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I am sorry for delay in my response to your letter. I wholly share your concern over the state of the Russo-British relationship. In the first place, Russia's policy in the Ukraine crisis was always reactive. Our Western partners admit that when they accuse us of both improvisation and pursuing a 'grand strategy'. It was not us who started all this destabilising mess. Not many care to have a look at its origins. So, I'll try to set the record straight on some key points.
The EU "Eastern Partnership" was declared by our EU partners as an instrument to deal with issues of our "common neighborhood", i.e. the countries of the former Soviet Union between the EU and Russia. We never minded. More than that, we suggested that trilateral projects, involving EU, focus countries and Russia, be implemented to sew the entire area together in terms of trade, economy, energy and infrastructure. We have never got any response to that.
NOTE: The EU did in fact respond to what Putin as called "a trading zone/political zone from Portugal to the Russian Far East--BUT Russia was demanding that it be under control and guidance by Russia-so the EU responded with a no and still does everyone time Putin states it and he does often these days as he wanted it tied to the EEAU.
Then we were told that a routine EU-Ukraine association agreement was in the works. Fine, we didn't mind that either. But in the autumn of 2013, it turned out that added to that agreement would be a Deep and Comprehensive FTA. In fact, in terms of consequences for our bilateral trade and economic ties it was nothing short of Ukraine becoming an EU member. In the past, when new members were admitted to the EU we held detailed bilateral and trilateral, including Brussels, talks on how to manage those consequences. But in the case of Ukraine this logic wasn't followed. We were told that it was none of our business, a purely bilateral matter for the EU and Ukraine. Only at the EU-Russia summit in January 2014, when the Ukraine crisis was already in full swing, our EU partners admitted that Russia had a legitimate economic interest in this matter, though we saw no willingness to follow it up. Later EU representatives admitted that, indeed, an FTA of the proposed scope with the EU wasn't compatible with Ukraine's membership in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) FTA. Thus, it would have been honest and straightforward to offer Ukraine the EU membership, which would have ensured orderliness and due process, including clear-cut mutual obligations.
NOTE: Russia has attempted four times to inject an unusual number of economic complaints and changes into the EU Association Agreement in an attempt to control the dialogue and take major precedence in the discussions away from the Ukraine--the EU roundly dismissed all Russian complaints recently stating they have been thoroughly answered by the EU.
That is, among other things, why we deemed the entire Ukraine project as a political one with the EU acting as proxy for NATO. Shall I say that, as far as we know, no veritable talks (and it was a set of documents of roughly 2000 pages) were held between the Yanukovich Government and Brussels. It had never been subject to open and public debate both in Ukraine and the EU. Nobody discussed costs and impact. So, it looked like a piece of secret diplomacy akin to that which was responsible for Europe blundering into WWI. Why secret diplomacy in our time, when nothing could be kept secret? All the more so that we had agreed with the EU that projects of economic integration in various regions of Europe were compatible. Adherence to the WTO rules and norms would see to that.
This mode of operation by the EU further undermined trust between us, especially immediately after Libya, where the UN Security Council mandate was stretched to destroy the regime of Colonel Gaddafi (now all of us have to deal with the consequences). It is not that we, in Russia, are Darwinists. But any outside interference has to be thought and seen through, which, as a rule, requires of the meddling nation a total commitment at the levels, seen in the two world wars and the Cold War. Short of that commitment, a truly collective international effort, mandated by the UN, is the only viable option. We have always been speaking in favour of the latter. And in that regard the case of Ukraine is no different from those of Iraq, Afghanistan and the "Arab Spring".
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There is no subjunctive mood in history. But the Ukraine crisis could have been easily avoided, had we joined effort to manage Ukraine's transformation from the very start. The problem is real. For example, Ukraine is the only former republic of the Soviet Union, which hasn't reached the pre-independence level of GDP. We have no designs on Ukraine's territory (it would be a drag on our own development) and will have no problem with a European Ukraine. All the more so that this is our ambition, too. But Europeanness means European values in practice, including human and minority rights. Why decentralization is good for Germany, Britain and Russia, but not for Ukraine, which experts say is a divided country. There is a choice to be made between war and reform, and to have both is a mission impossible. Subjecting its own citizens to economic and humanitarian blockade, wishing them chaos and destruction sound too bloody-minded for political traditions of this part of Europe. Russia insists on the rebel territories remaining part of Ukraine. Otherwise it won't be Ukraine at all. That requires implementation of all political provisions of the Minsk-2. Given the British experience in Northern Ireland, there is no other way forward, but return to politics of consensus and moderation.
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