Future of Ground Forces with MG McMaster
http://csis.org/event/ground-force-m...-still-matters
MG McMasters is interviewed by Dr. Maren Leed at a CSIS event regarding the role of ground forces in the future security environment.
During the discussion MG McMaster identifies what he calls two scary lessons that some people have apparently learnt from the past decade of conflict:
1. We think we can wars by raiding
2. We think we can outsource our wars and have others fight them
Both of these comments seem to be making a swipe on some of the verbiage coming out USSOCOM, but I don't think anyone senior in USSOCOM thinks we can wars with a raiding approach. Most realize it is a tool in the toolbox that does have numerous applications, but rarely is it decisive.
Regarding lesson number 2, I think this argument is weak because it is based on a series of assumptions that are not credible when you scratch the surface, yet on the other hand assisting others with addressing their security needs when it is appropriate is still a valid strategy. Of course this isn't new, we have been doing this for decades.
At the end of the day the U.S. military is responsible for defending our Constitution and nation, not our partners. Most of the time we have done that with partners, but if someone is proposing a national defense strategy that hinges on outsourcing this responsibility to partners that seems to be irresponsible and dangerous.
Moderator's Note
There is an earlier thread 'McMaster on War': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=647
Raiders, Advisors And The Wrong Lessons From Iraq
A "lurker" asked if SWC had spotted this speech by BG McMaster, at CSIS, on March 20th 2013. It appears to be mentioned on SWJ and was in the Daily News round-up.
The title was 'Raiders, Advisors And The Wrong Lessons From Iraq' and one news report was:http://breakingdefense.com/2013/03/2...ons-from-iraq/
Link to CSIS video:http://csis.org/event/ground-force-m...-still-matters
The Pipe Dream of Easy War
The latest McMaster article in the NYT; which ends with:
Quote:
What we can afford least is to define the problem of future war as we would like it to be, and by doing so introduce into our defense vulnerabilities based on self-delusion.
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/op...pagewanted=all
Makes an interesting comparison with the restrictions placed on serving British soldiers to write a book chapter, a very different public exposure when compared to the NYT.
McMaster on "four fallacies” and “easy solutions”
McMaster at a Brookings seminar is reported as having made the Army’s case in his characteristically blunt language.
Quote:
“What concerns me the most is really that we’ll engage in wishful thinking that’s motivated mainly by budget constraints,” he said. “You get the army that the people are wiling to pay for in a democracy, and it’s our job to do our best with it.”
The “wishful thinking” that McMaster fears is what he calls “four fallacies” about future conflicts that promise “easy solutions”:
“The return of the revolution in military affairs,” a theory thought discredited in Iraq — “it’s like a vampire,” he said — with its promise that long-range sensors and precision strikes will let air and sea forces win wars cleanly and bloodlessly (for us) on their own.
“The Zero Dark Thirty fallacy” that we can solve our problems almost bloodlessly with Special Operations raids, “something akin to a global swat team to go after enemy leaders.”
What might be called the Mali Fallacy (my words, not his) that we can rely on allies and local surrogates to do the fighting on the ground while the US provides advisors and high-tech support.
All three fallacies, he said, begin with a core of truth: Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, advisors, and allies are all impressive and essential capabilities, but we can’t count on them to prevail alone.
The fourth fallacy, by contrast, McMaster considers just plain “narcissistic.” The idea that the US can “opt out” of certain kinds of conflict — say, counterinsurgency, or ground warfare in general — without giving our adversaries credit for what they may be able to force us to do. Invading Afghanistan seemed ludicrous on September 10, 2001, after all, and inescapable on September 12th.
Link:http://breakingdefense.com/2014/02/t...s-4-fallacies/
Q&A with Departing Benning Commander Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster
Q&A with Departing Benning Commander Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster
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