A couple of points... (as always)
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Originally Posted by
J. Robert DuBois
If I'm reading our comments correctly, I think there's a great deal of overlap on principle and a trend toward disagreement on semantics, i.e., "smart" power. I don't use the word "semantics" to trivialize the difference, though. In fact, it's a very important distinction that may lead to the improved understanding of smart power.
I agree... I don't think we're that far apart on any of this, and what divergence there is comes mostly from seeing the same picture from different perspectives. That to me is a good thing, and one of the useful things about this forum. Still, as always (it's a habit) I find a thing or two to pick on...
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Originally Posted by
J. Robert DuBois
Some of the worst human abuses occur because someone who possesses some form of "hard" power (national authority, military might or IED) determines that his opinion is "right," his opponents' is wrong, and he has the self-appointed prerogative to use force. I don't want to overuse the cliche that Hitler has become, but...well, someone like Hitler.
It's certainly true that hard power is easily abused and misused, even with the best of intentions, and that the abuse and misuse of hard power are very visible and very unpleasant. If we're going to think of balancing hard power with soft, though, we have to remember that soft power can also be abused and misused, and that its abuse and misuse can turn an effort intended to alleviate tension and address root causes of conflict into a disaster that exacerbates tension and generates conflict. I've seen that happen a number of times and there are many many cases I haven't seen. That's one reason why I'm wary of turning "soft power" tools like "development" aid over to people who aren't really from the development world, such as those from military or diplomatic backgrounds. Because "development" is so often presumed a priori to be "good" and to be an antidote to violence, people not fully familiar with the history may forget how easily "development" can snap back as a driver of conflict.
That's not meant as criticism of soldiers and diplomats, just as acknowledgement that they don't generally have the training or the expertise to manage development efforts, which is a very difficult task that even development professionals routinely screw up. Realistically, it's not possible to give soldiers and diplomats that training and expertise without compromising their effectiveness in their primary roles. Soft power is a useful tool, but in the hands of people who see its utility but don't see its hazards, it can do as much damage as hard power.
Of course hard and soft power are both necessary and both useful, but we can't fall into the trap of seeing hard power as the harsh side and soft power as the benign mitigating side. If we're not careful and aware, we can make as big a mess with soft power as with hard, and that has to be considered when trying to develop a "smart" balance.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
J. Robert DuBois
The same is true, as you point out, for the term "smart." Once I get it in my head that my approach is smart, it may lead to the unconsciously logical conclusion that any other way is dumb. Maybe it would be helpful to use a generic term like "balanced."
I like "balanced" better, mostly because to my mind "balance" is something dynamic that has to be constantly assessed and adjusted. Whether or not anyone else draws the same implication is of course an open question!
These three points point me toward another of those things that I get worried about...
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Originally Posted by
J. Robert DuBois
Ultimately, what I would like to see on the table is that simply because a nation owns a Department of State and a Department of Defense does not mean that nation is effectively leveraging all of its resources at optimal efficiency and in optimal proportions.
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Originally Posted by
J. Robert DuBois
It seems to me that some of us in these fora (not you personally) dismiss discussions of "balancing" our methods for the simple fact that leadership has always involved aspects of diplomatic and military assets. My question to us is, "Then why isn't it working?"
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Originally Posted by
J. Robert DuBois
Yet in support of your reservations on all this in practical application, how in God's name can we ensure "humility" among our policy makers? It may be an absolute conundrum when we live in societies that reward those with election who make the most grandiose statements in their campaign promises.
Why isn't it working? Good question, with several possible answers. One possibility is that we're not using the right balance of the right tools, and therefore not achieving our goal. Another possibility, one that I think has been very much in play in recent years, is that we've pursued goals that are unrealistic and impractical, and often shifted our goals in midstream: the justly dreaded "mission creep".
I've been reminded several times on this forum that people from the military side are disinclined to question the goal, and tend instead to focus on the means by which the goal can be achieved. That makes perfect sense and there's absolutely nothing wrong with it. We need to be constantly looking for better tools, better way to use those tools, better ways to balance the various tools at our disposal.
At the same time, especially as we get to the theoretical "Futurists & Theorists" level, we can't let the search for better tools and more balanced use of tools take over to the extent that we stop questioning the goal, or that we forget that success starts with choosing the right goals and not steering the goals off on tangents. No matter how good our tools are and no matter how well we balance their use, if we use them in pursuit of a bad policy, we will still make a mess.
I'm sure our government is not "effectively leveraging all of its resources at optimal efficiency and in optimal proportions", or using the tools at its disposal in an optimally balanced method. Even if we were doing well, there would always be room for improvement and discussion of improvement would still be useful and necessary. I still think that our recent problems stem less from inappropriate or unbalanced use of power than from pursuing vague, nebulous, impractical and ephemeral goals... and that no matter how well we balance our use of power the problems with the goals will remain.
So yes, by all means let's pursue balanced power... but let's also not forget that even the best balance of power will not save us from poorly chosen goals.
I'd be the last to challenge civilian control of the military, but I confess that I'd love to hear someone from the military side say something like this:
"If that's really the goal you want to choose, we will do everything in our power to achieve it... but we would be remiss in our duties if we failed to inform you that in our opinion this is one %$#@ing stupid goal that's going to get us into all kinds of trouble"
Actually I recall Colin Powell saying almost exactly that, in slightly more polite language, about Iraq. Of course nobody listened, but it's always worth the effort.
Again, I don't question the need for smarter, better balanced uses of power in pursuit of goals. I just don't want to let the search for better ways to achieve goals blind us to the need for better selection of goals in the first place. Best way to get out of a hole is not to get in it in the first place. IMO, of course :D
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Originally Posted by
J. Robert DuBois
PS: How do I set my account to notify me when people reply? I'm an idiot.
I've never tried it, but I'm guessing "thread tools" up at the top, and then "subscribe to thread".
Looking forward to reading the book, though it might take a while to get to this back-country mountaintop!
Backgrounder: US Smart Power Counterterrorism
I missed Secretary Clinton's speech on the 9th, but found a reference on Cryptome. The speech:http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/09/172034.htm
A background briefing by 'Senior Administration Official Number One':http://cryptome.org/0005/us-smartpower.htm
Struck by recent comments
I was particularly struck by recent comments of new Army Chief Odierno that the US military presence not be too big----which would be an impediment to Iraqi progress for its own self-determination.
A small, belated but very insightful mea culpa to the entire sphere of post-defeat "foreign" activism, under any acronym we care to attach.
In grad school in the 1980s, the buzz word was Industrial Policy. The Japanese centralized control and we did not. The argument went that we must follow their lead or (1) we would be toast, and (2) they would take over the world.
A decade ago, the planning profession became enthralled with the term "Smart Growth," to which, ultimately, every smart, dumb, good or bad idea later became attached, and could be thoroughly argued from each side---to the point of meaninglessness.
I am all for "Smart Power," and generally, smart anything, but I can't seem to extend that to haphazard "Whole-of-Government" approaches, or ill-conceived COIN strategies aimed to locally prop up an ineffective central government, etc...
Smart is as Smart does, but it seems, from recent use, that those who argued it, and plaster "Smart" all over their idea, program, project or policy, do so to mask underlying problems.
In Northern Iraq in early 2008, the bridges were all down across the Tigris, and checkpoints restricted almost every movement. It was obvious that trade could not be restored until bridges were reopened and paths cleared.
That done, the recently released Wiki sitreps from Salah ad Din, for example, showed prices dropping, trade increasing, and business returning---across the board.
There is not a lot of rocket science to this, and no need to attach Smart monikers to most obvious post-conflict problems or solutions.
No matter how you label them, if they are stupid, they will fail.
Roger & Bob in Helmand Province
A short tale on video:
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former US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry was asked to reflect on the lessons he had drawn from the US intervention.....Finally, he told a story about how village elders in Kandahar remembered USAID and Peace Corps volunteers from the 1950s, and reflected on ‘those brave Marines who had fought so hard’, who ‘sadly would not be remembered’ so fondly.
Link and scroll down to the third podcast:http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/...m-afghanistan/
Alas the story is incomplete, so if anyone knows Roger & Bob were that would be neat!