UK combat operations effectively cease: well not exactly
It appears the UK just cannot draw down yet:
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Thousands of British troops will start serving longer tours in Afghanistan from October, the defence secretary has announced....And it means that only another two brigades will serve ....rather than three.. The UK has 7,900 troops in the country, set to fall to 5,200 by the end of the year.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22520249 and http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/ma...rs-afghanistan
Given the SWC debate on length of operational tours it does strange longer tours come at the end.
The value of having an entire brigade in Helmand, largely within Camp Bastion, when the ANSF are becoming independently capable is lost on me in my armchair.
UK forces in Helmand 'made matters worse'
Chatham House has published a report 'The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004–2012' by two Kings College War Studies academics, both with "time served" in Afghanistan, mainly in Helmand. Unusually it is freely available as a twenty-eight page PDF:http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/de...lGiustozzi.pdf
There's also a podcast with Theo Farrell:http://www.chathamhouse.org/audio-resource/193055
Meantime two passages to whet the appetite:
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Far from helping to secure Helmand, the arrival of the British triggered a violent intensification of the insurgency.....
.....What we find is an insurgency that is driven both by a strong unifying strategic narrative and purpose – jihad against foreign invaders – and by local conflict dynamics: rivalry between kinship groups and competition over land, water and drugs.
Citations from:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013...tan?CMP=twt_gu
Yes, there is a long running thread 'The UK in Afghanistan' from March 2006, with a thousand posts and 103k views - which is one of the highest on SWC. One day this thread will be merged into that thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7644
We don't do combat ops, err we do?
Elsewhere on SWC and SWJ IIRC references have been made to the continuing American assistance given to the ANSF, in particular its SOF components, so it comes as no great personal surprise the UK does too. In their mixed up way British officialdom maintains:
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We have reduced our profile to such an extent that we don't do ground combat-type operations any more.
Now we learn, via a regimental journal, that a company of the SFSG in partnership with Afghan commandos has mounted combat operations:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...mb-makers.html
UK PM 'mission accomplished': really?
The UK (447 dead), with allies, then the USMC (374 dead) in 'surge' mode from 2010, have fought in Helmand Province since 2006 and now it appears the gains are slipping away before the final withdrawal later this year.
Oddly media coverage in the UK is very limited, maybe the festive season has better news to cover. More likely is that the media presence is reducing, especially as Western reporters can only rarely go around unaccompanied. I have seen more regularly clues appearing on Twitter, even if linked to reports in 'The Times' behind a pay-wall.
Pre-Xmas there were reports of a local agreement in Sangin between the GIRoA and the Taliban, with alleged 'joint patrols':http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/w...cle3951966.ece
An interesting non-media explanation that such a relationship is good news for Afghans:http://sunnyinkabul.com/2013/12/21/a...ampaign=Buffer
Then a detailed WSJ article:http://online.wsj.com/news/article_e...MDAwMzEwNDMyWj
Just what is actually happening - from faraway - is not clear and UK political-military leaders have made some reassuring remarks. So we have PM David Cameron on a pre-Xmas visit, with 'mission accomplished' as the headline:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25398608
The UK's most senior generals comment, which refers to possible Taliban gains:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...Army-head.html
RUSI Director Professor Michael Clarke responded with:
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Whether Afghanistan will succeed after 12 years of involvement is something that we really can't do very much about, and that's not really a strategic success.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25407073
For sometime now the British public has had enough of our military role in Afghanistan and one Whitehall observer commented directly two years ago:
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We are stuck in Afghanistan until the politicians find a suitable narrative to explain why it was possible to exit, when in fact the original narrative's objectives have not been achieved.
There is a long running thread 'The UK in Afghanistan', which has much of the background alongside comments by those who have been "boots on the ground" and just some critical thinking IMHO. So this thread is likely to be merged there one day:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7644
Enough, time to go quickly and some expect a "backlash" here against such interventions - personally I'm unconvinced as few politicians want to assess what we did. No 'lessons learnt' here!
The MoD and sticking plaster solutions
To many this headline will not be a surprise:
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British ex-commander hits out over 'inadequate kit' in Afghanistan. Exclusive: Major Streatfeild speaks of shame at defending equipment and calls for MoD apology over friendly-fire death
Just an indication of what he says now, with a book coming out:
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Streatfeild said he now felt ashamed at how he toed the MoD line in reports for the BBC, defending kit he knew to be inadequate.
Link:http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2...it-afghanistan
Sad.:(
Learning the lessons of Afghanistan
That delightful phrase 'learning the lessons' I know features on SWC threads, but I am encouraged to post this official UK Army account of how it is going to work now.
Their title:
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Operational lessons learnt in Afghanistan have made the British Army a more effective fighting force.
Link:https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a...tan-experience
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A successful ‘lessons learnt’ process should enhance our tactics and procedures, reduce casualties, mould our training so troops are better prepared, and lead to the development of better kit.
The system ensures the Army remembers and acts on what it learnt during the last fighting system, from every training event and every incident. It is vital that personnel at all levels contribute and we’ve worked hard to make sure it’s as easy as possible for people to do so.
I would be mildly intrigued how this process has gone elsewhere, especially amongst those armies who have left or ceased combat operations. Yes, calling the Canadians, Aussies and Kiwis. Anyone else is welcome to join in!
Operational honours list...
If proof was needed of the quality of the British fighting man herewith the latest operational honours list of 117 members:
Operational Honours and Awards List: 21 March 2014
The British politicians and senior officers have screwed up once again at a cost in blood and treasure of their nation. The soldiers pay the price for this incompetence.
The US story is much the same.
Media reporting of the (UK) campaign
In 2009-2010 the UK campaign in Helmand Province was beginning to have problems on the home front. I have little doubt that it was the MoD PR machine which lobbied the BBC to accept the Sangin diaries by Maj. Richard Streatfeild.
With rare exceptions UK media reporting from Helmand, was invariably from within Camp Bastion and the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, and rarely gave us at home an overview. I know of army officers saying freely that the BBC's Defence Correspondent, Caroline Wyatt, was "on side" and reliable.
The comment 'How the BBC was deceived...' simply lacks credibility. The BBC knew it was broadcasting a sanitized explanation of events in Sangin. Yes they failed to add a "health warning" and this weeks 'Today' programme interview reflects that failure. Claiming the BBC was lied to is IMHO bizarre.
Incidentally the "turning point" for me was C4 News, with an Alistair Thomson report on a company-sized visit to a village, flown in by Chinooks, which was short-lived as sniping intensified and his punch line was that the Chinooks took them back a kilometre to their FOB.
Whether the Major should have done the BBC diaries whilst fighting in such a contested location I cannot judge.
Sangin IRRC was a 'hot spot' with a hostile population that consistently rejected GIRoA and its allies. Only when the USMC arrived was it subdued for a time. My recollection is that Sangin was where the most UK troops died; the figures are probably in a post in this thread.
A number of very interested parties to the UK role have long preferred to have the public "support our boys" and not ask, let alone contest, why are they there? As SWC posts show this divergence was reflected in public opinion polling and the displays at Wotton Bassett as corteges passed by.