Taking responsibility is the first step toward getting healthy...:)
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Well, the How to Win thread was a bit of nostalgia - deja vu all over again. ;)
I chimed in with post #34 A Failure to Communicate Here ?, shortly before Bob came on board, which started:
And soon, I responded directly in posts ## 48 & 49, Hi, Bob's World - Governance & Ideology & Formal & Informal Governance:Quote:
I've had difficulties with COL Jones' articles, which mix legal and military language and concepts in something of a pot-purri. That accords with his background.
Without doubt, his is a brave attempt to create a needed interface between communities that use different terms (for the same or similar things), all derived from different cultures.Quote:
E.g., Juris Doctorate from Willamette University (1995); Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College (2006); also a Deputy District Attorney in Portland, Oregon (2001).
At least both of us have had some consistency in our respective positions.Quote:
Ending up with Ideology, you and I would have some differences as to what is the "American Ideology" - even in (or perhaps because of) the stripped-down version you present. However, there is little point to two lawyers yammering on about Con Law and the Foundations of our Republic.
To me, there is a more basic issue which goes to the heart of the question - should we be marketing "American Ideology" at all (assuming arguendo that we could agree on what that is); and, if so, to what extent and to what purpose ?
If our focus is on the population of a foreign land, it seems more logical to me to learn the ideologies which are native to that land - and market the indigenous ideology that is most likely to aid us in reaching our endgoal (assuming that we know what that is). E.g., in a given country, communism might be the best answer, simply because the other ideologies are not going to be helpful (even if some of them are closer to "American Ideology").
Note that I have no objection to presenting the "American Ideology" (assuming arguendo as above) to explain where we are coming from - to inform others. Perhaps that is what you are saying; but you seemed to be propounding a broader agitprop agenda than that.
I'd say both Slap & you should be "blamed" for making the last several years more interesting. :)
Regards
Mike
There are a few aspects of ideology that trigger a "cringe" factor in me:
1. When the US does not act consistently with the principles we hold out to the world in our three principle founding documents (Dec of Ind, Const, & Bill of Rights).
2. When the US publicly calls out foreign leaders for not standing for the same current values that the US gives those principles (A value being a principle with a judgment applied to it) in cultures that are in a very different place in their background and development than we are; and where leaders to not respond well to public condemnations of their character and abilities.
3. When "experts" blame insurgency and acts of terrorism as being "caused" by ideology or leaders who employ ideological operations.
All three of those factors weave directly into the events going on across the Middle East currently. The US has formed relationships that have gotten us at cross purposes with our own ideological principles; Our leaders go to these countries (or deliver from the comfort of the oval office) stump speeches that serve to embarrass these leaders and cause them to entrench even more, while at the same time making the US look ineffective at causing true change; and lastly exposed now is the firm bedrock of discontent across these nations that AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood and others have been building their influence upon. Take away that bedrock, and their ideological houses of cards will tumble.
Bob
Nice graph from Bloomberg News, via the IMF. Though it certainly doesn't explain Tunisia:
From Bob's World.
With my standard quibble on the ideological aspect -- you discount that too readily. It is not pervasive, does not drive drive the bus. However it is an enabler; a fuel source. I note you're getting more cagey on that aspect, simply stating it is not generally causative. Generally, I agree... :wry:
I do particularly agree with your second item. I cringe whenever the press secretary of the day appears, whoever he or she is appears during these sorts of flaps. I firmly believe Senators should keep their noses out of foreign policy and most Representatives should be seen and seldom heard. :rolleyes:
Some compare current events to 1979. Not a good match. 1986 is a better correlation. ;)
1. High level - ideology & policy
2. Middle level - opportunism (advancement of self and included others)
3. Low level - basic interests (primarily different forms of personal and group security, and insecurity).
Unique to specific population group - general principles often lead down blind alleys.
Less and less people are involved as you climb the ladder. He who aspires to the highest level must kinow the lower levels well.
Nothing new - with respect to the political struggle and less conventional aspects of the military struggle, Mao, Giap and the other PAVN folks all point in this direction. So also, Jack McCuen (from 1966) and Tim Lomperis (from 1996) - the next key reference (a joint effort by Ken and JMM) will appear in 2026 (;)).
Regards
Mike
February 1986 when 2LT Jones reported for duty with the 8th Infantry Division in West Germany? :confused:
I agree with those who say that cultures are different, but I am very enthusiastic about the current revolution nonetheless. I think that there are indeed chasms between the values of this or that set of people, but they are still people and tend to converge (sometimes in surprising ways) when similar inputs and constraints come into play. Egypt, for all the Islamic pretensions of 80% of its population, is actually not living life using some peculiarly Islamic economics, or Islamic politics or Islamic sociology (not to speak of nonsense like “Islamic science” and “Islamic technology”).
Their Islamic history and its good and bad elements have a role in all these things, but still, a man’s got to eat. With many detours and disasters along the way, they will still converge towards some similar notions of individual autonomy, personal property, democratic governance, rule of law…the whole shebang. They will enjoy even more of the same philosophers, the same novelists, the same poets, the same musicians, the same artists…I know some deep seated Marxism is leaking through my brain right now, but I think we are heading for one world, just more slowly and tortuously than most one-worlders realize (one world does not mean totally homogenous on all scales, just one interconnected whole with many similar features endlessly repeated…fractally weird, so to speak)..
I dont deny that vast gulfs still exist. Just that there IS convergence and an increasing interdependence and intermixing..one step at a time.
The future is already here, its just not evenly distributed (William Gibson)
To the extent that the US has any influence, it has done what it has done in Egypt because of Israel, period. Everything else pales into insignificance. If there were no Israeli occupation and no Israeli lobby pushing the US to support/bribe people on its behalf, I cannot see how or why the US would spend 3 billion a year on bribes to Mubarak.
And I think what the US does or does not do is not necessarily decisive. So the US should take a chill pill in most cases. Stop worrying. The world will go on more or less the same. Even Israel will probably survive without the herculean exertions the US does on its behalf. It will just have to adjust its aims a little and treat some people with a little more respect.
Oil? What will they do with all that oil? drink it? I have never figured out why the US has to spend billions to ensure access to oil that everyone else can apparently just buy in the market. Again, if its doing so as part of some planetary level law-enforcement function (worldcop), then the planet should be taxed for it and the planet should get to have a say in how the cop does his job. No taxation without representation. Otherwise, it seems to me that the cost of maintaining order exceeds the benefits the american taxpayer derives from any such exercise.
What similar things happened during 1986? Does it have anything to do with Kurt Waldheim's military service?
Since it is all my fault:D here is what I think is happening. In fact President Obama spoke briefly on this in his State of the Union Address when he said "Somebody changed the rules on you in the middle of the game":eek: That was a rather Cryptic but very accurate and telling statement.
Link to the 5 part series narrated by Orson Welles based on the book by Alvin Toffler.......Future Shock!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Ghzomm15yE
However, that was not quite what I had in mind. That would be this: LINK.
There will be those who say no comparison. True to an extent, each nation and each situation will differ. However there's more commonality with that event and today than with the Iranian fiasco. The most noticeable difference is then there was early warning that was heeded (I know you don't like the Intel folks but they get a lot right... :wry:) and that was followed by 'distancing,' in turn followed by prompt decisive action at the peak of protests instead of dithering.
We dither a lot nowadays... :o.
I can't argue with this:
since I would be arguing against myself.Quote:
from O
Oil? What will they do with all that oil? drink it? I have never figured out why the US has to spend billions to ensure access to oil that everyone else can apparently just buy in the market. Again, if its doing so as part of some planetary level law-enforcement function (worldcop), then the planet should be taxed for it and the planet should get to have a say in how the cop does his job. No taxation without representation. Otherwise, it seems to me that the cost of maintaining order exceeds the benefits the american taxpayer derives from any such exercise.
Cheers
Mike
I was puzzled by those graphs because they contrasted with other things I thought I heard. Was curious so while not an economist, went searching for understandable explanations and contrasting viewpoints. Got this Gallup poll.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/145883/Eg...GDP-Gains.aspx
The graphs show GDP climbing rather dramatically in the last few years, yet the "thriving" rating declined. The turning point appears to be around 2008...when the worldwide recession was at its worst. Do folks vacation in Egypt during a recession? Compare the thriving ratings a few years earlier at 29 which was more comparable to other Arab countries...those with oil. People still must buy oil in a recession.
So my theory is that rising oil prices helped other Arab economies while declining travel hurt Egypt more than the others due to its lack of oil and extensive reliance on tourism. In addition, Egypt grew from around 52 million folks in 1990 to 85 million today...that would tend to put a damper on your economy and ability to feed folks and get them jobs.
Admit that it was surprising to learn from one network that the Mubarak family may be worth $40 billion plus due to fingers in many government contracts. That's kind of alarming in a nation with a $500 billion GDP.
As you probably know, tourists ride horses/camels at nearby Giza where the Pyramids are. I did. My wife has a horse. I don't ride it because anytime I tried, I went plop...plus it hurts other areas. An untrained thug would not ride like that.
Yeah, saw some pretty big boys being treated for injuries. When folks are concerned about losing their jobs as interior ministry and other police, that does not automatically mean that Mubarak's orders are behind it.Quote:
ordinary people staging "spontaneous" demonstrations do not challenge their opponents for a violent confrontation, grab one or two and then beat them, shot them and then drop their bodies in some alley...they do not loot and then burn down one of largest shopping mals (happened 3 days back in Alexandria), and I also do not know of ordinary people who shot at the others with a sniper rifle from the roof of the nearby building.
Allegations. Can you prove there were not Hezbollah agents or Muslim brotherhood instigators? I read that many folks with closely cropped beards (supposedly characteristic of that group) were up front throwing rocks.Quote:
If this is not enough, ordinary people involved in protest of whatever kind also do not launch decisive attacks on offices of two major human-rights associations, beat and then take away around a dozen of people in "some civilian bus", escorted by the Central Security Forces car...- and this while explaining to the crowd around them that these are Iranian-paid, Hezbollah agents.
Not sure $20 bucks is much motivation to get beat up...unless your job is at risk and you are broke because the banks are closed, and you feel like kicking troublemaker booty anyway. Just can't picture guys paying tens of thousands of thugs and nobody saw it.Quote:
Nobody does that unless he's paid and ordered to do it and promised to be backed up and protected later.
Or a series of overzealous officials screwed up trying to please the boss (or hang onto their job) and now find themselves under house arrest.Quote:
And at that point this all turns into a SOP for a dictator clinging to power - against all odds, and regardless the cost.
There are a fair number of common factors. One that gets insufficient attention is that both leaders were aging and rapidly losing their grip, and that in both cases the plans for succession were shaky and involved family members widely seen as inadequate. We tend to focus on the reasons for growing discontent within a populace, without realizing that these events are often driven less by discontent rising to a tipping point than by the leader's control declining to a tipping point. Peaceful rebellions succeed so often because they don't usually happen until it's clear that the leader no longer has control. Of course in the Philippines the leader's incapacity was evident far before the tipping point was reached, allowing more preparation.
At the risk of diverting the thread, though... the US role in resolving the events in Manila in '86 is substantially overstated. There was a great deal of dithering, and the US action was not decisive, nor was it at the peak of protest: by the time the US acted the matter had already been resolved on the streets. This is not entirely a criticism of the US - it's not always a bad idea to see who's going to win before committing to a side - but it would be inaccurate to refer to the US action as "decisive". It did avoid a very unpleasant end for both the rebellion and the Marcos family, but it did not affect the outcome one way or the other.
Having been right in the middle of that particular affair from beginning to end, I'm often struck by the extent to which the official records (there are a number of varying ones about, mainly arranged to serve the interests of their sponsors) get it wrong, despite the heavy media coverage. Not that I ever fully trusted the official record of anything, but it did place the deficiencies in stark relief.
True -- and Bob's World will agree wholeheartedly... ;)Also true and a contributor to the rather rapid DC decision to provide air transport at no cost. Therein lay the decisiveness of which I spake; albeit not clearly...:oQuote:
Of course in the Philippines the leader's incapacity was evident far before the tipping point was reached, allowing more preparation.
Not to my knowledge, really and I did not mean to imply that it was significant or game changing though I did through careless wording. Can't even claim laziness there, just sloppily careless.Quote:
the US role in resolving the events in Manila in '86 is substantially overstated.
All true however, the amount of dithering for about two years culminated in a rapid two days of meetings in the basement of the WH. That's what I meant by 'decisive' -- unusually rapid decision by the US to aid and abet what had indeed already been decided when the HKPP refused to fire on the protesters IIRC.Quote:
There was a great deal of dithering, and the US action was not decisive, nor was it at the peak of protest: by the time the US acted the matter had already been resolved on the streets.
Again true -- but still a 'decisive' action by the then Administration who were noted ditherers. Witness Lebanon.Quote:
This is not entirely a criticism of the US - it's not always a bad idea to see who's going to win before committing to a side - but it would be inaccurate to refer to the US action as "decisive". It did avoid a very unpleasant end for both the rebellion and the Marcos family, but it did not affect the outcome one way or the other.
I have long ( going on 31 years...) contended that Carter's abysmal handling of the Tehran Embassy seizure, Reagan's foolish foray into Lebanon and the mishandling of that whole episode, Bush 41s failure to topple Saddam in 91 and Clinton's tail wagging (that's a celebrity buzz - pop culture reference not a veiled innuendo) led to the attacks in the US in 2001 (and others worldwide before that time). So I'm not a Reagan fan. However, while he didn't topple Marcos, he did take surprisingly and unusually (for the US outside a war) decisive action when many were urging him to not take the action he did -- that was my poorly stated point.That's always a wise course... :wry:Quote:
Not that I ever fully trusted the official record of anything...
A very interesting analysis that I originally read on AJE's website:
Why Mubarak is out - Paul Amar
Quite a lengthy article but well worth the read for its analysis of the various social groups in competition both on the pro-Mubarak wing and the protesters in the square. Gets a bit idealistic towards the end, but the social analysis is quite interesting.
Going way OT... I'm not convinced that anything the US did was a decisive factor leading to the attacks in 2001. I suspect that the ultimate push coming to shove there was AQ's need for a foreign intervention in Muslim land to justify - and indeed to continue - its own existence.
My impression was that Reagan was pretty much the last holdout on the Marcos issue. Of course I watched it from this side rather than that, so there may be things I didn't see. I do know, though, that from the time of the disastrous (for Marcos) snap election and the blatantly obvious cheat, both State and CIA were desperately urging Washington to back away from Marcos, and I know for sure that the embassy people here were absolutely livid (not for the first or last time) over some of the pro-Marcos comments coming out of Washington. Seemed from here that by the time Reagan came 'round almost everyone else had already figured out that it was done.
One of the big differences between Manila '86 and Egypt '11, IMO, is that Manila '86 was triggered by local events, while events in Tunisia seem to have provided the spark for Cairo. Manila was the culmination of a chain of local events that allowed foreign observers to be better prepared and local players to be a bit better organized than they might have been in a more spontaneous outburst. The response to a failed election left a rival candidate and political apparatus in the picture, however tenuously, and created a possibility for rapid transition that is less evident in Egypt. In that sense, the Cairo spark may have been slightly premature.
It's often forgotten, of course, that the showdown in Manila was sparked not by Cory Aquino's supporters but by an opportunistic attempt at a military coup, which had it succeeded would not have led to a democratic transition.
Again straying OT, but it's not entirely off (at least in my imagination) to look at key balance points in analogous situations...
It's often said that the tipping point in Manila was the refusal of the Philippine Marine contingent to fire on protesters at the EDSA/Ortigas junction on the afternoon of day 2. That was a dicey moment, and if they'd put a hundred PSG thugs in front of the Marines it would have been very different: there weren't more than 20 or 30 of us on the spot when it came right down to it... but it wasn't the tipping point, in my view. (And if anyone wonders, the story that "the nuns stopped the tanks" is a load of bollocks. There was not a nun in sight.)
I've also heard it said that the defection of most of the air force's helicopter assets early the next morning was the critical point, but again I disagree. It was a huge relief to those on the street who saw their arrival on the scene as a pretty major "this is gonna suck" moment, but it wasn't the tipping point.
The key, to me: a few hours after the helicopters landed in the opposition camp it was broadcast over radio and TV that Marcos had left the country. Often forgotten fact: up to that point, the crowds on the street weren't really all that big. Once the news of departure came out, within an hour the crowd multiplied exponentially. Pretty much all of Manila hit the street. The funny thing was... it wasn't true. I don't think it was an accident, either: it was inspired disinformation. By the time everyone realized that it wasn't true there were a million or so people on the street, and they just stayed. It was too obvious by that time that there was no way back for Marcos. That to me was the tipping point. Most of that crowd would never have committed if they thought Marcos was still there... but once they were out the outcome was just too obvious for anyone not to see it. There might be a lesson there somewhere about the utility of the barefaced lie at just the right moment.
I still wonder whose idea that was; never been able to find out.
Although the author won't bet on a specific outcome, here are the three scenarios posited in Three Possible Scenarios for Egypt, February 3, 2011 · By Islam Qasem (Institute for Policy Studies - which has a "progressive" slant):
Logically, the third scenario should have variants; but I'm too ignorant of Egyptian political groups to suggest specifics. The Muslim Brotherhood gathered about 20% of the vote when it was allowed to present candidates; but that leaves a large slice for others.Quote:
Hosni Mubarak is on his way out, but when and how remain open questions.
....
Scenario one: Mubarak and his lieutenants will try to ride out the unrest. They hope to wear out the crowds using the carrot-and-stick approach. They will promise to address political reforms, improve employment conditions, and allow freedom of speech. At the same time, they will display a show of power with the military scattered throughout the country and fighter jets sweeping low over the crowds. Come September, an election will be held in which Suleiman will do whatever it takes to get to the top. Suleiman and the rest of the military establishment believe that time is on their side as they take every necessary step to avoid a second uprising. Mubarak will step down as a great president who has served his country in an honorable way for 30 years. Meanwhile, the promises made of political reforms are unlikely to be kept. In sum, the status quo will be restored under the leadership of Suleiman.
Scenario two: Mubarak steps down, but the regime does not. If the crowds remain on the streets, Mubarak will be forced to leave office to give the regime a chance of survival. The average Egyptian abhors Mubarak more than anything else. He has come to exemplify all of Egypt’s current failings. By dumping Mubarak, the military regime will not only attempt to avoid clashes with the people but also to win their support. At this moment, the most important thing for the military regime is to keep the reins of power in its own hands. Under this scenario, there will be no radical changes in Egypt’s domestic or foreign policy. Egypt will remain on the same path as in the first scenario.
Scenario three: Mubarak and the regime step down. What the people demand is a complete transformation of the political landscape: the resignation of the military regime that has dominated Egypt’s politics since the Free Officers’ revolution in 1952. A successful regime change in Egypt will have a domino effect throughout the entire region, ushering in a radically different Middle East. At home, the Egyptian society will have to endure a hard period of transition, during which lessons will have to be learned in political compromise, pragmatism, and consensus. At the same time, Islamists of all strips and colors will be emboldened. On the foreign policy front, no other country will feel the pain more than Israel. After all, Egypt and Israel fought four wars. Although a peace treaty was signed between the two countries, Egyptian society has never really legitimized it, and the late president Anwar Sadat paid for it with his own life. The second loser will be the United States. After decades of supporting Mubarak and pursuing narrow-minded policies in the region, U.S. popularity is at rock-bottom.
Anyone with reasonable knowledge of Egyptian political groups ?
Regards
Mike