Well, I'm listening -- er, reading...
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Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
There's a lot of common sense in this to me... think before you act, know what you're trying to accomplish, use the right tool for the job, don't stick your equipment where it doesn't belong. Of course life is seldom simple or clear, but the guiding principles need to emphasize restraint and recognize from the start that we are neither global cop nor global saviour.
I agree with all you wrote. This paragraph, in particular leads to the next:
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I don't really disagree with RCJ's assessment of the origins of insurgency. I think he's a bit too absolutist about it, and that his model needs the flexibility to recognize the exceptions and variations that are inevitable when models meet the real world. I also think his occasional proposal of conducting UW in other nations as self-appointed champion of the populace is, despite the best of intentions, a recipe for disaster.
Totally agree. RCJ has some excellent idea that merit deep consideration. However, he does -- and too many in the US policy arena do -- indeed suffer from excess absolutism (for examples, read any political speech by most senior Politicians from both US parties over the last 40 year...). RCJ himself is an exemplar; he often advocates not sticking our nose in the business of others and in the same posts sometimes advocates "helping" other nations with their problems.
Your 'take each case on it own merits' is the correct course, logically few will disagree yet that absolutist tendency takes over, egos overrule common sense and off we go again being the champion of the oppressed. :rolleyes: De Opresso Liber is a bad motto because it encourages such adventures...
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That's off the top of my head at 6:30AM, and not meant as a formal prescription for grand strategy... not as if anyone listens anyway!
Well, you're doing better than a slew of Think Tanklets, Prating Pundits and Pandering Politicians... :wry:
The "Political Effort (Struggle)"
For Bob's edification or embarassment, his points 2-8 (as I've numbered them - point 1 is his definition of insurgency):
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2. Conditions of Insurgency: A state of mind. The conditions of insurgency arguably exist to some degree within every populace. In most cases such conditions are benign in that they are not strong enough to support the rise of a significant insurgent organization, even if manipulated by outside actors conducting UW or by ideological themes designed for this audience. As perceptions of poor governance increase so does the degree of the conditions of insurgency. Left unchecked these conditions are apt to be exploited by internal and/or external parties for purposes of their own that may or may not have the welfare of the affected populace in mind. Conditions of insurgency are caused by the government and assessed through the perspective of the populace.
3. Poor Governance: Actions or inactions on the part of governance that contribute to create conditions of insurgency within one or more significant segments of the society they govern. Poor Governance is assessed through the perceptions of each significant segment of society separately as well as collectively. Objective metrics of effectiveness of governance are immaterial to assessments of goodness.
4. Good Governance: Governance, that may be either effective or ineffective, that through the nature of its performance prevents the growth of conditions of insurgency. Subjective, and measured as assessed by each significant segment of a populace, perceptions of good governance will typically vary across a state. Where good governance exists insurgency is unlikely. Where good governance is lacking the conditions of insurgency will grow, creating vulnerability for exploitation by internal or external actors pursuing agendas that may, or may not represent the best interests of the populace. The most critical perceptions that contribute to good governance appear to be those of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope.
5. Perception of Legitimacy: The most critical causal perception contributing to the conditions of insurgency in a society. Legitimate is not synonymous with Official. It is a recognition and acceptance on the part of any significant segment of a society of the rights and duties of governance to govern. This is independent of any official or legal status of governance or any recognition of this governance by others. Historically insurgent movements will ultimately fail when this condition exists, and prevail when it is absent. The absence of legitimacy is the cornerstone of despotism.
6. Perception of Justice: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Justice is not synonymous Rule of Law. Perceptions of justice are based in how the populace feels about the rule of law as it is applied to them. Enforcing the Rule of Law upon a populace that perceives the law as unjust is tyranny and will make the conditions of insurgency worse.
7. Perception of Respect: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Measured through the eyes of the populace, the widely help perception within any significant segment of a society that they are not excluded from full participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status. Assessments by those outside the affected populace, to include by the government, are immaterial.
8. Perception of Hope: A critical causal perception that contributes to the conditions of insurgency in a society as shaped by good or poor performance of governance. Hope resides in the absolute confidence within any significant segment of a society that they have available to them trusted, certain and legal means to change their governance. Hope is the great off-ramp for insurgency, as the presence of hope keeps politics within the established and accepted legal parameters.
are all factors that I'd take into account (possibly using different words) in mounting a purely political effort (struggle) vice a violent or a non-violent opposition group. So, is this stuff "war" or not ??
What that paradigm does not take into account are situations (say in different parts of the country) where the purely political effort must be mixed with some violence (as in Vietnamese Pacification), or where the political effort has to be deferred until military control can be established. Those situations seem to me to be the tough ones to resolve as to who should be doing what.
My own view is that the US should avoid getting involved in these messes, unless the mess is directly affecting us in a very substantial way where the costs of not getting involved will be materially greater than the costs of involvement.
Regards
Mike