The Petraeus Thinkers: Five Challenges
Herschel Smith discusses the issues raised in this thread at his Captain's Journal web log - The Petraeus Thinkers: Five Challenges.
Characteristics of repeated lying and tribal loyalties
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Originally Posted by
SWJED
For those of you who have yet to take a minute to read this Captain's Journal blog, you guys and gals now literally fighting this war for all of us, I urge you now to do so.
My views dating from 1963-1965 stationed in Karachi @ our then US Embassy and ever since concur with much or most of what this blog says, but I am simplier and more blunt spoken:
1. Both uneducated and even educated Muslims, be they Iraqis, Afghans, Pakistanis, of the UAE, name any Muslim world nation, are flat out, everyday, all the time liars. They make up b.s. to suit the moment and are totally unable in most cases to deal in reality.
2. I conclued 40 years ago in Pakistan they did this for two simple reasons:
a) To "get along with" what they thought a Westerner wanted to hear and be told, despite the grim facts of real life in their part of the world.
b) To appeal to any/a Westerner's "tourist sense" in hopes of getting you to buy something that was not as it seemed in their lying presentation.
3. Culturally, tribalism and ethic, sub-sets of culture that date back long before Islam existed, run very deep. If they could, for example, the Pakhtuns would form their own economically illogical nation out of parts of mainly Pakistan and Afghanistan. Ditto the boys in Balochistan, where Pakistan has it's own hot small war running largely out of control today. The bulk of these fellows are uneducated or undereducated, many youth today cannot/could not afford the uniform required of a/as child to attend for instance a Pakistani public school, but the Madrass schools will take them in, totally free, without such requirements, and educate and brain wash them ASAP, turning out ready made suicide bombers and terrorists. All funded of course, in the main, with Saudi Wahabbi money, the most extreme Sunnis Islam.
I have never been in Iraq, but have been several times in Iran. On Iraq, which is mainly Arab in composition as I understand, but then split between Sunni and Shiia, in the main, Islam, you have wild tribal characteristics that run back to the Old Testament argument of who was Abraham's "favored" son, Ishamael, born of Haggar, or Isaac, born of Sarah.
Understand that most Arabs can't even read so only a semi-literate to a literate Arab Muslim would even know or care about or understand that this early simple dicotomy of Ishmael vs. Isaac was used by Muhammed as the foundation stone to claim the "origin" of Islam from our common worship of the same God "ancestry."
Pakistan is mostly non-Arab, as is Iran, as you all know. No words wasted here, but the Islamic characteristic of huge lies and wild made up stories for whatever purpose, of late, to defame the West in general and the US/UK specifically, is the order of the day, clearly.
The Islamic characteristic of lying as a form of daily life dates back in my lifetime to my days in Pakistan, 40 years ago, and goes on today unabated, part of the "lore and culture" for lack of a sharper definition.
Again, the Captain's Journal blog is worth the read. While he invites comments, and I saw none, I think this larger forum would be the better place to comment back to the Captain's Journal blog, which is why this statement is my comment on that journal blog.
George Singleton, Colonel, USAF, Ret. (6 years active duty up front, the rest mainly individual reserve with regular forces at the JCS level, total service 32 years)
Former Commander, Det. 2, 6937th Comm Gp, old USAFSS, attached to the US Air Attache Office, American Embassy, Karachi, then West Pakistan, 1963-1965; former International Banking Officer, Asia (incl. SW Asia) Division, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., NYC, now part of JP Morgan Chase Bank; Assisant Deputy Commander for "the" Desert Storm Airlift out of Charleston AFB, SC, 1991; retired (reserve wise) from duty with HQ USSOCOM, formerly USREDCOM; detached reserve duty on TDY orders (repeatedly) with HQFORSCOM when/while then Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, USA was very "briefly", mainly on paper, the CG; TDY orders periodically for two years on war plans staff, joint/interservice/NATO, under Admiral Kelso, of Tailhook fame, while he was then CINCLANT out of Norfolk, VA. US Department of Veterans Affairs, Area National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Acting Manager, based out of Bham VAMC, 1993/1994. A coaltion of VA; DOD; the US Public Health Service (PHS): and FEMA which deals with actual operable plans for both domestic and international terrorist, natural, or war disasters. NDMS responded from across the nation with teams to the World Trade Towers both in 1993 and in 2001, as a small example. NDMS also sent teams a year ago to Kashmir to help with earthquake relief. Only meant as info basic background not meant as an old coot's bragging. You guys know more in a year of today's small wars than we did in a lifetime!
War was with Baathis (Nazis) Party headed by Saddam
To amplify your good remarks. The war was against the Baathis Party, made up of specific tribes, all Sunnis, of which party Saddam was the dictator and head. Baathist Party dates back well before WW II and is 100% built on the Nazi model. Hitler and his Nazi regime were/are popular in Iraq among the Baathists for a few simple reasons:
1. Antisemitism appeals to radical Sunni Baathists, before, during, and ever since WW II. They flatly hate Jews, long before the founding of Israel the Baathist hated Jews.
2. An early Baathis Mufti in fact became a General in the Nazi SS and went from today's Iraq to Nazi Germany to command his Muslim storm troopers as part of Hitlers army against the USSR/Russians.
3. De-Baathification is better understood as de-Nazification. That is what it is.
However, the US and our allies, even at the end of WW II, did not totally dismantle either the German nor the Japanes police at home nor all their troops in the field immediately. We in fact used the in place Japanese Army initially to help maintain law and order in what is today Malaysia and South China, as we had insufficient forces in these areas to do the security job then needed. Just one example.
Cheers,
George Singleton
Simplier and more blunt spoken !
Greetings George !
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2. I conclued 40 years ago in Pakistan they did this for two simple reasons:
a) To "get along with" what they thought a Westerner wanted to hear and be told, despite the grim facts of real life in their part of the world.
b) To appeal to any/a Westerner's "tourist sense" in hopes of getting you to buy something that was not as it seemed in their lying presentation.
A great summation that applies to nearly all of Sub-Sahara (and darn few Arabs there).
I would watch our State counterparts (who dare not go outside the embassy walls during social and political upheaval) send their drivers and gardners to gather info :D
Once info in hand, they would begin the arduous task of writing the day's report (your first reason above). The Zairian merely gave his "patron" exactly what he thought his patron wanted to hear. Tha fact that is was nowhere near true, meant little.
Regards, Stan
My reply to Tom is now "missing"???
Tom, I guess someone wishes not to have my factual, detailed reply that I entered here earlier today and which initially was posted?
Cheers,
George Singleton
Ph.D.s. and The DoD/DOS disconnect
Long ago and far away in the Land of Ahs (the marketing campaign used by the Kansas department of tourism when I lived there in the mid 80s), the Army taught me during CGSC about a thing called the "country team." I guess that hummer is passé now.
One would think that DoD and DoS should be joined at the hip throughout the planning and execution process whenever the US gets ready to involve itself in some OCONUS adventure. Likewise, one would think that a similar relationship would exist between DoD and DHS for a CONUS-focused operation.
It is not clear to me that we need a bunch of Ph.D's in uniform to solve the problem in Iraq. Someone else on this thread masterfully described a Ph.D. as a person who has gone from a macroscopic grasp of knowledge to becoming an expert in a piece of minutiae (I admit I have wordsmithed that other post greatly). What we really need are people who can see that many folks are stakeholders and have a part to play in the solution; we need people without blinders on or otherwise afflicted with tunnel vision. We need some folks who are wise, not just smart. Solomon, where are you???
Country Teams and Solomon
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Long ago and far away in the Land of Ahs (the marketing campaign used by the Kansas department of tourism when I lived there in the mid 80s), the Army taught me during CGSC about a thing called the "country team." I guess that hummer is passé now
CTs were my life and sometimes life was rather like the Hatfields and the McCoys as Stan and I encountered in our tour together in Zaire. Stan Reber was instrumental in identifying cousins and those who only claimed kinship.
Rwanda was a much closer CT. The team leader, Ambassador David Rawson, set the tone and that was cooperate, coordinate, and watch each other's back.
But I will also say the same kind of play occurred inside the Beltway; during Desert Storm it was much like Rwanda. Later when I visited from Rwanda, the inter-agency feud was in play like Zaire.
In another post on here by Menning, he put up George Packer's New Yorker article on Dave Kilcullen and Montgomery McFate. The article is an extract of Assassins Gate. Anyway Packer relates how Kilcullen came to the attention of Paul Wolfowitz because of Kilcullen's writings on irregular war.
I am glad that happened; I wish that in 2002 when Wolfowitz in speaking to Congress dimissed ethnic schisms in Iraq as trivial concerns when compared to the Balkans, he had stumbled across someone besides Ahmed Chalabi.
McFate is anthropologist whom Packer descibes as a missionary for the importance of cultural knowledge. An anthropologist, she had become a consultant for the Navy.
The Army and the Marines have long had a FAO program. The Navy and the Air Force started theirs in the 1990s when the JCS saw how important FAOs were to understanding the "New World Order" based on operations in the Middle East and Africa. I offer a quote on that very subject from 1994 I used to close my memoirs :
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...I had two very important encounters with FAO’s during my recent trip to Africa and Europe:
...First, in Africa, I saw how important LTC Marley and LTC Odom are to their respective Ambassadors and to the CINC. They are both out in harm’s way using their unique skills to be invaluable eyes and ears in this crisis...
...As I go around the Army today, I find that the Marley’s and the Odom’s are as important as ever—maybe even more important when consider the role they could play in many of the crises we are facing almost daily.
Gordon R. Sullivan General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
The Army has long had Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and PSYOPs. Kilcullen's experiences have resurfaced what many of those forces along with FAOs have understood for decades.
In a round about way I am making three points:
a. Our decisions are often made without counsel when there are many Solomons at hand.
b. Sometimes it takes an outsider--because they are an outsider--to be heard.
c. And any reaction depends on who is doing the listening.
Tom
Country Team doesn't cut it when there isn't one
Wm,
You are one of the few that implies that our interagency process is functional. They still teach us about the country team, and I have it seen it work well for missions in Liberia, Senegal, Philippines, etc.; however, there was no country team in Iraq or Afghanistan. There is a "huge" difference in scale from advising a government, to standing one up; advising a gov on economic models, to standing up a working model, etc.
The State Department (and this is only one agency) still can't mobilize enough resources to perform their functions in Iraq. The military is the only organization in the U.S. government that is robust enough to execute the DIME/MIDLIFE tasks in a situation like this. It would be worthwhile for me to see what the military's role was in post war Japan and Germany for reference.
If we are going to take those missions on, then I would argue we need a cadre of PhD (forget the PhD, we guys and gals educated on how to do this) advisors to enable us to perform these functions at an acceptable level.
Obviously State needs more funding, but just throwing money at the problem won't solve the problem, it will also require a significant culture change. Second, do we want to throw that much money at State for this type of venture? If we make that investment, it would imply we're signing up for a few more regime changes down the road. I don't think that is cost effective. The military will always provide the bulk of the doers in hostile situations.
By no means am I taking taking anything away from the country team, I seen it function well when the "right" personalties were in place.
We have all seen the result of what happens when the military waits for an alleged capability. I'm not faulting State, I understand some of the beltway politics that led to this. None the less, I think we need this capability in the military.