please, stop the catechisms
I wish some of you coindinistas (I use that term intentionally here to make my following point) would stop throwing these silly little catechisms in our faces. You know things like
"you dont get to pick the war you want to fight," or
"you are not going to kill your way out of this one," or
"in coin politics infuses actions to the lowest levels" or
"in coin man, you cant say 'not my lane," or
"when I was in coin i ate fish and man-kissed with sheiks because I realized what I was doing was inherently political,"
(and when we question calls for “diplomacy” we are not the new millennium’s Emory Uptons who are telling our political masters how and when they can use us!!)
My point is that in this thread to try to sum up and the fact that many of us have done coin at the business end with combat soldiers we get all of the political, nation building stuff; the thing of being respectful, of negotiations by certain levels of leaders with locals. Got It!! Did it!! So Ken White in the Nam ate rice with farmers and me and Big Rob Thornton in the Bdad ate kbobs with sheiks or Iraqi Army colonels!!!
What we are saying, I think, is that for this coin stuff to happen by combat forces first and foremost they must be just that: combat forces, trained, organized and deployed as such. To start throwing catchy words like diplomacy as a potential skill that combat soldiers must have, many of us took a step back and worried about what that actually means on the ground in terms of training, priorities and functions. Does a captain at a cop in the Korengal need to be able to talk, negotiate, bla, bla, bla with the locals? Well yes sure a big duh he does. But does that same concept before that young captain’s company ever gets to the Korengal from Fort Drum, Pendleton, Fort Benning, etc play itself out by meaning that instead of going to the shoot-house for a month it gets classes from the local community college on conflict resolution? See what I am getting at, and I think this is in line with RTK’s concern too.
gian
The million dollar answer
Where do we fit it in? What do we get rid of? I know we already try to cram everything possible in the shortest time possible. I just don't know what the answer is. I put myself in both shoes as the trainer and the student. We all know when we are the student we sit there and think why are they teaching me this? I have better things to do with my time. As the instructor we think I don't have enough time to train them on this. Can we ever get there, I do not know, I like to think we can.
I personally think we spend entirely too much time on yearly, quarterly redundant training. My pet peeves are the quarterly POSH training, the yearly safety training, terrorism level 1 training....etc. I just think there are more important things our soldiers need to be spending there time doing. IMO many of things would go away if we held individuals responsible for their actions, hold their feet to the fire. Hey troop why did you smack her on the ass? Sir I didn't know it was wrong no one trained me on it in the last 3 months. I mean come on..... Sorry to have digressed a bit, just seems to me we are wasting a lot of time on things that do not need to take up such a large percentage of our time.
On the advance course stuff, I know some years ago there was talk of integrating officer and enlisted during points of the course, did this come about? Thought it a good idea on the surface but never heard anything other than that. As some may know from my other posts I'm a big advocate of cross training across the Army. We need more integration on the training levels. Additionally in my experiences with most courses I come away having learned more from my peers than the school house. If only we could get our schoolhouse to adapt like we are on the ground. How can we not streamline this system as well? In the world of technology we have become an Army that does less and less face to face interactions and everything needs to be in pretty little spreadsheets and powerpoint presentations to get anywhere. Sorry but I just simply do not understand why changes take so long in the school house. Years ago when I attended BNCOC they were still teaching how to zero previous generation equipment. At least I had a fairly smart SGL (Small Group Leader) that let us revamp the classes we were teaching. Had a buddy of mine from 1/75 that we rewrote every class we taught. We threw out the classes that were created and started over. I cannot speak for things on the officer side, but on the NCO side of the house I do not see why this cannot be the norm in professional development courses. Upon arrival you are given the subject of the classes you are going to teach and you create and teach them. Might keep us up to date. I understand the cadre need to oversee the products being created to ensure all key points are covered, but this accomplishes many things.
Again I apologize for digressing off subject, do not mean to hijack the thread, just think that most agree we need to address "Diplomat Training" in the Army, but when and where and to who?
RTK pm enroute
Training is the problem -- or, rather, lack of training.
Bill Moore said:
Quote:
Max161 posted a RAND article somewhere in SWJ that addressed the reasons that the Army failed to use the existing COIN doctrine during the Vietnam War. In short, it stated that the information was available, but it was rejected. Seems the problem is more related to professional culture and organization. As you have stated elsewhere leadership can be decisive. If it is important to the leaders, then it will generally happen. Then again the RAND study said that GEN Abrams couldn't get his subordinate commanders to toe the line in some cases. He told them to focus on the populace, and they still did everything possible to up their body counts.
There are three problems with RANDs conclusions. The methodology wasn't rejected, it was ignored by the MACV staff which was more interested in metrics ans a tidy battlefield than in the COIN effort; it was rejected by some -- not all -- commanders who were into ticket punching and thought body counts were the way to go for more merit badges; it did not point out what I'm trying to point out with this post:
We pay lip service to train as you will fight and we don't do it. We pay lip service to first class training and we don't provide it. Our failures in training affect the way we operate.
Based on what I've seen over the last 60 years (sheesh... :( ) then and now, the way we minimally train those entering service is the culprit. In my observation, the average over all those years, 1948 to 2008 is that it takes about three peacetime years of IET / OBC and unit 'training' to produce a pretty competent Private / Specialist / Lance corporal or company grade officer. Introduction to a harsh combat situation will cut that time by 75%, to a less harsh situation (Afghanistan, Iraq or Viet Nam like) will cut it by about 40-60+% dependent on many factors. I think that's unacceptable.
If we train newly entering enlisted people and officers to full basic competency and demand excellent performance, they will perform better, casualties will be lower, retention will be higher and those inclined to be slothful and irresponsible will seek other employment.
We insist we can only afford to train people for their 'next assignment.' We have done that for years at a cost of high casualties until combat experience kicks in, mediocre retention rates and an abysmal failure to acknowledge that the Armed forces are not Acme Industries -- there. the cost of inferior training and education is busted widgets and a tax write off -- in the Armed forces, the cost is an unnecessarily high casualty rate. I submit we should train everyone for two levels ABOVE their next assignment.
That applies also to PME. It amazed me when I was an instructor at the Armor School that POIs for BNCOC and ANCOC differed very little. Going up a notch, the POIs for the OBC and the OAC differed not a great deal more. Give that some thought. As RTK says above that still seems to be pretty much the case. Some things don't change. Thirty years later and no change -- if that doesn't scare you folks, it should.
My contention -- and I base this on two major short notice deployments with units to combat in two different wars -- is that if the unit is good at the basics, a major trainup is not required so all this pre-deployment training can be task focussed and not back to basics. I was recently in Atlanta and I got a look at the latest FORSCOM pre-deployment training guidance. It is embarrassing. it is a litany of every conceivable training requirement for both theaters for everything from CSS to combat aviation and back again, I do not recall the page count but it was huge -- it was NOT training guidance; it was a CYA effort so they could say "Well, we told them to train on it." Bureaucratic idiocy.
Yeah, training is the problem -- and as RTK pointed out yesterday, the new overfull and unimaginative FM 7-0 is not going to fix it.
Extremely long winded way of agreeing with ODB; we are failing in our training, it needs to be fixed starting with IET / OBC and worked upward through PME. MTTs and pre-deplyment training are NOT the answer. Neither are the CTCs (Sorry, Tom and others ;( ). They are great training but no one seems to pick up on the lessons learned at them -- same problem as MTTs, it's a canned solution. Try free play and see how that works... ;)
Yeah, I know, I've heard it -- that may omit some required training evolutions and graded efforts; we can't afford the infrastructure to do that with a degree of control. Umm, free play and control are a contradiction in terms... :D
No intent to pick on anyone or the CTCs who do provide a valuable training environment -- I just get awfully frustrated by the lack of initiative, imagination, logic and willingness to accept 'risk' in our training. We breed bad habits inadvertently. Good units can turn that around with a lot of work -- they should not have to do that.
check the block, then deploy
In my early years we had limited money, at least until President Reagan was able to get the money flowing again, and SOCOM came on line, but it "seemed" that we trained more, and in many ways trained more effectively. We had training distractions then, but not to the extent that we do now. The training was less structured then, so there was more "time" for mentoring, which is when the real learning takes place. That also meant that leaders were being more effectively developed. Everything today seems so rushed, and this condition is not just a post 9/11 condition, it started in the 90s. I hate the term training management, because training management today is now driven my red, amber green dots on power point slides. Simply conducting mandated training does not make it effective training, and while we're supposed to train to standard our current management system doesn't allow that flexibility. We have idiots who think that the training schedule is the Holy Bible, and if you need to need to change it based on discovering a weakness in your organization, then you're obviously a poor manager. We give lip service to good training, but it does seem to be a lost art. One of the few things we did right is stand up the national training centers, and while I haven't been through a NTC rotation since 9/11, back in the day they were excellent training, and I hope they still are. But that doesn't make up for the loss of our day to day training. We have a mind set in many units that if you have green dots across the board, then we must be ready for war. That analysis is power point deep, and while it may sound absurd to blame a software product, powerpoint has fundamentally changed the way we manage training and other things in DoD for the worse. I would love to see a study on how the Army functioned prior to power point and harvard graphics, and what happened to it since then. We now live for the brief. Commanders need to observe more training, and spend less time in briefs. Talk to the troops, they'll tell you if they're confident.
To some degree we need a check the block mentality, but it is way over done. If we did all the non-combat related training that the Army mandated (often coming down from Congress) ranging from annual sexual harassment, drug abuse, gangs and tatoos, family support group stuff, briefs and more briefs, human rights training, etc., we wouldn't get any training combat accomplished. Why we have to conduct these events annually is beyond me, but once it becomes a requirement on the books, then it never goes away. Gian's post makes sense, because we are challenged to find the time we need. The reality is we need to train on both clearing houses and conflict resolution. The reality is that we frequently don't have time.
Someone mentioned that they wanted to bring back the Army Common Task training to Special Forces. Having lived through that whole cycle of stupidity that is the last thing we need. If Team Sergeants can't figure out what Army common tasks are relevant and how to train to them in a "realistic" manner, then they need to be fired. We used to get this laundry list of 10 tasks from higher that everyone needed to know, and somehow that was one of our metrics for effective training? If it wasn't related to your mission it was a waste of time period. Furthermore, the Army has adapted much of SF's training methodology from instinctive shooting to advanced medical treatment because when the bullets started flying it soon became apparent that a 30 minute block of instruction on how to apply a pressure dressing was a waste of time. If you can't teach that in 5 minutes, then something is seriously wrong. Instead of focusing on what is key, we used to focus on the type of knot, ensuring no white was showing on the bandage etc., things that had absolutely no functional value whatsoever to stopping the bleeding, saving a life. That is training management in the Army, and fortunately we have been drifting away from that mindset. Unfortunately it took a war to wake everyone up. When the Vietnam Vets said it was a waste of time, no one wanted to listen.
Hey my first rant for 2009. A case of beer.
Hey, that's a good rant. I agree.
Only one minor caveat. You said:
Quote:
To some degree we need a check the block mentality, but it is way over done.
Agree totally but would suggest the only block that needs to be checked is the one that says the Unit is combat capable -- and that based on a realistic, graded test in peacetime and in wartime or periods of tension a graded predeployment exercise attuned precisely to the theater and AO to which the unit is headed.
Units -- not persons. Units fight wars; the Army of One does not. We grade people -- wrong answer; grade the units. SF Team through BCT. It isn't that hard to do.
Heh. You do that by selecting the right people
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Excellent point! Now how do you do that in a non-bias manner?
for a few promotions instead of selecting everyone who doesn't screw up for too many promotions. That means eliminating DOPMA which is a Congressionally imposed fairness to all effort. War is not fair. It's not unbiased, either. There will be many who say that cannot be done. I disagree. There will be others who do not want it to be done -- those are people who espouse mediocrity and easy duty. I don't.
Quote:
If you get the right guys evaluating you, they will share value added observations that will help you realize your unit's strengths and weaknesses. If you get some egotistical idiot whose only comment is that isn't how we did it my unit, then the evaluation is a waste of time.
Both points are correct, proving yet again that my contention that our egos are a big BIG part of our problems in the Armed Forces. Solution to that is to forcefully tune them. That's a hint to the senior leadership of the services... ;)
Quote:
I suspect that is why the Army came up with objective evaluation criteria...
Partly. Having been around at the birth of that foolishness, I know it was really an honest effort to do just that -- but it failed for three reasons. The frailty of humans; an effort to produce ever more 'empirical metrics' to satisfy the numbers hounds; and a quiet, behind the scenes effort to remove any stigma from what was graded -- actually, it was to remove any penalty for failing...
Before the sorry effort called an ARTEP came into being, units ran Army Training Tests, those ATTs were subjectively graded by peer units. Since the 3d Bn provided OPFOR, support and OCs for the 1st Bn, for example, they had pressure to be fair and unbiased because in the round robin scheme of things, what went around came around -- it kept the system reasonably honest. The downsides in the eyes of some were (a) that the grading was essentially subjective, the scientific types hated that; and (b) that those who failed were replaced by a hopefully better person. That applied generally fairly; i.e. sometimes a Cdr went, sometimes an S3 or the S4, a Platoon leader or sergeant here or there. Sometimes nobody went. Generally just a few; those who really fouled up badly.
However, folks saw their friends gone and so a bunch of very smart Majors and Captains at Benning in the early 70s created the ARTEP as a new idea (it was not, not even close; same stuff as the old Army Training Program [ATP] and ATT combined in a new package; most tasks didn't even change) and pushed the civilian educator espoused ideal of no grading stigma {{ADDED:that was at the start of the 'self esteem' craze. I won't even go into the fact that a civilian educator with no knowledge of the Army is dangerous for an Army to listen to on any topic}}. In essence they used smoke and mirrors plus a new name and no grading to insure that when they got to be LTC or COL, they wouldn't get relieved if they screwed the pooch on an ATT. Like I said, very smart...
My observation is that the Army has gone downhill in many respects since.
Thus we're confronted with the FACT that a Commander can take a unit into combat to get people killed but he cannot be risked to take a test and be relieved if he fails. What risk? The terrible risk of upsetting the Personnel system that will maybe have to find the dispossessed a job and will certainly have to find a replacement for said dispossessed...
Quote:
...life isn't objective, we need a way to inject more subjectivity into our training. We need more mentoring around the camp fire, and less focus on checklists (they have their place, but there is more to training than check the block).
Yep, I think so...
The failure to rely more on the absolute subjectivity that is a judgment on any tactical evolution outside of combat (there it is definitely Pass or Fail) is due to the pressure of DOPMA to say that all officers of like grade and specialty are equal. It is an absolute fact that is incorrect but in an effort to support what they were told to do, the Army had to try to produce an 'objective' grading criteria; that meant 'metrics' and 'no subjectivity' -- it also induced a lack of trust because EVERYONE knows that system is flawed and allows incompetents and incompetence at all levels. It's really sad IMO.
Happy new year, Bill ;)
Rob makes some excellent points
and has it right, I think.
All things considered, the biggest training problems are two things; too much bureaucratic BS in the way and most of that due to the second issue -- the training systems are designed to make life easy for the systems owner or operator, not for the unit training...
Good leaders do what it takes to get the job done.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
In my early years we had limited money, . . . , but it "seemed" that we trained more, and in many ways trained more effectively. We had training distractions then, but not to the extent that we do now. The training was less structured then, so there was more "time" for mentoring, which is when the real learning takes place. That also meant that leaders were being more effectively developed.
In my LT days, we had both limited time and limited personnel; we also had a huge number of training distractors. I was in a tenant unit in USAREUR's VIIth Corps area where we ran a real world intelligence mission 24/7 with an organization at about 60% strength (on a good day). We did our jobs and were still able to do all the training the Army, USAREUR, my MACOM, and VII Corps required of us as well as all the valuable (and silly) stuff my troops needed to learn to be able to pass their MOS tests (and later their SQTs). How did we do it? Bill has the answer partly right.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Commanders need to observe more training, and spend less time in briefs. Talk to the troops, they'll tell you if they're confident.
All "leaders" need to observe more training. Real leaders will observe day-to-day performance first, recognize what training their subordinates need, and then develop and conduct the appropriate training to fix those performance shortfalls.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Rob Thornton
The wild card is wartime OPTEMPO. It means that the available time to train has to be scrutinized better. There is certainly risk associated with it, but there may be some training models out there we could look at for MTO&E units which would reduce the amount of friction we have.
Wartime OPTEMPO is an excuse for not doing the right thing. Rob is correct about making sure to use the right kind of training to get the desired results though--that is what training management is really all about.
Caution war story follows:
I was a platoon leader and the Bn training officer (as an additional duty) when Skill Qualification Tests (SQT) were coming into existence. My Bn Cdr's pucker factor was getting huge because he knew his OER would be affected by the performance of the Bn's soldiers on their SQTs. He tasked me to develop a training program for the SQT. In my plan, I proposed what my NCOs and I were already doing in my platoon: a great amount of on-the-job training, executed by the NCOs and me during normal duty following "pre-testing"--an assessment by the NCO of soldiers' job proficiency. (As noted above, my unit was maybe 60% strength and we were doing real world Cold War intel Indications & Warning work, not some garrison training, annual live fire at a range on Graf, and maneuver wargames as part of a REFORGER--but we supported those and Autumn Forge exercises too.) When I briefed the plan, the Bn Cdr's concern was with the lack of classroom training and any ability to verify that the training had occurred. He wanted sign-in sheets and post tests after the classroom instruction--the check the box mentality mentioned by Bill Moore predates PowerPoint and Harvard Graphics (2 tools that I have grown to loath over the years, but they still are better than the old hand drawn charts we had to use in the "brown shoe Army" of the Carter years and earlier.) Being more concerned with doing the right thing than with presenting the right appearance, I used some well placed expletives about his proposed approach to training and convinced the commander to forego that kind of nonsense. The troops did great on the first round of SQT (and subsequent ones too, so I was told). At the same time, my platoon increased its Bn-leading mission productivity. Other platoons actually got better at their missions because of the additional scrutiny given to their soldiers them by their NCOs and LTs. And, overall Bn morale improved (as indicated by a drop in drinking related incidents and other MP blotter reports involving my Bn's troops).
End of war story
So it's been 11 months....
I re-read some old posts tonight and I came to three burning questions:
Are current force modernization efforts based upon the fights in which we are currently engaged resultant of failed foreign policy strategies or are they based upon a coherent concept of future threats to the nation?
Is it possible that future wars will include both conventional and unconventional aspects where both COIN/CT focused units and heavier conventional units will be required?
Are we shooting spiders off our shoes with a 12 gauge?
Discuss....