We have some great trainers...
Unfortunately, they are rarely allowed to train others because we are wedded to the foolish myth that anyone / everyone can do anything / everything and to the equally foolish dream that people must move about frequently and go to new jobs so they are more qualified to do more things... :rolleyes:
Thoise two fallacies have ruined US police practices, are almost directly reponsible for the flaws in airport screening and have harmed the Armed forces of the US -- all significantly.
Curmudgeon:
You avoid having to do that if at all possible because that is not s GP task for the GPF. It's a highly specialized task that requires specialized training and selective assignments -- anathema to the US Army...
You could also re-define "average" -- or realize that many members of that 'average' cohort are more competent than their nominal superiors.
Thoughts on a way ahead...
I would like to offer three ideas for consideration.
First, reduce or limit the number of general purpose forces working directly with ANSF.
Second, create a Cultural Liaison Officer who is imbedded in units working directly with ANSF. Their job is to observe and identify potential cultural issues that could fester and explode into violence. There would be one on the ISAF side and one on the ANSF side. The would consult together and make recommendations for interventions.
Third, institute a Sulha style conflict resolution system. The Sulha’s task is to facilitate transformation of the disputants’ as well as their clans from a desire for revenge (with its potential implication of endless blood revenge cycles) to a willingness to forgive, binding all disputants, for all generations, past, present, and future. The Sulha is based on a mix of mediation and arbitration applications performed interchangeably by a Sulha committee ( Jaha) composed of community dignitaries—men with standing and clout. On the “mediation side,” Sulha strives to reconcile differences between the disputants’; on the “arbitration side,” the decision of the Jaha is final and binding. (Pely, D. (2010). Honor: The Sulha's main dispute resolution tool. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 28(1), 67-81. doi:10.1002/crq.20013) The intent would be to arbitrate disputes in a system that would be acceptable to the Afghans.
The overall intent would be to identify problems at the unit level and resolve disputes there. Where this is not possible the alternative would be to personnel actions to separate the ISAF or ANSF personnel who are most antagonizing the situation.
That's the way the entiure US Army used to work...
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Instead, one might create a list of units that worked fine and the time periods thereof.
Next, look up personnel files to identify people who experienced these good practices for long enough, finally check them with an interview. Said interview might be in a bar with some cool beer - a more promising environment than some sterile interviewer's desk.
Marines. too. It worked quite well.
Regrettably, as Curmudgeon said, that has some relationship to SF selection -- not much but some -- and the larger Army has been forced to avoid such a sensible process as it would be 'unfair' and not 'objective' as the Congress of the US has told DoD their Officer selection processes must be. That destructive fallacy is now migrating to the NCO Corps and the prognosis ain't good... :rolleyes:
Can't officially compare units, either -- that might introduce an 'elitist' tendency which is anathema to the social engineers. :mad:
We can disagree on most of that...
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Originally Posted by
carl
Could that view of honor vs communitarian values be ascribed to the view of 18th and 19th century Southerners vs Northerners in the US?
Absolutely. Still somewhat true today.
Fortunately... ;)
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We may not be any uglier in Afghanistan that we were in Iraq but the results of that are turning out to be much more important in Afghanistan...
That's your assessment. Mine differs, it's not an ounce more important, it just has a different effect due to the cultural difference.
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We have handled cultural differences before over hundreds of years. We don't seem to be doing so good a job anymore.
Again our assessments differ, my reading of history says that we have done far from a good job at that. Certainly Metacom, Thayandanega, Osceola, Sitting Bull, Emiliano Aguinaldo and Pancho Villa didn't think so. In my travels here and there from 1947 forward, I found that most of the folks with whom I had contact were very polite but in real serious conversation would point out that they didn't believe we got along at all well with their nation or culture...
I've been in virtually all Asian nations, a couple on the other continents and throughout the ME. I can't think of a single nation where, once you break past the politeness barrier (Most other cultures are more polite than Americans IMO) a majority of people would agree we get along with other cultures all that well.
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And it seems from what I've read, the kinds of things that are setting these guys off are the kinds of things that set most people off, Western or Eastern.
What one reads -- and infers -- versus what happens on the ground often differ significantly.
However, could it be that the 'set-off' factors are or certainly may be the same but the fact that the reaction is different in Afghanistan is the crux of the problem?