There are a lot more than 100....
China alone has over 300, including modern versions known as the SU-30MKK. India has 40 SU-30s and licenses to make 140 more. There are 449 SU-27s in service in Russia. Lots of other folks, like Vietnam and Venezuala have them or have them on order.
The SU-27 has seen very limited combat by the Eritrean AF.
The list of countries procuring the Flanker is a long one, many of whom could be potential adversaries, although the liklihood of fighting any of them is arguable. Some of them, such as India, field very well trained pilots indeed. Others probably are very clueless on modern tactics and wouldn't use the aircraft near its capabilities at all.
I do agree, that the timeline for designing and procuring takes far too long. The whole acquisition system, starting with the POM, needs to be completely rethought.
Here are some worries to consider
Quote:
Originally Posted by
George Raihala
And I guess I don't get the rationale that if we get into a fight with China or the others we'll have "much worse worries", as if that means we don't have to pay attention to winning the air superiority battle. Is it better somehow to make it even worse by ceding control of the the air as well?
Fascinating thread.
I'll let Ski answer for himself what our much worries might be besides whether we have air superiority in a war with China, but before it deteriorates to that point, I'd expect:
1. China to have presumably dumped their holding of US currency reserves on the markets. That's about $1.756 trillion.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_exchange_reserves
Confederate money, for its novelty value, may be worth more than the $US dollar at that point.
2. Oil finished trading today at $136 or so. Ready for $1,000 per barrell-- who knows if it would even be trading at that stage.
This list could go on. Would such economic catastrophes induce saner heads to come to some kind of negotiated solution?
I only bring this up because others are citing the economic costs of this equipment. The economic costs in a runup with a war with China would give some a crash course in basic international economics. A diplomatic compromise might look alot better when confronted with this.
There are several benefits in being old.
- Discounts at Waffle House.
- Ability to substitute 'their' for 'there.'
- Having witnessed American resiliency put to the test in circumstances far worse than those that pertain today.
- Ability to use Bush's 'misunderestimate' in lieu of the more correct but lengthier 'fail to properly appreciate the depth of.'
- Being able to pontificate knowing full well one is not infallible... :D
Live long enough to be a total
embarrassment to your kids, they say.
I have exceeded all expectations. :D
How the Air Force Fell So Far
How the Air Force Fell So Far by Loren B. Thompson, Lexington Institute.
Quote:
The forced resignation of the Air Force's top civilian and uniform leaders last week is the latest chapter in a chronicle of decline that has been unfolding for decades. The political influence of U.S. air power has gradually ebbed away since the cold war ended, and the resulting vacuum has been filled by representatives from other services, most notably the Navy. Air Force officers today are largely excluded from the uppermost tier of the joint command structure, and have grown accustomed to being out of step with the priorities of senior political appointees running the Pentagon. Some proponents of air power offer conspiracy theories to explain why the Air Force has fallen to the lowest point in its sixty-year history. But an honest appraisal of what happened suggests that the service's wounds are mostly self-inflicted.
Perhaps the greatest defect of Air Force leaders in recent times has been their failure to adapt to the changing demands of a transformed global security environment. The Air Force won its independence from the Army and became first among equals in joint military counsels by offering a theory of strategic bombing that seemed uniquely responsive to the geopolitical rivalries of the industrial age. The promise of air power at its inception was that it could hit the "vital centers" of enemy power, and thus bring speedy victory that avoided the static trench warfare of World War One. A generation later, nuclear weapons made air power even more potent -- not so much as an agent of victory, but as a tool of deterrence. However, U.S. defeat in Vietnam signaled that the source of danger was shifting to elusive, unconventional aggressors, and the Air Force failed to change as fast as the threat did...
Interesting that your quote is to you more important than this:
Quote:
Perhaps the greatest defect of Air Force leaders in recent times has been their failure to adapt to the changing demands of a transformed global security environment. The Air Force won its independence from the Army and became first among equals in joint military counsels by offering a theory of strategic bombing that seemed uniquely responsive to the geopolitical rivalries of the industrial age. The promise of air power at its inception was that it could hit the "vital centers" of enemy power, and thus bring speedy victory that avoided the static trench warfare of World War One. A generation later, nuclear weapons made air power even more potent -- not so much as an agent of victory, but as a tool of deterrence. However, U.S. defeat in Vietnam signaled that the source of danger was shifting to elusive, unconventional aggressors, and the Air Force failed to change as fast as the threat did...
Proving that priorities differ from person to person, I guess...