Interjections for consideration.
Cliff:
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But you can still create a model of any system, and attempt to apply probabilities to it.
Can you define the 'you' quoted?
Can you insure that the 'you' involved will always be someone competent to make the judgements required?
I submit that if the answer to the first question is not 'whoever is in the chair at the time' and the answer to second question is not anyone of 'moderate intellect with experience in the efforts to be undertaken' then the concept is flawed. A strategic conceptualization that does not itself prepare to contend with the vagaries of humans is unlikely to provide an effective approach to dealing with problems or situations involving humans. If a concept takes an exceptionally capable person or persons to make it effective then it is likely to fail at any time employed by lesser beings. There are a lot of those about... :wry:
I've watched the US Army among others try to develop mechanistic theories to improve planning and other capabilities. None of them really worked well, mostly because attempts to make people think in mechanical terms, to apply metrics to everything, simply are rejected by most minds. Some people think like that, the vast majority do not and will subtly resist being forced to do so.
This question from Cliff deserves an answer and I'm sure pvebber has one:
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So we should throw up our hands and give up? What do you suggest as an alternative?
However, in the interim, my answer is "pretty much what we humans have been doing for thousands of years when confronted with complex systems -- make the best judgment possible with the information available at the time." The item in bold is to illustrate another flaw in the Warden approach; to return to his background, nations and people do not react IAW the laws of physics like airplane do thus perfect or near perfect information on which to make decisions will rarely be available. In fact, generally far from perfect information is available in small quantities and some of that may have been skewed by the opponent and there will assuredly be gaps and errors in that which is available. You cannot perform Slap's "good systems analysis" far more often than you can do so...
I've long observed and we all really know that flawed input leads to erroneous conclusions which in turn drive improper responses. To use Slap's analogy, if you think the electricity is important -- and it is not -- then you can screw up. Indeed, you may do more harm than good. Conversely you may go Iraq and deliberately not attack the power system so that it can be used by you or your new friends...:rolleyes:
pvebber:
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..."theory at the theoretical level" and not be troubled to dig into the implications of that theory or the need to "roll up the sleeves" and find the devil's in the details.
Interesting observation. While I have not had the pleasure of talking to Colonel Warden, I have in encountered people in all four services who unfortunately tend toward that approach. I've met a very few who could and would adapt their theory to cope with reality but they've been the exception. I mention that to address your subsequent point:
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In broad terms keeping "theory theoretical" is OK - until someone says that we need to throw out our vocabulary and rethink our concepts of doing business.
The current US Army training system was adapted from several civilian technical training theories designed ib the late 1940s to train assembly line workers. It was not appropriate for the Army even in the bad recruiting days of the mid 70s when it was adopted -- it is today totally inappropriate for a professional force. We still have it. It was a theory, it had neat slides, it was adopted by a less than stellar General (pun intended...) and as a result the Army has suffered -- I use the word advisedly -- for over 30 years with that theory. Our moderately well trained Army is as good as it is due to a lot of good leaders doing more than the system provided or required.
Point: It's not just a vocabulary issue, it's far more dangerous: 'neat' ideas get adopted and take on a life of their own.
Slap also says of Warden and applying his theory -- or any strategy -- to specious causes:
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That is why he has consistently said to stay away from such actions.
Yes, he has. So have hundreds of thousands of thinkers before him, to include many in recent time. Any intelligent person would heed such advice. Yet, we went to Viet Nam, to Somalia, to Afghanistan, to Iraq. I think that goes back to who sits in what chair and when...
It's a flawed concept. Not disastrous, just not particularly helpful in many situations. It has certainly use in some cases but it is not safely applicable universally. No theory is.
Leaders, Processes, Infrastructure, Population, Fielded Forces
Let's analyze COL (ret) Warden's perception that attack of the the Five Rings in the title above decreases in importance from left to right.
Leaders:
That's why we are conducting serial Predator/Reaper attacks in Pakistan and night raids in Afghanistan. Don't believe Pakistan would be nearly as receptive to parallel massive bombing of every madrassa and all of Northern Waziristan. The intelligence takes time anyway. It's hard to find a target from the air that does not want to be found. Should we have instead dropped a 2,000 lb bomb on Karzai's erring young relative and multiplied the collateral damage manyfold? Should we be bombing ISI leaders since they seem to be part of the problem? That would go over well.
Processes:
Believe that's why we attempt to replace the poppy-growing in Afghanistan with a different crop, and pursue better government as a solution to graft and warlords. It's difficult to encourage either from 40,000' or many miles off shore.
Infrastructure:
We know who gets blown up by IEDs or sniped trying to secure the host country's rebuilding efforts. The guy on the ground, not in the air or at sea. If you say, we don't need a guy on the ground, I would answer what happens when the enemy has invaded another country and still has guerillas, foreign fighters, and sympathizers staying behind? Do we abandon our allies? Now let's say the offending invader is Russia or China. Do we attack the infrastructure of invaded Ukraine or invader Russia. Russia is big and its hard to retrieve downed pilots there. They have nukes. China too! What happens to our infrastructure (Walmart) and oil supplies (Russia, Iran, Libya, Venezuela, Canada oops sorry).
Population:
Some would say that's why we have a population-centric strategy for locating the bulk of ground forces. It's more difficult to influence the population from 60,000' with a F-22 or B-2. Don't believe either has much of an EO/IR capability with stealth and altitude. How do they assure no collateral damage?
The British population increased its resolve as a result of WWII German bombing of London. A small diameter bomb can take minutes to travel multiple miles during which time targets may move near civilians or vice versa. With a "parallel" strategy and inability to perform BDA for multiple simultaneous targets, we miss failures and lose successes attributed as collateral damage by the adversary.
Fielded Forces:
Conveniently, this has the least priority because it the most difficult for airpower to accomplish. Bad guys can easily hide from airpower once their invasion is complete...and because of blitzkrieg-like ground invasions, they will nearly always be complete IN ALLIED TERRITORY, by the time a decision is made to do something about it.
So the author would say attack the leaders, processes, and infrastructure because they are more important. But the government we leave behind will simply go back to the original undesired behavior or fall again if we like that government, unless our ground forces have the opportunity to train their host nation replacements. It's insufficient to train only host nation pilots.
How long did it take us to find Saddam Hussein and would it take to locate Qaddafi or Kim Jon Il, or Chavez, or Ahmadinejad and Khameini? That last leader would go over well in the Islamic world.
If the leader is a tad crazy as many potential rogue nation leaders are, do they really care about processes and infrastructure? What if religious beliefs subscribe to an austere existence anyway, and jihadist sacrifice of the people is viewed as fully acceptable? What if they have nothing to lose anyway. Look at satellite pictures of North Korea at night to see how much electricity they have. If the enemy army is in allied territory, what stops them for living off the land and goods of the allie ala Sherman? If we ignore the fielded force sitting in allied territory ala Kosovo, and the leader is not as rational as Milosevich was, how does the war end?
Badly and with little accomplished I would respectfully submit. I would like to hear how the sniping would have stopped if NATO peacekeeping forces were not on the ground and if allied ground forces were not threatening a full scale invasion. We see how well we stopped leaders, processes, and infrastructure in Desert Storm without the full monte ground attack until completion. The Shiite populations didn't fare too well, either?
If instead of massive bombing of hidden enemies and hitting populations instead, or their infrastructure/processes (that will make long term friends) we instead attack the invading country on the ground, from the sea, and air...they are forced out of hiding where airpower, long range fires, and rapid maneuver can engage them. They are slowly choked of oil and exports by blockades. Our rapid build-up of ground forces by air initially, and eventually sea, protects ports and airheads from further invasion. Having adequate force remaining for stability operations, and keeping the "enemy" army intact and on our side to help stabilize prevents the problems that occurred in OIF and an initially neglected Afghanistan.
Just an alternative theory some call Joint and Combined Arms warfare and full spectrum operations.
If you are agreeing with Warden, you aren't agreeing with me ;)
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Originally Posted by
slapout9
Posted by Cole:"If instead of massive bombing of hidden enemies and hitting populations instead, or their infrastructure/processes (that will make long term friends) we instead attack the invading country on the ground, from the sea, and air...they are forced out of hiding where airpower, long range fires, and rapid maneuver can engage them. They are slowly choked of oil and exports by blockades. Our rapid build-up of ground forces by air initially, and eventually sea, protects ports and airheads from further invasion. Having adequate force remaining for stability operations, and keeping the "enemy" army intact and on our side to help stabilize prevents the problems that occurred in OIF and an initially neglected Afghanistan."
Cole, your right. You just described Warden's Gulf War 1 Strategy. Perfect 5 rings example, works exactly as advertised.
Two points Slap:
1) Other than the 82n ABN, it took 6 months to sea deploy to Desert Storm which did not end the problem nor did the Iraq no-fly zone. What if Hussein had continued his attack into Saudi Arabia? Early airpower and airborne or SOF forces alone would not have stopped that. Even in 1991 in atypically open terrain, it took the ground attack to dislodge Iraqi forces from defenses and Kuwait so they were more effectively bombed and strafed. Assumptions that Hussein would fall did not pan out anymore than they are now in Libya. Multiple available options from air, land, and sea complement one another and cover multiple contingencies when things don't go as predicted.
2) An easy analogy for you is law enforcement. Is there any law enforcement agency that relies on aircraft or boats for anywhere near the bulk of its efforts. Of course not, because aside from cost (also an issue) even low flying helicopters and harbor ships cannot influence the bulk of the 24/7 ground efforts or respond to and deter crimes.
Ships are slow, vulnerable near the shore, and too far from many threat country interiors and their land-based forces and insurgents. Airpower at higher altitudes and faster speeds, often with a single pilot, cannot begin to locate and effectively target ground threats in complex or urban terrain even with effective electro-optical pods.
It takes someone on the ground finding targets for them, or a slower and lower flying helicopter or unmanned aircraft with a two-man crew and extensive combat arms, intelligence, and operations personnel cueing them to fullly exploit airpower. It takes ground forces able to survive close combat to force the enemy from cover and concealment to fully exploit air attacks and long range fires.
Can't keep up with you, pvebber!
Sorry I am lagging this fight- not enough time to really keep up!
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Originally Posted by
pvebber
How do you determine "predictability"? but thanks for not pushing back on need for predictability :)
I think you have to have ways of defining the confidence you have in your understanding/information, combined with solid political/economic/social/scientific analysis of the available data.
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The problem is if you only consider the predicable part you will an answer KNOWN TO BE WRONG for the system as a whole. Based on what information do you determine predictability? What sort of "exeriments" do you do and on what? THis is the sort of "next level of detail" - detatil that makes the theroy practical - that one never can seem to get to.
Just because you pick the most effective/predictable ways to affect a system doesn't mean the answer will be "KNWON TO BE WRONG" for the whole system. As for the "exeriments", see above- exhaustive analysis of the environment/system. For instance, see here for an effort to understand different human behaviors.
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Cancer is analogous to a major conflict - which poses a "threat to our system - or that of an ally, which is the only context where we are talking about "breaking" an adversary's ability to resist and the Five rings.
Warden talks about affecting the system in this paper, not neccessarily breaking it. I think the cancer analogy is getting in the way.
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Surgery is a tool, it is not class of disease. The structure of the anlogy was to point out that you have a pratictioner looking at a particular category of war (disease) in Warden's case compelling an adversary to do what you want by threatening to break or paralyze him - that is major war.
Your example of operating on a cadavor reinforces my point about the single sidedness of the whole framework! Doing surgury on a cadavor is "complicated" but not complex. You can practive technique, but learn nothing about the response of an actual patient to the shock of being cut open. Rehersal and exercises of any peacetime sort are heavily scripted - sure the individual pilots in Red Flag get to "freeplay" dogfighting to a great extent - but that is like operating on a cadavor - there is no actual response from the actual adversary! You learn a lot about surgery - the tactics of air combat and dropping ordnance, but you learn ZERO about how the enemy "live body" will reposnd to the actual surgery.
First off, a slight side note- at Red Flag there is an actual response from an actual adversary - in fact, the USAF has one of the largest and best resourced Aggressor forces in the world, and they use actual adversary tactics and operational doctrine. Nothing scripted about that. You are suggesting that the only way we can learn better ways of waging war is to actually wage it, and learn by trial and error. I am saying that would be a very wasteful and irresponsible way to operate, although I'll grant you that it seems to be the way we (the US) seem to like to operate. Part of why the USAF has been so successful is because of the culture of the debrief - the fact that (thanks to USAF Weapons School) most USAF warfighters have a structured way of debriefing where honest assessments are conducted of everyone's performance. These debriefs are brutal, and rank doesn't matter in them- in fact, in most cases an O-3 or junior O-4 is the one leading them. Additionally, these lessons are captured in training, and combined with the lessons captured in warfare are used to develop new doctrine and tactics. I would submit this is a much better technique than what we used in WWII - a bunch of theory that had been rehearsed but never really tested or exercise, resulting in the USAAF having to learn by trial and error.
Now I am not saying that this will completely take the enemy's choice out of the equation- far from it. But isn't it a pretty good idea to study all the possible choices the enemy could make, train against the most likely and most dangerous ones, and then develop ways of limiting the enemy's choices?
At some point we hae to make a decision on how we will act, so at some point we've done all the analysis we can and must decide based on potentially imperfect information. At that point we are operating off of our best guess of how the enemy will react to the different effects we attempt to have on his system. But the alternative is to do nothing- which may be a good choice, but many times won't lead to our desired end state.
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"Study of the real world system" is like observing the behavior of patients. It gives a certain level of information, but the probaility of a particular surgury being successful is NOT PREDICTABLE FROM practice on a cadavor and observatin of the human body. "Probabilities" in such cases are at best bayesian measures of belief, not actual physical propensities.
See above. Yes we cannot assign with certainty a definite and completely accurate probability. But since we're humans and not omniscient, we always will be operating on imperfect information!
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And I agree that diagnosis is the most important part. I just don't want a guy diagnosing me that thinks he can learn everything required to be a good doctor by studying books and cutting open cadavors. And thinks the most effective treatment is to give me a handful of pills that will attack all my symptoms at once and will cure me i none fell swoop. There was a time when that was routinely done. It was called "patant medicine" and often resulted in the doctor getting run out town as "snake oil salesman" ;)
See above - the cadaver is as you say practicing techniques and process against the most accurate representation we can make of our adversary, to include the human portions thereof. Most of doctor's knowledge of how the body reacts is based on scientific studies of past occurences. These are not perfect, and don't mean that your body will react exactly the same way (IE "side affects vary but may include...") Unless you never want to be treated by a doctor ever again, you will have to accept that the doctor is making the best guess at what the treatment should be - and in most cases is probably close to right.
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I'm harping on chemotherapy because that is what Warden is selling! (see thesis statement above again - if that is not what you consider the thesis statement, please let me know. I'm trying to argue about the paper and its specific arguments - and hopefully made clear the parts of Warden's theory I agree with, are in harmony with current joint doctrine and conceptual thinking and are not controversial.
Don't disagree- that is the thesis. Your chemotherapy example is wrong- he is arguing for a different method of diagnosis, which will then lead to different treatment in many cases.
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That may be, but that desn't change the fact that the article is fundamentally about airpower advocacy, Warden's overall strategic theory doesn't have to be and I ask the question a different way - whatif Warden had made all the points, but with a thesis statment about how strategic theory has been outpaced in recent years by the unexplored ocean of NEW 'WAYS' transformational technology (MEANS) has given us. Can these new WAYS significantly affect the way we approach achieving ENDS?
You'd still criticize him because he's Col Warden. :)
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If he asked that question, hoping to generate a discussion, then I think the result would have been far more positive. The fact he did not approach the paper from the point of view of "What are the implications of new WAYS on how we think about ENDS", but rather from the point of view of an airpower advocay piece, detracts from the broader applicability of his ideas on strategy and almost deliberately invokes a viceral "Here comes the Airpower Mafia starting to lay the ground work for the budget battle over the new Bomber". I fully concede that this is probably as much a bias effect as not...
I think it is funny... as I have mentioned before, the USAF is the one service that it is "cool" to bash. You don't see the USMC, USN, or USA bashing each other to the same extent (especially here), but just mention airpower and watch the spears fly. I think a lot of this stems from the bad blood from the 50s when the USAF took msot of the money due to the decision to rely on the few nukes we had to allow a smaller budget... I understand that folks can't get accept the fact that maybe an article has validity even though it was written by an airpower advocate for the USAF's professional journal.
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Replace the notion that "complexity" is a continuum of "complicated-ness" with the notion that there is a threshold where a combination of "complicated" but casually simple systems reach a "point of no return" beyond which they are no longer "complicated arrangements of simpple things" but "Complex" entities that will no longer exhibit their full range of behaviors if they are simplified back below that line.
I understand the concept- again I ask you what is the alternative? you essentially are saying that there's no way to envision a future and plan to try and reach it. If you really think that, then how are we (the military) to be ready for future conflicts? How do we ever achieve our objectives? I think a lot of our problems sometimes stem from the US military (and the USG's) penchant for making things more complicated than they need to be. See here for an example... This often results in us wringing our hands while we wait for perfect information. As Patton said, "a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week".
V/R,
Cliff