Can the CABs provide the armored reconnaissance mission required by the BCT commander? If so does it make sense to replace the ARS with a third CAB or reinforce the ARS with armor and additional scouts?
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Can the CABs provide the armored reconnaissance mission required by the BCT commander? If so does it make sense to replace the ARS with a third CAB or reinforce the ARS with armor and additional scouts?
What are all the METT-TC factors? Have to know those to answer your question.
A TOE is an administrative tool to aid budgeteers and planners, the most inflexible of all bureaucrats. Organization for combat rarely is straight TOE for many reasons. Thus, in broad measure, how many sub-elements or widgets are assigned is not terrible important for comabt operations; what counts then is what you actually have available. Over rigid adherence to TOE design is a part of the problem. Training is another part...
The whole point with the BCT concept was to be modular and adapt unit fill and assignments to the job at hand. Too many try to forget that. Two maneuver Bns not enough; assign a third. Need more Recon capability, plug it in...
The massive juggling of which BCTs went where in Afghanistan and Iraq was in part a measure to force flexibility. Unfortunately, a good practice and idea was ruined by the type of war we were fighting; it just wasn't appropriate in wars where continuity of effort is far more important than in MCO.
The problem with the modular approach is lack of flexibility of both the institution and some commanders. The same thing that killed the old Pentomic design -- lack of flexibility on the part of the senior officers. They are raised in a structured instead of a chaotic environment, then thrown into the chaos of combat and many -- not all; the good 20% or so do not -- have trouble adapting to the rapid thinking and flexibility required. They want stability and constancy. Unfortunately, in warfare, you can't really have that. Our training and education again let us down...
[QUOTE=Ken White;107386]What are all the METT-TC factors? Have to know those to answer your question.
Same type of mission the 3ID had in the march-up to Baghdad in OIF1.
An ARS could not do what 3-7 CAV did for the 3ID in 2003, and neither can the BFSB CAV SQDN. Simple numbers comparison proves it. An ARS has 18 M3 and 30 HMMWVs in platoons actually doing recon and/or fighting- 3-7 CAV has 36 M3 and 24 M1s in platoons. The BFSB CAV SQDN has only 24 HMMWVs.
The ARS can handle the mission the BRTs did- mostly LOGPAC and CP security, as I understand it.
The CAB is better suited to handle the DIV CAV mission, with 24 M1, 24 M2, 3 M3 and 5 HMMWVs in platoons. Whether or not it is trained to execute recon and security like the DIV CAV is another question.
Of course, if the division commander pulls a CAB to be his advance guard or otherwise fill the DIV CAV role, he's leaving a BCT as a rump with 1 maneuver battalion.
Ken,
Below is a CAB organized to include recon as a general function and not the responsibility of an ARS:
A Troop 6x3 scout platoons, 1x4 tank, 2xmortar
B Company 4x3 inf platoons, 1x4 tank platoon, 2xmortar
C Company 4x3 inf plt., 1x4 tank, 2xmortar
D company 4x3 tank platoons, 2xmortar
E Company 4x3 eng platoons, 2xmortars
F Company FSC
remember, I'm old. A CAB to me is a Combat Avaiation Brigade. I could stretch it to include the new Combat Action Badge but beyond that...
I don't recognize your organization...However, working off what's there, I'm unsure why you've mixed things up as much as you have and I presume the "B Company" for example is what used to be called a Company Team with elements from two or more Companies under command of the B Co Cdr. I have no idea what logic dictates A Co, don't know what 6x3 Scout Platoons means (3 Plts w/ 6 veh each?). Why does D Co have no Inf? Why do I give the engineers mortars? May make sense, may not. Do I take the FSC with me or not? Depends...
Having said that, I would need a whole bunch more info than "going to Baghdad" ala the 3d ID in 03 before I use the organization you offer. For instance, while that 'situation' gives me a rough idea of the terrain, climate and enemy it does not give me adequate knowledge of the terrain to decide your organization would be acceptable to my plan and that plan would depend on a few other factors, i.e. leaving Kuwait? First day? Tenth day? Who else from what unit is where? Am I the lead Bn for a Bde or just in the column?
If I'm the lead and in the absence of more knowledge I would have if actually there, I'd go with two Cos of Tanks (w/ one Inf Plt ea) and two of Inf (w/ one Tk Plt ea. Open terrain, Tanks lead, close or urban, Inf leads; broad diamond in the open, Column avoided at all costs. Need to know medevac, fuel and resupply plan...
Also, I'm going to change my task organization and formations probably at least daily and most probably more often, situation dependent...
To go back to your original question to which I responded, the broad general answer is yes but there will be exceptions (METT-TC again...) and there will be shortfalls in performance unless the Bn in question has worked at the Recon effort a few times. It's not optimum but it will work.
That study from Leavenworth that you cited did a lot of damage because it was misunderstood and because the US Army solution to Reconnaissance is, basically, not to do it. We don't have the patience or the training to do it right, so our Cav elements too often just went out looking for trouble. That may be combat, may even be Cav to the max -- but it ain't reconnaissance.
Thus, in effect, for the US, we elect to have gaps and shortfalls in our knowledge of the terrain and enemy ahead because since late 1944, we have always had the combat power to make up for that shortfall so its been acceptable from then to now. It was NOT acceptable early in WW II in Europe or all through WW II in the Pacific, where we did do some great Recon work.
Prescribed Organization is relatively unimportant, Task Organization for combat can fix most of the ills the TOE designers foist on us. Just taks a bit of flexibility. And knowledge of METT-TC.
Mostly METT-TC...
Thanks Ken for the critique and information. The CAB I was referring to is the Combined Arms Battalion of two M1 companies and two M2 companies.
I based my CAB structure on a couple of things. First, the HBCT having only two maneuver battalions, and second, BCT commanders wanting more boots. So, I re-arranged the charis on the deck and looked at the definitions of scouts, reconnaissance and surveillance.
First, re-organizing the cav troops into mechanized infantry companies. This of course adds an additional infantry company to the battalion (boots). This of course would place scouting responsibilites on the battalion commander, but if scouting responsabilities are capable of being conducted by regular infantry the battalion commander would have three companies to rotate through this responsability or use his best one.
Secondly, the battalion scout platoon conducts RSTA. To me scouts are out looking for the enemy and eventually run into them and the fight begins. Reconnaissance is out to find the enemy without being seen and then calling in the fighters. Surveillance already has a pretty good idea where the enemy is at, but keeps the enemy under observation to learn more.
So, the battalion looke like this:
scout/sniper platoon w/10 vehicles
mortar platoon w/seven mortars (BCT has 14)
M1 company
M2 company/M1 platoon
M2 company/M1 platoon
M2 company/M1 platoon
or
2xM1 companies
3xM2 companies
Why so focused on battalion organization? Up here, we use (and continue to use) branch pure battalions and "battle group" them as required. Essentially, all companies from any branch are like lego blocks for a Battle Group.
Both pure battalions (need to be reorganized for action) and mixed battalions have their pro and contra.
Pure battalions are better to train in more basic skills while mixed ones are better to train on large unit level and have less friction in early battles.
Sooner or later all formations and large units in battle are a patchwork, either because not all soldiers deployed and the unit design doesn't fit the mission (small wars) or because of attrition of personnel and material (great wars).
IMO excessive focus on the tree can obscure the old forest...;)
We mixed and matched Tanks and Infantry into Co Tms and Battalion TFs for specific missions as required for years with no problem -- now we're supposed to be so-o-o-o much smarter -- and that's too difficult for us to do?
BCT (that used to be 'Basic Combat Training' before that abbreviation got purloined by people who ignore history -- and common sense; one abbreviation for one item or you confuse the world...) or Bde Cdrs will always want more people -- they aren't boots, they're people or Soldiers or Marines, not boots -- Tough munchies for the Commandantes. They get what the TOE guys -- and the Bean Counters -- allot. The TOE is to provide a mean, no more.
Combat is not fought in TOE packets, but by forces task organized for the specific missions and conditions envisioned.
Given the fact that everyone acknowledges that the current concept is undermanned, trying to reorganize within existing authorizations strikes me as seeking to perpetuate flawed logic. IF a major wars starts, we will rapidly reorganize and all the flawed designs, driven as much by a more flawed personnel management system trying to provide enough Officer spaces so the HRC job is simplified, will go by the wayside as they have in every war.
We, the US, are penalized by several myths in combat organization. One is that with proper education and training, most all can command effectively in combat. Not so. Another is the triangular organization, adopted by the Germans to force better tactical though by not allowing balance formations in combat. Probably fair idea at the time but that was almost 100 years ago; things have changed a bit. The third is that Reconnaissance problem. We have never designed a force or used the idea well since mechanization appeared. You're correct on Recon and on surveillance but it takes training to do both jobs. If you're just going to charge out looking for bad guys, then a lot of extra training can be ignored. Thus our mediocre training (which can be fixed) and our aggressive impatience (which can also be fixed but is far more difficult and entails better selection for command criteria) lead us to just go charging into the fray. So, yeah, an Infantry Bn can do that.
The questions really are, should an Infantry Battalion be so employed and is their lack of all relevant training and capability acceptable; and is that failure to have Recon and Svlnc unit, be they Cav or whatever really the best solution?
For one answer to that question, look at the RSTA Sqns in todays Bdes. Their organization is questionable and tales I've heard on their employment could give even Custer gray hair. Go back in time, look at the Bn Recon Plts in Viet Nam -- almost all woefully misused leading to allowing the enemy to initiate far too many contacts. Smae thing is happening today in Afghanistan...
IMO, Bns need Scout or Recon Plts and a Bde needs a Co or Troop and they need to be trained as Scouts, as Surveillers and as Combat capable elements who can and will fight for information and who are capable of delaying an opposing force. We can easily 'organize' elements to answer that -- can we easily get the US Army to properly employ such units? The answer on that is decidedly mixed...
You can put Tanks and Mech Infantry together at Plt, Co, Bn or Bde / Div level. Where you do it is really sort of academic and all the various mixtures have advantages and disadvantages, not least maintenance and resupply. Regardless of how you do the organization, the critical factor is flexibility in adapting the organization to changing situation -- sometimes rapidly changing. So in the end, what is where and how many there are is not immaterial but it is not nearly as important as the mind set and the training of those who are in the units.
RE:Your question to Infanteer. Check this LINK, pull the wiring diagram up and zoom in on it. Google has plenty of links for more detail.
Thanks Ken. You are absolutely right - why re-design within a flawed structre.
I care to recall led me to make that statement. If you "redesign within existing allocations" all you're doing is telling the bean counters they were right -- and they rarely are. I found out years ago and the hard way that you have to challenge the system and processes to achieve glacial forward movement. It isn't easy but it can be done but they will try their hardest to convince you that nothing can really be changed, you can only tinker around the edges -- that way, life is better for them.
Shouldn't be the driver; missions accomplished at minimum costs should be. Unfortunately, they don't have to do the missions so that's not a major issue to them...
Resources have to be considered, no question, so do personnel and equipment availability but to constrain yourself to cutting and pasting -- which is the typical Army methodology -- instead of trying to a little imaginative and design a structure that is oriented to the most likely missions at hand and not cater to the personnel and RM folks is a better approach.
Instead of letting them force you into a familiar box with a bell and whistle or two, design one that may make them work a bit harder but that provides the tools for the guy on the ground... ;)
P.S.
With all due respect to Hacksaw, don't have planning cells. Make the operators plan; the planners tend to give you unconstrained plans. The guys who have to execute will be a little more realistic.
Balance in all things. Balance and METT-TC... :wry:
So, if we seem to be doing it wrong who is doing it right? Is there a consensus on this site that a particular military seems to be doing it right?
If I recall correctly at the time of Pearl Harbor the Army had Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment. In 1942 they were merged together into the TOE to avoid the need to cross-reference repeatedly between the two while new units were being raised from the ground up. Their main function was to aid in the rapid activation, manning, and equipping of lots of units in a hurry. A TOE is not an inflexible guide for the conduct of operations, which often requires task-organizing to suit the particular mission.
Just use your imagination. The Bde Commander is doing task X, so he mixes his 3 Infantry Battalions, his Armoured Bn, his Eng Bn and his Arty Bn as he sees fit. When bns are mixed and match like this, they become "battle groups" (armoured/infantry groupings) or Battalion Groups (augmented Inf Bns) in our parlence.
Within the Battle Group, you see the same thing happening. The Battle Group Commander mixes his companies up depending on his task. Combined arms companies become "Combat Teams" (armoured/infantry groupings) or "Company Teams" (augmented Rifle Coys).
In doctrine, the Square Combat Team is probably one of the most potent organizations around. It is the 15 vehicle Mech Inf Coy combined with a 15-19 vehicle Tank Coy (Squadron for us), a 4-6 vehicle Engineer Platoon (Troop for us) and, of course, a FOO team. Thus, the combat team commander (either the inf or arm comd, dependant on a few things) has over 30 vehicles to hit the enemy with.
Lately, "Platoon Groups" have become a reality as well.
Speaking as a former Battalion Motor Officer, the conduct of operations is influenced not only by the amount of equipment -- the reportable items, mainly vehicles, aircraft, and commo -- authorized by the TOE, but how much of it is running. Where the TOE becomes important and can have an effect on the reputations of unit commanders is in the periodic reports submitted up the chain of command. The Materiel Condition Status Report on DA Form 2406, the proverbial "Deadline Report," includes an operationally ready rate based upon the assigned items of reportable equipment. That report in turn feeds the monthly Unit Status Report of Army Regulation 220-1. Commanders can get in a lot of hot water when they report low levels of readiness.
Have many of the light/airborne/air assault BCTs deployed to Afghanistan been reinforced with a third battalion or have most deployed as is?