Thanks, Slapout, I'll add it to my read pile. It looks like it'll be interesting.
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Thanks, Slapout, I'll add it to my read pile. It looks like it'll be interesting.
I think there is probably something to this argument.
Already, the agreement which determined the role of aviation in each of the armed service (was it the Key West Agreement?), is coming apart under the strain of combat UAVs. The Good Ole USAF is loath to accept tactical UAVs for units at brigade level and below.
Perhaps a new aviation agreement might be in order, whereby functions of aviation would be delegated to services rather than delegate by type of asset (Naval Aviation to the Navy/Marines, Land-based Rotary wing to the army, and land-based fixed wing to the airforce.)
Perhaps ISR, assault support, and CAS could go to the army. Marines would retain their "6 functions" (ISR, assault support, offensive air support, C2, air defense, tactical EW). I'd be fine with my beloved Corps abandoning the air defense role (our meagre LAAD Bns), and possibly even the EW piece if someone else picked up the slack, reducing the 6 functions to 4.
I think this might help the services to stay in their respective lanes. The answer might be to de-purple-ize and instead to develop services with specialties and actual expertise, rather than pretending that we all do acceptably well and everything.
I understand there is some problems with this (B-1s actually can make acceptable CAS platforms when loaded with appropriate PGMs.)
It would also allow army aviators to fill in as FACs, which would probably be a good thing.
Thoughts?
S.E. the whole idea of assigning assets whether they be air,land or sea based upon your mission makes a whole lot of sense as opposed to way it is done now. I think the concepts of Air force, Land force, Sea force are obsolete. As you suggest they should be mission forces and they should have any and all vehicles air,land,sea to accomplish the mission.
Recognizing slapout9 was on to something, have move this whole General Purpose vs. Specialized set of posts to a new thread here.
Please continue that discussion there, and keep up the Non Cents here.
Recent White Paper from HQ AFSOC:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/document...cept-may07.pdf
enjoy,
jak
Some thoughts that got spun off into the new thread, but are, may be as relevant here, minus some key elements that invite derailment.
Sargeant made some remarks that inspired this chain of thought.
In this forum, I don't think I need to walk to dog explaining that COIN/MOOTW/LIC/SASO/Small Wars are the norm and major conflicts like WW II are exceptional circumstances for U.S. forces.
Following this logic suggests that the U.S. military, including the Air Force, should be optimized for the norm, Small Wars, but ready for exceptional circumstances, mid- to high- intensity conflict. So in air power for example, the priorities should be (roughly) airlift, ISR assets, space-based comms, support to SOF, CAS, bombers, and at the very bottom of the list, fighters. Note that this is pretty much the reverse of the AF's current priorities (culturally, if note doctrinally).
Note the Canadian model for ground forces; duel equiped BDEs, one set of gear with wheels for small wars (usually peacekeeping) and one set with tracks for the mid- to high- intensity scenarios. Drivers get the worst of it, as they need dual quals in very different chassis, while a master gunner who has instructed M1A1 and 25mm gunnery stated that the different weapons are relatively easy to dual qualify/cross train on. Units are capable of operating in the norm and in exceptional circumstances.
But the really important piece is to recognize which circumstance is the norm and whic is exceptional, and keep this in perspective.
Van
All good ideas and I believe certainly supported by what I have seen and experienced on active duty and as a retired guy analyst. I have come to believe it is easier to unleash a "LIC" soldier for "HIC" than it it is to go the other way. Tougher to get the leash back on the dog when he has someone else's throat in his jaws.
The issue of course like David, wearing a coat of many colors. One is that of culture. John Nagl points out that for all the US military's experience on the frontier, it always modeled and measured itself on European armies it had virtually nothing in common with beyond snappy uniforms. I am not a Civil War buff; I am a contemporary history buff. I have often wondered just how much of the slavish bloodletting that took place on CW battlefields came from this long distance worship of Napoleonic military thought.
The other is money of course--but money coupled to equipment and training. Getting the balance correct wouold be difficult but it would be doable. I will say that I believe you have to fix the culture issue before you can address money, regardless of form.
Best
Tom