Al Qaeda and the people in Iraq
This poll suggest al qaeda has been firmly rejected in Iraq. Judith apter Klinghoffer writes:
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Al Qaeda has desicively lost the Iraqi battlefield.
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Overall 94 percent have an unfavorable view of al Qaeda, with 82 percent expressing a very unfavorable view. Of all organizations and individuals assessed in this poll, it received the most negative ratings. The Shias and Kurds show similarly intense levels of opposition, with 95 percent and 93 percent respectively saying they have very unfavorable views. The Sunnis are also quite negative, but with less intensity. Seventy-seven percent express an unfavorable view, but only 38 percent are very unfavorable. Twenty-three percent express a favorable view (5% very).
Views of Osama bin Laden are only slightly less negative. Overall 93 percent have an unfavorable view, with 77 percent very unfavorable. Very unfavorable views are expressed by 87 percent of Kurds and 94 percent of Shias. Here again, the Sunnis are negative, but less unequivocally—71 percent have an unfavorable view (23% very), and 29 percent a favorable view (3% very).
Iraqi confidence in Iraqi forces (as opposed to militias) is increasing while its confidence in US forces is decreasing. Given US policies there can be little doubt but that US forces have lost significant Shia support and gained some Sunni support. I suspect increasing number of Shia no longer believe that American forces are capable of protecting them and with increased confidence in their government's capabilities no longer fear the consequences of an American withdrawal.
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If the people are the COG is it possible that both sides are losing? The poll results on the Americans seems inconsistent with reports coming out of Baghdad on the reception for US troops being brought back into the neighborhoods.
Analogies and institutions
Hi Selil,
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Originally Posted by
selil
Is this Center of Gravity an analogy like a black hole has a center of gravity with an even horizon an point of no return, etc.. etc...?
When I read Clausewitz many years ago, I just assumed he was using it as an anlogy from Neutonian physics. The discussions and information in this thread (and some others) has really made me wonder about that. For me, the position paper by Krieger was what really changed my thinking on how the concept is actually being used. I've come to the conclusion that the original analogy has been totally reified out of its original context and converted into an institutional formula that is bereft of any anlogic connections.
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Originally Posted by
selil
Or is it more like a tire ballancer shows displacement towards the weight thereby illuminating where more effort could be put forth? As an example some object/process such as the population is sucking down everything else and when a threshold is met other elements (food, freedom, determination) get sucked into a vortex never to exit.
Maybe it's a balance?
I'm thinking of a three sided triangle that has politics on one side, resources on the other, and time on the final side (just as an example). If politics becomes weighty than time and resources are light and are lifted. Simlarly if time and politics become weighted resources is exposed further.
I think that Bill hit it on the head when he said that
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I notice this conversation is getting a little more heated, which probably means we're about to break into new ground.
Honestly, I'm not sure if it is a case of breaking "new ground" or breaking through institutionalized mindsets. I'm also wondering what this "new ground" would look like once we start surveying it: a collection of heuristics? an inductive model? a reworked analogy? a formal deductive model?
As the discussion progressed, I certainly started to see it in terms of relinking a useful heuristic (Centre of Gravity) back into a complex system based loosely on analogies from quantum physics. That started me thinking about dimensionality at various operational levels which, in turn, made me think of the Malinowski material since the cultural/symbolic operational level seems to be the one that is least developed in current planning models. I think your suggestion of time, politics and resources is probably a good start at developing a series of dimensional scales, but may be too general.
My current thinking is tending towards the idea of conceptualizing operational levels based on time, information-communications density and format, resources, favoured elementary relational models, and environmental feedback loops (e.g. how information gleaned from the operational environment is processed and new models are developed and communicated back to level based actors). I am really looking forward to RTK's COIN handbook because, from what I gather, he has probably put together a really good model of that operational level (post #39 in this thread).
Marc
What is a Guerilla's Center of Gravity?
What is a Guerilla's Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability(ies)?
Strategic Level? Operational Level? Tactical Level?
Here is an example at Strategic-Operational Levels:
WWI, German East Africa. Col Lettow-Vorbeck and his German and Askari defense forces face overwhelming odds presented by the combined British, Belgian and Portuguese forces arrayed against him. Yet they where never 'beaten.' The Center of Gravity for the Germans in EA was their resolve, their will to resist. Note the main goal of Lettow-Vorbeck was not necessarily defense of the Colony but to draw the maximum enemy force possible into Africa and away from Europe. The critical vulnerability at the Strategic-Operational levels was simply Germany itself. Lettow-Vorbeck's force was small mobile and capable of prolonged guerilla resistance, no longer relying on the Colony for support, tying up thousands of troops and large amounts of war material. This resistance could have been continued for some time past the Nov 11th 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck stated he could resist indefinetly, but when Germany lost the war in Europe, his will was broken, their no longer existed a reason to resist.
Mao Tse Tung had a similiar will to resist as his COG. You could kill thousands of his supporters, force him to march a thousand miles, but his resolve remained. What was his CV? What could have broken the Communist insurgency at the Strategic-Operational levels?
I state (it seems obvious) that the global insurgent's COG is his will to fight, this would definetly apply to the levels of war. In this sense, what then is today's guerilla or insurgent, in the global war's, critical vulnerability? This applies to the trans-national insurgent not the local, who would have a different CV all together based on his local conditions.
Honor and A Nod of Approval From the Commander
you always fight for your buddies and your Commander. It is the latter's charisma, his personality, his paternalism, his spiritual power, his personal magnetism that binds the cohesiveness of a unit(s) together. Attached ideologies and goals are extraneous. Guzman from the Shining Path, Boudica of the Iceni and Massoud of the Northern Alliance are classic examples of the cult of personality. On our own land, the 250+ years of Native American insurgency was fueled by strong, competent, inspirational leaders. Seneca, Corn Stalk, Gall, Roman Nose, Geronimo, Quanah Parker, Chief Joseph, Cochise, Louis Rael, Tecumseh, Crazy Horse, 'King' Phillip, Red Cloud, Buffalo Hump, Little Turtle, Blue Jacket, Sitting Bull, Little Crow, Victorio, Pontiac and many others were the driving force behind the insurgency. These Indian guerillas didn't rush the cavalry with cries of " let's save the buffalo!" or " This one's for the deer!" - they charged, fought and died in emulation and loyalty to the men in front leading them. I think sometimes it's difficult for us to realize that people who blow up civilians, torture and behead have a sense of duty, honor and loyalty.