I don't see any fresh thinking on Small Wars....
An an outsider to the military, I don't see much difference between some of supposed "retreat into conventional mode" and the "small wars are important" types.
I see a comfortable retreat into familiar arguments about familiar topics using overly represented and familiar examples by some proponents of the study of small wars--with no real reflection on what might have happened in the past decade or so and no opening up of the discussion on a theoretical or practical level.
Why the constant retreat to a few examples that seem to keep cropping up, the British in Malaya, Algeria, the Indian Wars, the Phillipines?
For the study of the Afghan campaign, a very careful full-rounded study of various South Asian insurgencies (outside the comfortable frameworks often presented on SA insurgencies here, same old same old, even the Indian General that wrote an article on COIN basically just repeated "hearts and minds") might be interesting.
I feel I spend too much time commenting already and would prefer to read academic papers or books on "small wars areas of interest" to me that don't seem to be covered much here. If I find interesting things, I will post--time permitting.
The moderators are awesome. The commenters and contributors are awesome.
David is absolutely terrific as a moderator.
But if the study of small wars is so important why are those interested always circling around the same few topics in the same way? I see nothing new, just the same old half-conceived notions of American history and practice regarding small wars.
It's a fascinating topic so where is the robust study and argumentation outside a little social science and some tactical discussion?
Best to all.
Not everything can be that clear with an opinion
Hey Madhu,
Would almost tend to agree with you. However, seems all the lessons learned from the past and our members' vast knowledge of the same has fallen on deaf ears.
We are not always meandering in the past, but sharing what we may feel has indeed been overlooked and deserves a relook or, we feel a need to share what our past revealed.
As duly noted, most of us come from military backgrounds and are in one form or another, still serving.
Not everything herein is Small Wars, but most everything has something to do with what may eventually occur and has often been overlooked by far more intelligent beings.
Regards, Stan
Reading, thinking and some posts
Bill M. asks a good question:
Quote:
What lessons do you feel are critical that we allegedly learned since 9/11 that we are at risk of losing?
So I think a thread entitled 'Lost Lessons' may emerge, but then Madhu's post entitled 'I don't see any fresh thinking on Small Wars....' gives a contrary viewpoint. So the thread maybe called 'Lost Lessons & Fresh Thinking: a challenge for SWC'.
My reopening of this thread was four days ago and we have just hit a 1k views, with thirty one posts. That indicates to me an ample readership, but only a fraction comment.
We Lost The Lesson That The Air Force Can Fight Small Wars
In the late 40's and early 50's the Air Force came up with the concept of using an American Air Force and a small force of advosrs(CIA) but let the supporting country supply the needed Army. So I say the biggest lesson lost is that the Air Force cannot fight a Small War.....They can.
Thanks for the correction and point of agreement
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
Actually, both the Indian War and the Philippines are poorly-studied here. Brian Linn is one of the few scholars who actually has devoted a great deal of time and attention to the Philippines (at least the period from 1898 through 1910 or so), and his work is outstanding. The Indian Wars tend to be rather spotty, and often the focus is on a specific individual or battle rather than a longer-term view of the conflicts. There are a few outstanding scholars to be sure, but some areas remain very neglected and would certainly repay study. That doesn't mean that they are the "be all and end all" of small wars, but to assume that they've been mined out would be a mistake.
I agree that there is a lot of (misplaced) focus on areas like Malaya and Algeria. There's also little attention paid to things that have happened in both Central and South America.
Thanks for the comment too, Stan.
I tend to paint with too broad a brush in order to make a point. It's not a good habit. That's one reason I want to read more academic works. I need to break this habit. If I read more, I would have already known your point....
At least we all agree on one thing, we need more study and to keep the study alive, current and vibrant. I think one area that I have a kind of cultural disconnect from the military (or maybe the blogs I read?) is that I'm not really looking for quick "lessons learned" in the sense of "oh, look at what those guys did."
I have certain curiosities or questions about conflicts and want to read up on the questions because I think that current COIN doctrine oversimplifies the history of some campaigns used as a model. Gian Gentile in his book says that the models are too rigid and prevent a kind of grand improvisation (not minor tactical improvisations) or tailoring of a counterinsurgency campaign toward a specific conflict in all its peculiarities.
I have such a different narrative of colonial small wars in my head because of my ethnic background that sometimes it's like I'm from Venus and you all are from Mars.
Well, naturally that, given that I'm posting on a site about small wars....