said change was easy.
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Originally Posted by
Entropy
Just a few questions.
How do you operationalize such a shift in priority? How do you get the people to trust you, the foreign occupier, over Karzai, the Taliban or the local warlord? Karzai cannot be easily separated from his constituents and base of support. Once he is kicked to the curb, how do you prevent him and his allies from throwing a wrench into your efforts to bring governance and stability to the Afghan people (which is something that's happened at the provincial level on at least a couple of occasions)? Similarly, If defeat of the Taliban is not a priority, then what will prevent them from promoting instability? What do you plan to do about local leadership & powerbrokers, who are the gatekeepers to the loyalty local populations, to say nothing of the major players? Does the US and NATO have the resources and resilience build governance over the long haul provided Karzai doesn't play ball? In short, good governance is your goal, so how do you get there in the mess that is Afghanistan?
Good questions. I once worked for a general who would announce to us staff nugs after we had slaved way at some problem for weeks and had achieved a major success "good job! We are now at step 2 of a 100 step process!" (We were all quite pleased when we were assessed at reaching "step 3")
So, what is step one? Well, much like the steps developed for defeating the destructive behavior associated with addictions, the first step is to admit that you have a problem and need to change. Most addicts don't get to that point until they are face down in the gutter with their lives and every relationship that they once valued in total shambles, and their financial and physical health squandered in the pursuit of their addictions.
I would offer that the US is a bit addicted to power and control, and that I would like to see us have that "come to Jesus" moment far prior to waking up face down as a nation in that proverbial gutter.
Step two is to simply recognize that governments come and go, threats rise and fall, but that populaces, while ever dynamic, are what endure. That by linking our efforts to approaches that prioritize our enduring relationship with the populace in the lands where our national interests may fall is in the long run far healthier than linking them to the current government there or some current threat emerging from there. Deal with those government and threats in the context of one’s prioritized relationship with the populace.
Step three would be a major shift of focus from the "State" Department. We are too designed in name and approach to dealing with "States", yet everyone recognizes the rise of non-states; the growing number of "failed" states, and the growing empowerment of people in general due to the access to greater and faster information. A "Foreign Office" construct is probably more inclusive and descriptive. Once the name is fixed they can then set about looking at how does the US approach to foreign policy need to be tuned up to operate with less friction in the emerging global environment. Certainly they'll still primarily work by through and with states. We hopefully just won't get so tied to the manifestations of government, and grow a better focus on the populace which that governance represents.
(I've never gotten past step three with that one particular general, so I'll stop there. Just getting to step three would be a tremendous shift in the right direction.)
He's neither our problem nor our responsibility.
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Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
What if he can't lead and won't follow, which on the basis of form to date seems likely? How do you propose to get him out of the way?
Easy. Pack it up and go home. If's he's legit, he'll prevail against both official and unofficial challengers. If not, he'll soon be replaced and we can make that government the same offer we made him; to be a supportive ally that will not allow them to harbor organizations bent on doing us harm. That in exchange for working with us on that concern of ours we will help them with concerns of their own.
My wife teaches third grade. She sets standards for rewards and punishments with her students and holds herself and them to those social contracts ruthlessly. As a result she has order in her classroom as everyone knows what the standards are and that they will be held to those standards. Our foreign policy is more like the classroom management of those teachers who agonize over hurt feelings if someone gets what's coming to them, or the burden to themselves if they actually perform as promised to either punish or reward certain behavior, teaching the class that the standards don't really mean anything. Those classrooms are chaos, and everyone suffers from it. Our foreign policy could use a good dose of 3rd grade classroom management.
Decisions like this are why a President gets up in the morning.
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Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
I think we all know he won't prevail. He'll probably be replaced by the Taliban (with possibly a few equally dysfunctional governments in between), who won't be interested in our help and will not care at all about what we will or will not allow. In short, this brings us back where we were before, which is why Karzai is pretty sure we won't do it.
Seems we're right back to something we've done before: harnessing ourselves to a Government that cannot stand, but which we cannot allow to fall. Hasn't worked so well in the past, and I can't say I'm terribly optimistic about the outcome this time out.
My concern are the guys and gals who brief him up on his options prior to making those decisions. With an overly threat-focused intel community; and an overly state-foucsed policy team; we are ill equipped to provide him the type of analysis that is most relevant for the world we live in today. Between the "Good Cold Warriors" on one side, and the neo-socialists on the other the voices of reason are either too few or simply not allowed access to the debate.