Straying a bit from Afghanistan, but...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
This is a good summary of the post-WWII insurgencies in the Philippines, but in truth there has really only been one insurgency, and it has been radiating out from government since the Spanish planted a flag. Swapping that flag for a US flag changed nothing, nor has changing that for a Japanese or now local homegrown elite leadership either.
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles...ilippines.html
"Peasant revolt is historically endemic to the Philippines despite the differing nature of the insurrections it is the relationship between the peasants, the elite and the military that remains the main cause of unrest. Luckily for the Philippines governments the nation has remained low on the list for any countries wishing to supply arms to the rebels and luckily for the rebels the US was frightened of any further involvement following Vietnam. Despite the end of the Marcos regime the insurgencies still rumble on and seem to do so unless the social and economic and political structure of the Philippines changes radically. “Philippine history shows that rebellions can be suppressed but rarely eliminated for long “ (Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, R.J Kessler)"
Two insurgencies, actually... the one in Central/Western Mindanao really doesn't derive from "the relationship between the peasants, the elite and the military" and has fundamentally different causative factors.
The assumption that all derives from governance can obscure the reality that governance and patterns of governance often derive themselves from culture and history. When incompatible populations are combined by quirks of post-colonial borders into "nations" with implicit potential for conflict, it's only natural for governance to reflect the inherent conflicts. Of course in theory you could expect governments to transcend these issues, but in reality governments reflect these implicit divisions and it's not realistic to expect them to do otherwise.
The "governance-centric" approach, whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere, has virtues and does help to understand why insurgency emerges. The risk, of course, is that from the conclusion that all emanates from governance, we may deduce a need to run around changing the way other countries are governed, which is likely to get us into an even deeper pile of scheisse. Understanding the role that governance plays in generating insurgency has to be matched by an understanding of the challenges and general undesirability of attempts to dictate, impose, or attempt to generate changes in the way other nations are governed.
Armies reflect the society from which they come.
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Originally Posted by
carl
I do not trust Big Army to be anything but dogmatic. That is the danger in stating that this or that can't be done, Big Army will believe it and never bother thinking about it again.
We can also disagree on that. The Army put itself through a bad patch from 1975 until 2005 or so. It did that for a variety of reasons, some good, most not so good -- basically it hunkered down and tied to rebuild. It did a great job in many respects but it also erred in others. It was helped in erring by USSOCOM who were more flexible and saw an opportunity to get missions (money, spaces) and the Army did not realize what was happening -- or many in the Army did not. It was also not aided by Congress who passed a number of restrictive and counterproductive laws in the interests of fairness, objectivity and guarding the taxpayers dollars. In any event, that was then, this is now and that the Army will not learn from the last ten years -- and adapt -- is not only far from certain, indications thus far are that it is trying hard to change a good many things.
The last regime on E-Ring would have emulated -- did try in may respects -- the 75-05 processes. My belief is the new one will not do that. We'll have to wait and see but in the interim, being convinced the system will invariably take actions of which you disapprove might be considered a teeny bit dogmatic... ;)
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I don't think that is good for the country in the long run. Even if we haven't done it yet, doesn't mean that it can't be done or that it might not have to be done. The corporate monster will use a dogmatic statement to be dogmatic, come hell or sandstorms.
Much truth but no certainty. The real issue is not the Army, it's the Politicians. The Army will do what it's told, it may sluff and cheat a bit but it will do the job. The important thing is that Politicians -- and the broader electorate -- really need to know far more about the capabilities and limitations (because there are both and they are fairly finite...) of military force than most do at this time. Armed force is destructive, attempts to use it peace or nation building are likely to be unsuccessful; if one wishes to do that sort of stuff, a different force, one not specializing in violence should be formed -- if one can afford to do that and wait for a chance (or look for one...) to employ it. Sounds awfully expensive to me but the electorate can decide on that.
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I've tried to explain this idea as best I can. Forgive me if I am unclear.
Not unclear. I as always applaud your intent even if I disagree with it. The Army isn't nearly as monolithic as many seem to think. It is conservative, it is self protective, it is bureaucratic -- but it plays in the political mess that is Washington; for better or worse it is a reflection of the nation.
The old fly in the ointment...
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Originally Posted by
carl
I was very glad to read the following.
is that some changes the Army must make are embedded in Title 10, USC (and others...) -- laws are hard to change; Congress is loth to admit errors and reluctant to grant too much authority to its vassals... :mad:
Prognosis is good but it ain't gonna be easy. :wry:
ISAF capture/kill operations decline - report
Back to reality readers and hat tip to Circling The Lion's Den:
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A new report from the Afghanistan Analysts Network on ISAF capture/kill operations, written by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, shows a significant fall-off in such operations from June 2011, possibly due to the departure of General David Petraeus, whose command saw an increased emphasis on such actions.
Commentary:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....s-decline.html
Report itself, which is twenty-five pages long and full of stats, graphs etc:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.net...ssReleases.pdf
Graphics by categories:http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datab...map?intcmp=239