weekly security report for 4th week of May in Iraq out. IS's spring campaign continued but no mass casualty bombings. Main fighting in Anbar with Fallujah op while IS still hitting Baghdad. Here's a link.
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weekly security report for 4th week of May in Iraq out. IS's spring campaign continued but no mass casualty bombings. Main fighting in Anbar with Fallujah op while IS still hitting Baghdad. Here's a link.
A comment by a RUSI expert in an Al-Jazeera report:Link:https://rusi.org/in-the-news/what-su...-look-fallujahQuote:
Why the Iraqi army, which is already getting air support from coalition partners, ground support ... from the US and some operational support from the Iranians, needs to use sectarian militias is a curious question.
I cannot readily identify the report, but this story helps to explain:http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/0...063735601.html
From my simple "armchair" position it is all politics.
Another RUSI expert in a podcast (2 mins) comments:https://rusi.org/multimedia/2016-battle-fallujah
Hat tip to a "lurker" for this Vice News film clip (30mins) 'Fighting the Islamic State with Iraq's Golden Division: The Road to Fallujah', which was filmed over weeks as they fought towards the city itself.
Accompanying text:https://news.vice.com/video/fighting...ad-to-fallujah
Film only:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6axTxU30yo
A couple of comments. The only Iraqi officer with a speaking part, a major with ten years service, who comments there has to be more than a military defeat for ISIS. His orders after presumably incoming Shia militia mistreat locals, with words akin to "shoot them if they disobey". Then the reporter's comment how would the militia behave once the SOF leave?
As I recall this SOF unit is the only truly inter-communal formation left; with Shia, Sunni and Kurds fighting together.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6axTxU30yo
Fighting the Islamic State with Iraq’s Golden Division: The Road to Fallujah
A well done documentary by VICE on Iraqi Special Forces fighting their way back into Anbar province to take the town of Hit to isolate Fallujah. The Iraqi Special Forces are very professional, but unfortunately after liberating a couple of towns enroute to Hit they were followed by Shia Militia thugs to provide security (or looting). Both inspiring and disappointing.
My comments after watching three days ago.
A couple of comments. The only Iraqi officer with a speaking part, a major with ten years service, who comments there has to be more than a military defeat for ISIS. His orders after presumably incoming Shia militia mistreat locals, with words akin to "shoot them if they disobey". Then the reporter's comment how would the militia behave once the SOF leave?
As I recall this SOF unit is the only truly inter-communal formation left; with Shia, Sunni and Kurds fighting together.
As the Iraqi forces are fighting to retake Fallujah important to remember how the city originally fell to the Islamic State. Here's a background piece.
New weekly security report out for Iraq in first week of June. Continued high violence due to IS spring offensive and counter attacks to government operations in Fallujah. Here's a link.
There are increasing reports of abuses by the Hashd taking part in the Fallujah op. Here's a recap of what's been found so far.
Iraqi forces were able to penetrate into the middle of Fallujah in under a month. Took over two months to do the same in Ramadi. Better Iraqi forces and surprisingly weak defense by IS seem to be the cause. Read more here.
New security report for 2nd week of June in Iraq out now.
New weekly security report for Iraq out. IS continues with spring-Ramadan offensive. Govt finishing off Fallujah while starting new campaigns in Ninewa and Salahaddin. Here's a link.
After the 2003 invasion Pres bush talked about his freedom agenda of transforming the entire Middle East starting with Iraq. At the same time the CIA wrote a report saying that the Iraq War would likely entrench Sunni Arab regimes in the Middle East. With hindsight looks like CIA was right. Here's link to article.
This is bitter - at least for Oblabla & Co KG Gesmbh...
Last night, reports appeared, according to which the Iraqi military in cooperation with the CJTF-OIR completely smashed a big Daesh convoy, destroying 170 vehicles and killing 'over 750' idiots.
This morning, at least according to Brig Gen (ret.) Ismael as-Sodani, former Iraqi Defence Attache in the USA, the 'fog of war' is clearing, but then in an entirely unexpected way.
Namely, according to as-Sodani, 'US denied last night's Iraqi JOPC air support request. Iraqi Army Aviation hit the convoy.'
Gauging by all the nonsense the various US intel- and military services are meanwhile creating in Syria and Iraq, I tend to 'believe' this, i.e. say: 'scratch CENTCOM's involvement in that operation' (complete destruction of the Daesh convoy).
What actually happened in that incident is still not clear. I'm reading the early reports in the Iraqi press and they're all over the place and the number of vehicles destroyed and people killed quickly escalated. Will probably take a bit for things to clear up.
Weekly security report for Iraq just out. Fallujah was declared fully cleared. Iraqi forces also re-clearing Ramadi and Baiji area due to IS re-infiltration, while new op started to try to free Shirqat in Salahaddin. Displaced from Fallujah also suffering humanitarian crisis. All the details here.
The Origins of the PMUs
Quote:
The head of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Ameri, revealed a known secret a few days ago: the formation of the Popular Mobilization Units (aka al-hashd al-sha’abi, or sometimes ‘the Shia militias’) began several months ahead of Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s momentous fatwa on June 13, 2014 following the fall of Mosul. Ameri ‘corrected’ the record during a meeting between senior PMU leaders and Maliki on June 28.
...
Why is this important?
It’s important for two reasons:
- The weaknesses of the Iraqi Army were known to the Iraqi leadership months ahead of the debacle at Mosul. No tangible steps were taken to structurally address such concerns. The decision taken at the time was to build out new auxiliary forces, hence the PMUs.
...
- There may be some evidence that the US government had an early relationship with at least one PMU that was close to Suleimani, an organization that was cultivated and propped-up by his adjunct Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. That PMU is Jund al-Imam. See below for notes on this organization and the possible coordination it had with US forces. The Wall Street Journal once described it (during the Tikrit operation) as “US-backed”.
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NOTES ON JUND AL-IMAM MILITIA:
-Headed by Ahmad Jasim Sabir al-Asadi (AKA Abu Ja’afar al-Asadi, b. 1971, Australian citizen). Official spokesman of the PMUs.
-Org first established by Mehdi Abdul-Mehdi al-Khalisi (AKA Abu Zainab al-Khalisi) in Iran in the early 1980s.
-Al-Khalisi was one of the founding members of Badr Corps; he is credited by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis with the idea of the creation of Badr. Al-Muhandis headed Badr in the mid-1980s until shortly before 2003. The US military arrested al-Khalisi in 2003 and released him in 2005. He died shortly afterwards; his lieutenants claim that the Americans injected him with cancer. They also assert that cadres of Jund al-Imam were targeted for assassination by the Americans.
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-Jund al-Imam claims that they have thousands of fighters that constitute the 6th and 15th brigades of the PMUs. They take credit for destroying Saddam’s tomb in Auja, Tikrit, as well as securing the Speicher Air Base, which they have renamed Abu Zainab al-Khalisi Air Base. One credible source claims that they are responsible for burning down Albu Ajeel village to the east of Tikrit.
-There is plenty of circumstantial evidence that Jund al-Imam receives special attention and support from Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
-At the time of the Tikrit operation, the WSJ described Jund al-Imam as “US-backed”. See here and here.
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In that sense, a particularly interesting study (and a recommended download), here:
The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects
Quote:
In 2012 and early 2013, media sources were widely reporting the imminent fall of Syria's Bashar al-Assad regime to Sunni rebel groups. But not long thereafter, it began to show resilience, holding off further rebel advances and even retaking lost ground.
This turnabout was fueled largely by Iran-backed Shiite proxy groups fighting on Assad's behalf. While these groups often invoked the defense of the Sayyeda Zainab shrine as their rallying cry, their influx into Syria was far from a spontaneous expression of Shiite unity. Indeed, it reflected instead a highly organized geostrategic and ideological effort by Iran to protect its Syrian ally and project power across the Middle East. When fighting spread to neighboring Iraq, many of the Iraq-based proxies regrouped across the border to defend their homeland against advances by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).
The web of Iran-backed Shiite proxies is exceedingly complex, with much overlap and many changing aliases. In this new Institute study, Phillip Smyth -- a prominent blogger and University of Maryland researcher -- deftly navigates these many groups, exploring topics such as the narrative of pan-Shiite jihad, the range of Shiite clerical views on the jihad, recruitment techniques, and weapons used. His discussion compellingly shows why pursuing U.S. regional interests must involve targeting not only ISIS but also its Shiite adversaries.
Why such studies might be 'important'?
Because of this: Our Military Campaign Against ISIS is Working, But...
Oblabla is going to manage an even bigger screw-up than Bush Jr...Quote:
...The American-led effort to defeat the Islamic State is yielding significant tactical and military results. But the campaign is deeply flawed: It’s being waged as if the politics can be worked out after the fall of ISIS’s statelet, and in the process providing ISIS the conditions that will ensure its revival.
Western air power is currently enabling ground forces regarded as illegitimate by many locals — the local branch of the PKK in Syria and Iranian-controlled Shi’a jihadi militias in Iraq, primarily — to take over territory from which ISIS has been cleared.
Already residents in Sunni cities like Mosul and Raqqa, including those who have paid a high price for anti-ISIS activity, have said that ISIS will gain significant support during an invasion by these forces, simply as a means of defending their homes, and afterward there will be political space for ISIS to present itself as the least-worst instrument for advancing local interests.
This sense of a US-enabled anti-Sunni campaign is also helping ISIS mobilize foreign sympathizers, who are called on to launch “defensive” terrorist attacks to punish those Ggovernments taking part in this “conspiracy against the Sunnis.”
Support to local, legitimate forces is the crucial missing component of the attempt to sustainably defeat IS. The tribal outreach of the Awakening in Iraq is a model for the necessary engagement.
...
Good overview of what happened on the fleeing IS convoy from Fallujah area. Some questions are still unanswered. https://warisboring.com/iraqis-and-a...3bb#.yqxil5arw
Fallujah fell to Iraqi forces in just 5 weeks. Here's why.
June 2016 most casualties in Iraq since 2014. Fighting for Fallujah and mass casualty bombings by IS causes. Read the full report here.