And the concrete pads and tin roofs for
the housing of friendly Montagnards who promptly penned their pigs in them and built new elevated thatched huts for themselves nearby... :wry:
We gotta admit the bicycle powered paddy irrigation water pump was a good idea, though. ;)
We're getting smarter (not). Like the US standards hospital in Mosul we designed and donated with a built in O2 distribution system. Which will be great when and if someone starts producing O2 locally in a volume that will be adequate to fill the tanks... :(
Depends on what one wanted to accomplish.
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Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
With the benefit of hind sight would more MCO or COIN or some combo thereof have made a difference on the M side of DIME?
However, all things considered and given the goal of an independent, democratic (western version) nation, probably neither would've made much difference in the long run -- the nationalistic strain was too powerful. All out MCO could've taken us to Hanoi in less than six months -- but the Eurocentric staff at MACV / USARV would not have known how to handle the resultant COIN effort and the South was not ready for it at the time. In any event, we went in with a 'limited objective' in mind and "all out" wasn't in the cards. Shades of I-rak, 40 years later... :(
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During OIF 1 it was my impression that if we had consistently and heavily focused upon the populace across the country within the first six months after the initial MCO we could have kept/flipped enough folks to have kept the lid on. The combination of summer heat, little or no electricity, mass 'downsizing' among the workforce, and deteriorating population security snuffed out that candle however and we all know the rest...
Agreed. Missteps by the 2/82 in April of '03 followed by the doofus decision to disband the Army and Police allied with a total lack of knowledge (and combat arms ego-centric disinclination to use CA) of what to do doomed us to what occurred. Replacing McKiernan with Sanchez was also abysmally stupid... :rolleyes:
Both wars were hobbled by very poor pre attack intel and an overweening sense of hubris at the WH that didn't pay enough attention to the intel that was available. Add to that Army egos which refused to listen to FAOs and others who knew the area and the people; Commanders who selected campaign goals that were flawed; and an overall inadequately trained Army...
All problems that could've and should've been avoided.
Realistic Training is key...
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Both wars were hobbled by very poor pre attack intel and an overweening sense of hubris at the WH that didn't pay enough attention to the intel that was available. Add to that Army egos which refused to listen to FAOs and others who knew the area and the people; Commanders who selected campaign goals that were flawed; and an overall inadequately trained Army...
All problems that could've and should've been avoided.
Ken,
Realistic training is more important than high dollar weapons systems; getting a consensus (as evidenced by sufficient resources) on what is realistic training however is always tough.
Keeping in mind that we do not have a habit of religiously following doctrine and instead we often seem to rely on adaption to existing ground conditions, there is an Oct 06 document that may still be floating around on CALL which covers an analysis of a battalion planning process. There are some points worth considering in there, despite the obvious influence of the MBA types :rolleyes: Here is a first hand account which might be of help in the analysis of the worth/lack of worth of portions of that planning process.
As with most things cookie cutter solutions do not work everywhere and as you know even better than I, we are playing for all of the marbles everytime we step onto a battlefield, even with the benefit of that 'sure-fire plan'.
Regards,
Steve
Hearts and Minds can be powerful
Ken, "Hearts and Minds" and "Carrots and Sticks" are overly simplistic and often misunderstood and misapplied. Unfortunately "hearts and minds" is too often interpreted as some politically correct feel good crap, and carrots and sticks while understood almost always turns out to be nothing but carrots when put into practice. However, when the phrases are correctly understood they can be useful guidelines to developing your strategy.
Frequently strategists define the center of gravity as the will to fight, while I don't think it is that simple, I do think that is critically important. How do you influence their will their fight?
If we're the counterinsurgent, then winning hearts means convincing the populace that their interests are best served if we win. This requires a considerable amount of information engagement to clearly deliniate the differences between an insurgent and government victory to the target audience. They don't have to love us, but they need to understand an insurgent victory will be a less desirable outcome. Relating back to Jone's Populace Centric Engagement argument, if we can't convince them that this is the case, then we probably can't win without employing draconian measures.
Winnng minds means convincing the populace that we're going to win both the short and long term fight. The short term fight means we can protect them from insurgent coercion, and the long term fight means they know we're going to go the distance and do what it takes to win. If they think otherwise, then it would be to their benefit to support the insurgency since they will continue to live there regardless of who wins.
Written by Mike,
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Love that last line, Ken.....Far away and long ago, lots of hamlets in various provinces where economic prosperity seemed almost incongruous (indicators include power tillers having replaced buffalo, proliferation of well-built, new stucco houses, etc. )--Yet they remained insecure to the GVN...VCI ran the hamlets, usually in tandem with the menacing effect of a nearby enemy base area. (one example, southern panhandle of my first province, Tay Ninh, with NVA base area across the border in Svay Rieng)...
We failed to protect the populace, you can't win their hearts our minds unless we do. This is my biggest beef with our Civil Affairs folks, they do great work, and their projects make excellent Kodak Picture moments with smiling kids standing around the new school, etc., but it doesn't mean anything if we don't continue to exert continued presence in that area to ensure that the populace is protected and that they answer to State Law, not insurgent law.
This involves tough love, aggressive tactics, and higher risk operations (more exposure to attack).
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Actually, in Malaya the British -- correctly -- first went after the CTs and removed their ability to terrorize minds; then they terrorized the Malays and the Chinese civilians not playing CT by virtually eliminating Civil Rights and moving the majority of them into 'New Villages.' There was no winning of hearts and the minds involved were coerced, not coaxed.
I don't think they terrorized the Malays, but they did control them so they could eliminate the threat. War is tough, I think the measures that were taken were effective and I think they are in line with the hearts and minds concept. That approach won't work in most countries, the tactics you use to control the populace must be based on local factors.
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""People will act in their perceived self interest and they will follow their heart -- but they will not let you win that heart. Nor do you need to...""
We have to find what their self interests are and show how a government victory is better aligns with those interests than an insurgent victory. If you don't do that you may have to do a lot more killing, which in the information age is not generally a feasible course of action.
Understanding culture is the first step...
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
We failed to protect the populace, you can't win their hearts our minds unless we do. This is my biggest beef with our Civil Affairs folks, they do great work, and their projects make excellent Kodak Picture moments with smiling kids standing around the new school, etc., but it doesn't mean anything if we don't continue to exert continued presence in that area to ensure that the populace is protected and that they answer to State Law, not insurgent law.
Bill,
What the American taxpayer is looking for is a low cost solution to his problem in country X, or even better yet no problem in country X. SOF are there to see if they can prevent or resolve problems by working with the local culture to provide an acceptable and long term solution.
Population Security, Good Governance, and Government Services when provided by local people provide long term solutions. If we are taking the lead on population security or building new schools, providing government services, etc. then the solutions that we are providing are not reaching the 'hearts and minds' that we are aiming at, nor are they long term. Nobody likes charity. What people are looking for is a partner to commiserate with, perhaps teach them a few things, and to help them out of a bind.
Admiral Olson gave an interesting talk at the CNAS which spoke to the importance of the ability of being able to provide both direct and indirect solutions. He is able to address this concept better than I can.
Steve