And the EBO beat (debate) goes on....
Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, has again kindly permitted SWJ to post a Point - Counterpoint that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.
First up; from SWJ, this 14 August 2009 memo by General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Quote:
Attached are my thoughts and Commander’s guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.
This brings us to January's JFQ Point - Counterpoint in reaction to General Mattis's memo. First, from Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, (ret.) - EBO: There Was No Baby in the Bathwater.
Quote:
We should not be surprised that one of our most combat-seasoned and professionally informed leaders, General James Mattis, USMC, who commands U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), recently issued a memorandum that calls for an end to the effects-based operations (EBO) nonsense that has permeated much of the American defense community for the past 6 years. Nor should we be surprised that other leaders with similar operational experience promptly applauded General Mattis’ actions. They all saw effects based operations as a vacuous concept that has slowly but surely undermined professional military thought and operational planning. One can only hope that the general’s action, coupled with a similar effort by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in 2007,will halt the U.S. military’s decade-and-a-half decline in conceptual thinking.
U.S. Air Force Colonels Paul M. Carpenter and William F. Andrews take issue in Effects Based Operations - Combat Proven.
Quote:
The USJFCOM directive to “turn off” EBO concepts is not well advised. Although the command has vigorously pursued development of EBO concepts, over time efforts have rendered a valuable joint concept unusable by promising unattainable predictability and by linking it to the highly deterministic computer-based modeling of ONA and SoSA. Instead of pursuing a constructive approach by separating useful and proven aspects of EBO and recommending improvements, USJFCOM has prescribed the consumption of a fatal poison. General Mattis declares that “the term effects-based is fundamentally flawed... and goes against the very nature of war.”
We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force. A very successful wartime concept is sound and remains an effective tool for commanders. It is valuable for commanders to better understand cause and effect - to better relate objectives to the tasks that forces perform in the operational environment. While there are problems associated with how EBO has been implemented by some organizations, they can be easily adjusted. As a military, we must understand the value of EBO, address concerns in its implementation, and establish a way ahead to gain the benefits and avoid the potential pitfalls of the concept.
The current issue of the U.S. Army War College’s Parameters also reprints the General Mattis memo in article format with a counter by Tomislav Z. Ruby entitled Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever.
Quote:
Whether effects-based operations (EBO) and the effects-based approach to planning have led to negative warfighting results is a topic well worth our collective time and study. In fact, it is a healthy activity of any defense institution to question and evaluate its doctrine, policy, and procedures. The current debate on EBO brought about by General James N. Mattis’s memorandum to US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directing the elimination of the term from the command’s vocabulary has not put the issue to rest. Quite to the contrary, the Mattis memo reinvigorated the debate, and this article aims at being part of that debate. Effects-based operations are not dead. No one individual can kill a concept, and this concept has staying power. When the underlying rationale for General Mattis’s decision is analyzed, one can see that EBO as a concept for planning will be around for some time.
EBO is anything it wants to be
As Van Riper says, there was no baby!
EBO is shape shifter concept that always stays just out of reach, and alters in the face of criticism. Success are, in hindsight, chalked up to EBO, and failures were "poorly done" EBO.
EBO endures because it's many and varying definitions are so general and so non-specific, that anything good can be attributed to it, and anything bad can be denied as being part of it. It abuses history in the same way Manoeuvre Warfare, and 4GW do.
That to me, indicates that it's real utility is to promote agendas, secure budgets and make reputations. It's no good for the practitioner.
The impassioned defense of the Baby is as flawed
as the kid...
Sayeth Defenders:
Quote:
We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force.
Neither of which accomplished much until folks went in on the ground thus 'success' is a highly relative term...
Quote:
The importance of this principle is particularly relevant to ongoing operations in Iraq, where General David Petraeus declared the Iraqi people as the “key terrain.” Our actions are seeking lasting changes in their behavior.
Heh. Good luck with that search.
Quote:
Practically made for mission-type orders, EBO is not locked to any specific level of conflict and may be used by commanders at any level . . . Mission-type orders are essentially an application of EBO at the tactical level.
This from the service that demands control off all air assets in theater and issues Air Tasking Orders. Sorry, their statements are beyond counter intuitive.
Quote:
... the revisionist “slap” at the value of precision aerial attack is oddly out of place . . . If “precision fires alone” are judged by USJFCOM to have been “ineffective” in 1991, 1999, and 2003, we must wonder what standard is used to make this provocative judgment.
Nothing revisionist about it; even the USAF has acknowledged many times that air effort alone is not enough and USAF bombing campaign assessments have found shortfalls.
I suspect the standard for the judgments revolves around the fact that troops moving into Kuwait in 1991 found most of Saddam's men and equipment demoralized but still largely intact and functional; Post war assessments in Kosovo showed the USAF and its coalition partners had bombed a large number of decoys and missed a large number of real vehicles plus little changed until the KLA went in on the ground...
The effort in 2003 combined the flaws of both earlier wars -- and compounded the failure to deliver by being called "Shock and Awe." Embarrassing.
I'll also echo what Wilf said...
A good point here and there, but I'm not buying
Quote:
The key is to not abandon the EBO concept. The key is to ensure that effects-based operations are properly planned and executed and that the effects are measured within the decision cycle of current operations.
What the heck does this mean? Comments like this support GEN Mattis's claim that EBO is too vague and complex to be of value, or as Owen wrote above, EBO tends to alter in concept everytime it is challenged in order to remain unassailable, so its supporters can contiinue to operate under the pretense of scientific method.
Quote:
When Generals Casey, Abizaid, and Pace were asked by the White House in 2006 about the prospects for a “surge,” none believed it would work. Their core belief was that there were already too many soldiers on the ground in Baghdad and that to add more would only add to the number of deaths.12 The commander’s intuition that General Mattis says we need to rely on resulted in a strategy based on killing as many insurgents as possible rather than providing security for the Iraqi people. If not for America’s civilian leadership pushing the military, then the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) would either still be playing “whack-a-mole” or possibly even failing by now. All because there was no understanding of what the desired strategic effects in Iraq were or how to design a campaign that would permit the parties to plan backward in an effort to achieve them.
Here I can agree with the author about the failure of intuition, but I suspect strongly he is wrong in his attempt to associate the surge with EBO. Securing the populace has been a principle of counterinsurgency for several decades, so how can he claim it was the result of an insight derived from using the EBO conceptual approach? All he demonstrated was that a Commander's intuition can be incorrect. That isn't exactly a novel idea.
His argument also collapses when it is examined closer, because the failed "whack-a-mole" approach he is talking about, was a result of the EBO process. EBO advocates attempted to frame the enemy problem as a system with key nodes (HVIs) that should be targeted, which in turn will supposedly collapse the system . This proved to be a bunch of rubish..
Quote:
The elimination of EBO, SoSA, etc., would be a definitive step backward for America’s military and its move away from mass to technological and qualitative superiority.
Why is it a move away? The services were doing effective targeting prior to Desert Storm. The OSS taught the French Underground how to target using the acronym CARVER (english, CRAVER in French), which was nodal analysis of rail systems, electric power, and other simple systems that were easily analyzed using a scientific method. It isn't new, the only thing new is the failed attempt to attempt to transfer this method to complex adaptive systems that are unpredictable. When we can accomplish the mission with a surgical strike we will, when we can't we will use a more holistic approach.
Additionally, the author's statement the paragraph prior to this one where he claims EBO supported the surge. Which one is it? The reality is it was EBO and SoSA like thinking that led to the failed strategy during the initial phases of the OIF COIN fight (the whack-a-mole phase). It just so happens that sometimes more boots on the ground is the most efficient method, because it may smoother the fire before it explodes. I took EBO classes and the process did not facilitate that type of thinking and complexity, instead it guides you down the path of system and nodal analysis (if you tickle node Y you get result X), and any attempt to claim otherwise is an attempt to twist EBO into something it is not. If there was a baby in the bathwater, then the baby was this works for simple systems (railroads, electric power, factories, etc.), but again not for more complex problems.
Quote:
The EBO concept was developed to prevent misanalyzing and attacking centers of gravity that do not lead to the attainment of objectives. The US military cannot continue to analyze the enemy with the same shortsighted and unimaginative results when “popular support for the insurgency” or “the enemy population” are his centers of gravity.
Sticking with the author's example, I don't see how he can defend it using EBO. If I'm not mistaken, most of the civilian casualties (due to coalition forces) in Afghanistan are due to NATO air strikes. I'm not blaming air power for this, because most bombs are not dropped without permission of the ground commander, but my point is qualitative technological superority isn't always the best answer. War is nasty, tough, hard and unpredictable, so mistakes will always be made by all participants. If the author's argument is we should do a better job of planning, he is right. If his argument is that EBO is the key to doing so, then I remain skeptical.
There are no easy answers, and the continued search for nodes that we can surgically target with our advanced technology to disrupt enemy so-called systems will simply continue to provide the illusion of progress. We have been doing this in Afghanistan and situation continues to deteriorate. This isn't because we're not using EBO, rather it is because we are using some EBO like methods. The reality is that to actually defeat the enemy you still have to wage a war of attrition to push the enemy and populace to the tipping point. This involves taking and holding terrain (human terrain is part of that equation), and it involves killing/capturing or turning the combatants (not just the leadership). EBO does not facilitate the development of campaign plans and holistic objectives, it is a simple targeting tool that has been taken way out of context. EBO, whether by design or default, attempts to frame complex problems into systems, subsystems, and nodes that can be effectively targeted and predictably influenced, which has proven to be false time and time again.
Quote:
The importance of this principle is particularly relevant to ongoing operations in Iraq, where General David Petraeus declared the Iraqi people as the “key terrain.” Our actions are seeking lasting changes in their behavior.
As Ken stated, "good luck with this one". Please tell me where we had long term success usng the military to change a foreign culture's behavior? If this is what EBO advocates are defining as mission success (a military objective), then we should pack our bags and go home now. How can be so blind as not to see this as an offensive operation that will offend those we are allegedly attempting to help? Are we now Conquestor missionaries?
EBO thinking has been used for years on the war on drugs with less than desirable "effects". We can't even change the behavior of criminals and the market for illegal drugs, yet we're (the military) going to change cultures that have been in existance for hundreds of years?
The Operational Design Doctrine (draft) that the author attacks as simple minded thinking, is actually a much better attempt to provide a framework to address complex problems.
Better decision making...
Judgment, experience, and capability allow operators to effectively use tools. An Artisan and an Amateur who use the same tool set will nonetheless most certainly produce different outcomes.
Commanders must understand the Principles of War and have appropriate judgment, experience, and capability in order to successfully apply management tools. Effects Based Operations Methods are sets of management tools, which enable a Commander bring to bear the predictive power of systems analysis and applied mathematics to the chaos of warfare.
Since EBO Methods are no longer approved, one could search for case studies which demonstrate the cost/benefits of using non-EBO systems analysis and applied mathematics techniques to analyze chaotic situations which are similar to our situation.
Operations Research Analysis is a field, which affords many of its practioner’s a wage above that of the US median wage.
Quote:
Median annual earnings of operations research analysts were $64,650 in May 2006. The middle 50 percent earned between $48,820 and $85,760. The lowest 10 percent had earnings of less than $38,760, while the highest 10 percent earned more than $108,290. Median annual earnings of operations research analysts working in management, scientific, and technical consulting services were $69,870.
Quote:
“Operations research” and “management science” are terms that are used interchangeably to describe the discipline of using advanced analytical techniques to make better decisions and to solve problems. The procedures of operations research were first formalized by the military. They have been used in wartime to effectively deploy radar, search for enemy submarines, and get supplies to where they are most needed. In peacetime and in private enterprises, operations research is used in planning business ventures and analyzing options by using statistical analysis, data and computer modeling, linear programming, and other mathematical techniques.
OR case study which includes small firms.
How Operations Research Drives Success at P&G (Large firm case study)
Can we or should we train our staffs on the use of new (to many of us anyway) management tools in order to support our Commanders? Let us consider what the deep thinkers are saying.
Quote:
"As Schlesinger said, we must again embrace eggheads and ideas – and the Minerva Consortia can move us in that direction."
It is still a broken tool
Surferbettle I applaude your continuing attempts to integrate science and its ever emerging theories into our planning and operational processes, but I still argue we already used the scientific approach prior to EBO when and where it was applicable. Obviously some were better than others, and I suspect there was a lot of unnecessary wasted effort in previous conflicts, but I don't think EBO is the silver bullet that will address those shortfalls. Of course many shortfalls were only visible in hindsight, and we should keep that in mind. The EBO approach works (as did previous targeting methodologies) when it is applied to relatively simple systems that are predictable, but it is an educated guess at best when it is applied to complex adaptive systems; therefore, it is not a scientific method. I support continued research in this area. We have no idea what will be possible in the future, but EBO theory is not ready "today" for prime time and should not be part of our doctrine.
A couple of interesting articles/studies that support many of the naysayer arguments:
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/pub.../feature6.html
Quote:
As noted above, the goal of EBO is to force the opponent to make choices that are consciously limited by the structure of a campaign. While this is true of all operations, the distinction between the assumptions of EBO and classic military campaigns is the degree of certainty associated with the limitations of those choices. A brilliant campaigner like Napoleon or Lee might be able, through his own intuition or genius, have the insight to lead his opponent about by the nose; EBO claims a scientific-like process for generating similar outcomes, reliably and in a replicable fashion.
Choice, however, is a matter of human judgement and interpretation. The complexity of any human society stems from the fact that even in the most repressive systems, there is a level of freedom in every human choice. Even the most totalitarian system has never been able to completely reduce human choice to a short list of politically acceptable options. Despite draconian punishments, all political systems have dissidents and criminals. Illiteracy, ignorance, and madness itself also impacts on the choices individuals make and further complicates any model attempting to predict human behaviour. Indeed, the very distinctions between any of these categories are themselves suffused with uncertain political and moral judgements and individualistic interpretations of right and wrong.
Mechanical causality makes three assumptions:
- same causes have the same effects;
- there is an equivalence between the force of the cause and that of its effect; and
- the cause must precede the effect.20
http://www.securitychallenges.org.au...dKilcullen.pdf
Quote:
On present trends, it seems probable that EBO will remain at best a worthy
aspiration. The pluralistic nature of Western democracies, including that of
Australia, limits the coherence and unity of an effects-based approach to
strategy. Moreover, Clausewitz’s trinity of chance, uncertainty and friction
continues to characterise war and will make anticipation of even the firstorder
consequences of military action highly conjectural. Interaction between
personalities and events means that any given military action may have
totally unpredictable effects on different actors. In addition, a systems
approach to warfare does not guarantee that second- and third-order
consequences of actions can be predicted, let alone managed. Clausewitz
was right when he argued that the best outcome that a military force could
achieve was to disarm an enemy. The use of force will continue to be an
imperfect instrument of persuasion, while coercion is likely to be unpredictable in its moral impact on an enemy. Uniformed professionals
should strive for the achievement of positive effects from their military
actions while working hard to minimise negative outcomes. Developing a
capacity to be more discriminating in the use of armed force is perhaps the
closest that Australian military practitioners can hope to come to the ideal of
executing effects-based operations.
On occassion I use an EBO like model to help define problems and solutions, but I still agree with GEN Mattis' assertion that EBO has done more harm than good for the reasons previously posted.
Essentially, it appears that you are saying
SOD EBO. Is that a fair assessment? :D