Done.
Printable View
So how exactly did the Mar 14 movement succeed in driving Syrian troops from Lebanon without a shot fired? They may be besieged, but the Mar 14 coalition is still in power in Lebanon, and certainly their names are being spoken quite often in Beirut and throughout the region.Quote:
@ Of course they can be destroyed. If Syria wanted to destroy Hezbollah, they would, and Hezbollah would never recover, and no one, who was left alive south of the Litani would ever speak the word Hezbollah again. Maybe Bashir isn't the man Hafas was, but I am sure you get my point.
I think you are dramatically overestimating the power of brute force. Even after Hafez Assad smashed the Ikhwan at Hama, the Ikhwan survives in Syria, and the Ikhwan never had anywhere near the strength that Hizbullah commands amongst the Lebanese Shi'i (indeed, it had already largely severed its own support among the larger Syrian Sunni religious community through its violent terrorism against regime targets and several indiscriminate car bombings).
I largely agree, Tequila. I do, however, think Hama/1982 does illustrate the utility of massive, raw brute force--when coupled with sustained and effective authoritarian controls. However, the fact that the Syrians couldn't use similar levels of brutality to maintain their position in Lebanon, to eliminate Arafat in Tripoli in 1983 (or to eliminate Fateh in Lebanon thereafter), or even to force their way into Sidon against the PLO/Joint Forces in 1976 highlights the constraints that even highly authoritarian countries face in using it.
No one will be using Hama levels of brutality (2-3% of the civilian population killed per week) in Lebanon (thank goodness!). Given this, I would suggest that "of course they can be destroyed" is an abstract possibility at most. We could also be on Mars in three years. We won't be.
Which gets back to the political puzzle of how best to "moderate" Hizballah's behaviour and gradually shift it away from armed activity. Here we face several problems. The first is that hopes of integration into Lebanese politics (including cabinet participation) leading to greater Hizballah moderation have been challenged both by its recklessness in sparking the war in 2006, and in its subsequent recklessness in trying to bring down the Siniora government (although I'll add that not all of their gripes are without foundation). Second, and as I've suggested before, resolution of the Shaba Farms issue--something that might also facilitate the demilitarization of the movement--is much more remote in 2008 than it was before 2006. Finally, in the absence of a Israeli-Syrian peace deal the Syrians have no interest in a demilitarized Hizballah, and in the current context of Iranian-US relations, nor do the Iranians. Quite the contrary.
In order to keep things neat (and since this was originally an IDF COIN discussion), I've posted by response to this Lebanon thread.
This is a well-crafted, unique and insightful piece; unfortunately it is addressing an exhausted topic. It may still be worth publication based on the unique perspective of the author...would require the introduction to be cleaned-up--adding clarity to the situational background (stage setting).
JCPA, Apr 08: Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience
Complete 42 page paper at the link.Quote:
Contrary to popular belief, conventional armies can indeed defeat terrorist insurgencies. This study will detail the six basic conditions which, if met, enable an army to fight and win the war against terrorism, among which are control of the ground where the insurgency is being waged, acquiring relevant intelligence for operations against the terrorists themselves, and isolating the insurgency from cross-border reinforcement with manpower or material. It will also examine the factors that can help drive a wedge between the local population and the insurgent forces seeking its support. The principles of war will also be analyzed in terms of their applicability to asymmetric warfare to show how they still serve as a vital guide for armies in vanquishing terror. Finally, the study warns that if the U.S., Israel, or their Western allies incorrectly conclude that they have no real military option against terrorist insurgencies – out of a fear that these conflicts inevitably result in an unwinnable quagmire – then the war on terrorism will be lost even before it is fully waged......
JFQ, 3rd Qtr 08: Forty Years of COIN: The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories
Quote:
.....This article assumes that the government’s response to an insurgency plays a predominant role in explaining insurgent success. It examines Israeli government policies toward the Palestinians and observes when there are reductions in the frequency and lethality of Palestinian insurgent attacks. This does not mean that factors other than the Israeli government’s response have had no influence on Palestinian insurgent strength. In fact, the physical and political environment, the insurgency’s level of organization and unity, and insurgents’ strategies have also played a role. Still, “of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than government response.” This study does not develop a comprehensive explanation for Palestinian insurgent strength, but merely identifies Israeli occupation policies that have coincided with COIN success and failure. Given limited space, it leaves to future research the explanation of why these associations exist.....
Whole comment.
I had a few problems with the study, to be honest.
First, as the author notes, "tactical success" (insurgents stopped/killed/etc) is far from being the same as "strategic success" (which is what counts in the end). In the IDF's case, it might well be argued that some of its tactical counter-terrorism measures, while enhancing immediate Israeli security, have fanned radicalism in the long term--for example, the election of a Hamas government in 2006, and its subsequent take-over of Gaza.
Second, I'm a little unclear whether the post-2005 data includes rocket attacks from Gaza. If it did, and the data were extended through to the end of 2007, the trend lines would look far more negative than Figure 1 suggests. It certainly doesn't include Israeli external operations related to Palestinian armed groups, notably the 1978 invasion of South Lebanon, or the 1982-2000 occupation of Lebanon. (Also, given that the data is from terrorism database, it presumably should exclude attacks against the IDF and only include attacks against civilian targets.. which again may raise some questions about the utility of the data.)
Third, Figure 3 gives a rather particular view of settlement growth, suggesting that it flattened after the mid-1980s. This, however, is because the chart depicts numbers of "settlements" not the "number of settlers", and most settlement in the 1990s and subsequently has occurred by the expansion of existing settlements or the establishment of satellite settlements (or outposts) rather than "new ones," as the chart below shows:
http://agonist.org/files/active/1/Is...20settlers.jpg
(In fact, the numbers are higher than this, since CBS data excludes East Jerusalem.)
Same here. I also question his highlighting of Israeli development efforts after the 1967 War. From what I read those development efforts were targeted toward settlements and improvements for the Palestinians were side effects rather than objectives.
Overall it is a good article; it would have been a better article had he broadened his sources. I agree with Wilf's concerns that direct comparisons can be misleading and in all fairness I think the author sort of says that at the end.
Tom
I didn't get into that issue, but you're correct. The primary driver of Palestinian economic growth in 1967-93 was access to the Israeli economy (for both goods and labour), coupled with petrodollar remittances from the Gulf. It was not Israeli development expenditures--indeed, in most years Israel put few net resources into Palestinian development (these were largely financed by Israeli-collected Palestinian tax payments).
Through 1994-present, the economic costs of mobility restrictions more than offset international assistance, as the World Bank constantly reminds donors.
On another note, public opinion survey data shows that there is actually very little linkage between socio-economic conditions, or social class, and Palestinian political attitudes (especially in terms of support for militant groups).
The study does suggest, however, that building fences around the population works: at least tactically and operationally. And - to address Rex's point - IMO strategic success is really a function of diplomacy as opposed to "boots on the ground."
I disagree with your last sentence.
While I don't doubt that diplomacy has a lot to do with success, I submit that you can't succeed with a bad tactical campaign and, further, your "boots on the ground" can defeat you faster than anything else, particularly in terms of second and third order effects. Take a look at the "Jesus Coin Marine."
Quite so. I could dredge up a number of historical examples to support this. If anything, the trend has accelerated many-fold based on "near real time media." A screw-up on the ground that comes out in almost real time puts higher-up in immediately reactive mode and can snowball into something that cannot be contained (or managed).
Perhaps diplomacy is the wrong word. What do you think if I replace diplomacy with "hearts and minds" or "political reconciliation" or "the emergence of effective local governance?"
in scope and application. Each situation, each nation is different and there is no one size fits all. All those things have a place, as does the tactical aspect.
And just to make your life easier, which item is pre eminent is situation dependent and almost infinitely variable within a given situation. In either Palestine or Iraq (two vastly different scenarios), the esoteric aspects are now of principal importance -- that can change in either nation overnight and the tactical aspect could dominate all other effort. ;)