Military support is different...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
The specific methods were for example delivery of arms (Saudi-Arabia's army is not hesitant at all to proclaim that its primary purpose is to keep the royal family in power), money aid and political backing.
What the U.S. could do:
Support the opposition instead of dictatorships or at least drop the support for dictators.
Do not supply arms. The point here is not so much that this will deprive them off arms (others will sell them), but it'll make the army less happy and thus more inclined to not support the dictator in a critical moment.
I would argue that the a big part of why the Egyptian Military hasn't overtly attacked the people is because they have had 30 years of association, education, and training with the US. This has built personal relationships that can be used to influence the military. OBTW we can leverage spare parts and technical help to provide material pressure. The Saudi military
Cutting off military ties is one of the dumbest things you can do in most of these countries IMHO. The police forces or gendarmes as well as the intel agencies tend to be the main sources of repression - not the military.
I'm not saying we should blindly support those who commit atrocities - but at the same time, I wouldn't conflate military support (which tends to be stabilizing) with support for repression.
V/R,
Cliff
Lot of catching up to do on this one, but one point first
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Do not supply arms. The point here is not so much that this will deprive them off arms (others will sell them), but it'll make the army less happy and thus more inclined to not support the dictator in a critical moment.
Not supplying arms is a tough one at the moment, especially to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. We're not giving the stuff away to them. They are paying, and paying plenty: the Saudis alone are in for $60 billion. I've read that this amounts to some 75k US jobs, no doubt strategically distributed among key legislative districts... that total is probably massaged a bit, but any way you slice it the number will be large. The other Gulf states have another $60 billion on order, with similar implications for US employment figures.
Withdrawing these sales would leave much of the US defense industry is a position of doubtful viability and would generate a significant domestic backlash. I don't think any US politician is going to propose blocking $120 billion in orders from US factories in this economic climate... to put it simply, it ain't gonna happen.
People who think the US has leverage over these regimes badly need to recalibrate their assumptions. If anything the leverage is running in the other direction.
Where the 'Spring' started
Much has happened in Tunisia since the last post, thirty months ago! So for updates try the BBC country profile:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14107241
Today, AST was designated as a terrorist organization. AST being the salafi-jihadi organization Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia:http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/0...ia-in-tunisia/
The curious case of the Tunisian 3,000
A short academic article on Tunisian foreign fighters, which after all come from the birthplace of the 'Arab Spring':
Quote:
A surge of Tunisian jihadists into Syria tells much about the wider story of violence and politics after the Arab Spring.
Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensec...-tunisian-3000
In a conversation this week about North Africa it was noted that Tunisia is being used as a refuge for those Libyans who can afford to leave and as a R&R place too for those who fight. There was speculation that for the jihadists Libya was a better prize than Tunisia, so violence there would be restrained. Mmmm.
Triumph and challenges ahead
A usaeful commentary via Kings College's Strife blog:http://strifeblog.org/2014/11/13/the...llenges-ahead/
How Tunisia fares is important, not only for its citizens and with my emphasis:
Quote:
A waning economy combined with high unemployment rates amongst college graduates is ripping apart the hopes of the Tunisian youth and creating the perfect audience for jihadist propaganda. So far, more than 3,000 Tunisians have allegedly travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the fight of the Islamic State (IS), making
Tunisia the world’s biggest exporter of jihadist fighters.[6] In the radical alternative preached by groups like IS, Tunisia’s disillusioned and marginalised youth find the economic security and the political recognition they are denied back home.
From Arab Awakening to Islamic State
Professor Paul Rogers reviews the "shifting sands" of the MENA region by examining Tunisia:http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.u..._islamic_state
Tunisia stands out as an exception
A short explanation from Australia's Lowy Institute; better than a long WaPo piece today:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...CC=3218904964&
Quote:
How can we explain such an outcome? A number of characteristics make this small country, with modest natural resources, a special case in the Arab world:
- The role played by civil society in highly urbanised areas.
- A modernised society thanks to the abolition of tribal structures after independence in 1956. Tunisia is today a country unified by its municipal organisation.
- Tunisia is relatively homogeneous and unified, with no strong ethnic or religious minorities. This is the why the country is open to modernity (female emancipation, social reform, multi-lingualism, some religious tolerance) without risk to its national unity.
- A republican army with no political ambition.
- A relatively advanced political and social life (eg. political parties have existed since the 1920s, and Tunisia has the oldest trade union in Africa).
- Modern education and high literacy.
What's more, Islamist fundamentalists played no role in the revolution, the army did not intervene against the popular revolt, and Tunisian women played a key role in defending civil liberties during the uprising.
Tunisia set to lose income after murders?
Amidst all the reporting on the murderous attack yesterday in Tunis, this commentary deserves a read:https://theconversation.com/tunisia-...emocracy-39026
Personally I cannot see the West providing much, including President Obama's promise of US$1b aid.
Already one cruise line, Italian MSC, has announced no more port visits and just as bookings start for the sumemr holidays, will European governments warn against travel there?
Tunisia, bridging the gulf
A short commentary via Open Democracy by a British SME (a Barcelona resident Frances Ghiles), which gives the context for what happened last week:https://www.opendemocracy.net/franci...-bridging-gulf
I noted this sentence and wondered who had helped:
Quote:
It needs help in training its rapid intervention (or SWAT) forces, which - in contrast to the
police - did a good job during the Bardo outrage.
Between The Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Tunisia
We opened our breasts against the bullets
A photo has been given prominence here, I don't know if it has in the USA:
Quote:
Tourist staff describe how they formed human shield against gunman during attack on western tourists in Sousse
Others confronted him, one dropped roof tiles on the gunman.
Link:http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...rkers-witness?
Moncef Myel, builder who threw roof tiles atgunman, flooring him, allowing police to catch up. "It was my duty as a Muslim"
Sorry, the photo refuses to copy here; please check the cited article.
Early comments here asked why the men did not tackle the lone gunman.
Some of the news reports here have referred to ordinary citizen action, as Muslims and Tunisians:
Quote:
Hotel staff formed a line of protection around the hotel. They were prepared to take the bullets for us. You can't thank them enough
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33313022
These actions are not unknown. They happened in Paris and long ago @ Luxor.
The Tunisian-Libyan Jihadi Connection
A short ICSR Insight by a SME. The opening passage:
Quote:
It should have come as no surprise that Seifeddine Rezgui, the individual that attacked tourists in Sousse, Tunisia more than a week ago, had trained at a camp in Libya. The attack represented the continuation of a relationship between Tunisian and Libyan militants that, having intensified since 2011, goes back to the 1980s. The events in Sousse are a stark reminder of this relationship: a connection that is set to continue should The Islamic State (IS) choose to repeat attacks in Tunisia in the coming months.
(Near the end) What we have seen already did not come out of nowhere; it has a history that stretches back decades and represents a problem too often ignored, taken lightly, or blamed on others by Tunisian officials prior to and after the 2011 revolution.
Link:http://icsr.info/2015/07/icsr-insigh...di-connection/