Yes. Long overdue at that...
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Originally Posted by
Cavguy
...Ranger BNs special...At heart, they are highly resourced and trained light infantry. They have selective entry standards, and can drop any non-performer for any reason...They receive copious amounts of training time and little in the way of red cycle BS the GPF endures.
True. Some day most will realize that 'SOF' has become a misused term. Because regular infantry training from 1975 until quite recently was severely lacking in rudimentary skills that were once taught all Infantrymen, so-called SOF missions became the province of a select few.
I will guarantee you that will not last in a real MIC / HIC war. It cannot..
Fortunately, the Army (I think) has learned that many units can do the old so-called 'Ranger' missions while the Rangers do other things. As Field Marshall Sir W. Slim, arguably one of the best WW II Commanders if not the best, said, any infantry battalion, properly resourced and trained can do all the so-called special operations mission except Strategic reconnaissance (for which we use the wrong people... :rolleyes: ). Long way of getting to the point:
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Now, create a cav sqdn/armor BN, give it the same advantages. Might be a worthwhile capability, even if it isn't SOF in nature.
Absolutely!!! Been a dream of mine for almost fifty years. It is achievable and could have great utility. Such units could do some great things with the right equipment and training. Think of strategic raids...
Yes, I'm serious. We need -- have long needed, since before Viet Nam -- the capability to smack lightly, destroy surgically take relatively few casualties and withdraw the force. Our last few attempts at trying to wage full scale war using a less than full throttle approach haven't been nearly as successful as we'd have liked, have they...
We're talking the same sorts of missions
I just used shorthand and the most (now) impractical. ;)
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Originally Posted by
Cavguy
* "First Responder" unit, nation's armored response force, rapidly deployable, lethal
* Mobile Reserve/Counterattack force in large conventional battle
* Deep armored penetration (no jokes here) force, for raids
* Support SOF/SF or HN militaries as required
Agree, one per CoCom responding to the Army component Cdr. There should be also, I think, a light version with wheels (though nothing we have today is, IMO, suitable).
I agree with all your '"Pros" and while your Cons are all valid, I suggest, in order:
* Raise the entry standards across the board to make the Army a challenge and attract even more high quality troops than we already have -- besides, we can let the slugs go (with suitable remuneration and penalty for contract non-fulfillment). We need to shed the mass, peoples Army myth which has not been true for most of our history. World War II will just not go away (and it's been 63 years. Sixty Three. Three Score and three.)... :rolleyes:
* Fix the personnel system which is still operating in the last century. That, of course, needs to happen regardless.
* Fixable easily, I think. We could use Stimulus money to build more ranges (little current humor there; we can afford more ranges but lets build them where we do not have Woodpecker or tortoise problems and where full scale APFSDS firing is possible). Training area for tracks is sort of finite but we could also go off a five day week (another one of my pet rocks... :wry:) and stagger ranges day and night. Yep, night. Turn some young S3s loose and tell them to work it out -- and tell the Installation they're there to support, not dictate, training. All the old retired guys at Range Control can handle it...
Will you quit stomping on my Jump Boots???
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Originally Posted by
ODB
An additional con. Would get misused like the rest of us. Not sure why, not at my levels to determine why we consistently get misused, just know we do. Don't forget the "We can't employ them we may need them for this later", mentaality. It's a fine line between proper utilization, under utilization, and flat out misutilization.
True dat. 'Nother one of my pet rocks. Let's talk about Strategic Recon and who really ought to be doing it. Then there's the DA mission and who should not be doing that. And the FID mission and who ought to be leading it.
On the GPF side, the units who are really aimed at a type of mission -- and then are given one completely out of character. I'm not talking about re-roleing Tankers or Arty to patrol infantry, that's bad but understandable and supportable -- and as David points out above, other Armies have also done that. We've done it before. There are plenty of cases of severe misuse in all parts of the Armed Forces.
Anyway -- you're right, misuse is a potential. An easy trick to preclude misuse is to design the TOE, training plans, stationing and personnel requirements to preclude it. That is quite possible but you'd have to break a rice bowl or two to do it.
That would work for SOCOM and the Army...
Well, I'm a Herky Bird fan but there are just some things
a C-130 can't do. The C-17 may not be the perfect replacement but it can haul vehicles better and it can land enough places. Not to mention the C-130 is also too big for some things since AFSOC is buying PZL M-28s, Pilatus PC-12s and C-27Js...
Just to clarify a point, I don't think Cav Guy or I were talking about a "Ranger-Mech" unit or "SOF Mech" unit. I know I was not. I am not a Ranger fan.
We were talking about an Armored Cavalry unit that was PROPERLY trained instead of marginally trained. The only Ranger involvement was to allocate more money for training, better support, the ability to fire anyone who looked crosseyed for not breathing properly and better access to intel among other things. IOW, give the rest of the Army the bennies the Ranger Regiment has. Yes, I'm aware of the costs involved -- and aware they're microscopic in terms of the net DoD budget. It's affordable -- it's just not wanted and rice bowls play a bigger part in that than does affordability. Sadly.
There's an old civilian saying that's appropriate: "You get what you pay for."
All that said, it's not going to happen because the upper echelons of the Army and SOCOM cannot and / or will not tolerate sweeping changes to the status quo and their uneasy relationship.