Humans are more important than hardware...
Bill,
Appreciate the response. You and I are 'active learners' and have learned in both the classroom and field that Humans are more important than hardware. We both know that all that running around on a battlefield with an equation on piece of paper is going to do is get somebody killed, instead it takes men and women who are willing to physically do what must be done. My point is this does not mean that hardware/and the math behind it should be ignored, and I will try to provide some relevant examples which show that math has and continues to help to create the conditions for success on the battlefield.
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Steve, not to reopen an old debate on our opposing views of EBO, but complex adaptive systems is not about tools, it is about human behavior and the ability for humans to learn and adapt. In simple grunt terms (my language) the enemy has a vote, because they will adapt to our response and we will adapt to theirs, thus conflict co-evolution. I strongly disagree with your assertion that a tool will allow us to simplify war into a math equation. Tools may help, but I tend to trust a "good" commander's intuition much more than a tool.
I suspect that you too remember learning about John Henry way back when. Look where we are today with respect to earthmoving equipment. How about crossbows versus our 'old' standby the M-16 musket IMHO you and I stand at a similar point in history with respect to the evolution of some more aspects of warfare from art into a math based science. The computer and the internet have had huge roles in our and our enemies TTPs in this particular event and the genie will not be heading back into the bottle any time soon.
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Wilf makes the point that none of these concepts are new is correct (that is only half true, our descripton of something as old as mankind is new), but again I would argue not useful. 90% of our failures in so irregular warfare are due to leadership failures to understand the nature of the problem and respond correctly. 90% of the successes are due to leadership successes. The other 10% is random or luck. You would think fixing the leadership issue would be relatively easy, but it isn't due to our deeply embedded culture for conventional warfare, thus whether new or not, the concepts of IW and hybrid warfare are useful forcing mechanisms. I suspect you'll disagree, but I don't know how you can argue the point that we didn't do very well initially fighting this type of war, and I'm not sure how the argument that war is war (even though its true) is helpful is fixing our underlying problems. Please explain your position?
Using the following definitions:
- War: struggle over life and death
- Warfare: the act of waging war or methods used for waging war
Unconventionally during the invasion of Afghanistan and conventionally during the invasion of Iraq we did very, very well. As you mentioned however, the enemy has a vote and has adapted to our style of warfare. My point is that we need to continue to adapt our methods of warfare as well and a conventional, non-asymmetric, math-free/light response will not answer the mail. Our combat trained/tested leadership at all levels NCO/WO/Officer is the glue that holds it all together; in spite of the cold war bureaucracy which works to hold us back in some important respects.
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
I think the main issue for our general purpose forces creating an awareness of the holistic nature of war through education and training. In addition to fixing our professional education and culture, we need to direct more funding towards Special Operations, security force assistance, and so called asymmetric capabilities such as cyber, missile defense, space dominance, etc.
I agree with you on this point, and as usual here at SWJ our path takes us right back to the importance of relevant training...
Steve
I think it's a combination of semantics and perceptions
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I don't agree with a Hybrid War concept. It falls between being an invented problem, and naming something we don't need to name. It's a another poorly defined feature of contemporary military thought.
My take also...
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If US Armed Forces are being pulled in two very different directions then someone needs to be sacked for stupidity for letting that happen.
1. I think that US tactical and operational thinking has been so severely constrained by our fetish with 'metrics' and providing 'systems' thinking that we see anything out of OUR now constrained definition of ordinary as something new when in fact it is not; thus our perception -- or rather, that of some (fortunately not all) of our 'strategic thinkers' -- is easly skewed.
2. Add to that the US governmental system that says Person C get elected to replace Person B. Person C must appoint People who will publicly refute every trick, technique, policy or statement of Person B -- just. as Person B and his or her folks did yo Person A.
... a. Until, of course, they find out there was a very good reason for their predecessor's policies and quietly reinstitute them... :D
... b. In any event, new appointees will parrot new things just cause they're different. This usually consists, in DoD, of listening to the buzz amongst the troops and emphasizing something that predecessor civilians did not. Such mention will not necessarily be either in context or involve common sense. This is an obvious problem made worse by 1. above.
3. This governmental process also requires 'new' thinking every four to eight years. Sometimes, that appears, usually it's just the old wine with a new set of buzzwords.
The benefits of the term Hybrid Warfare...
Wilf,
Enjoyed the Gray link, he is well written and presents some points to reflect upon:
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The domain of uncertainty can be distressingly large, however. If you are not blessed, or cursed, with a dominant enemy, the path of prudence is to cover all major possibilities as well as possible, without becoming overcommitted to one particular category of danger. The temptation is to assert that flexibility and adaptability are not policies, certainly not strategies. Nonetheless, they are often the basis for defense planning when the time, place, and identity of enemies are unknown, or at least uncertain.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
This is the easiest military environment we have faced since 1914. We need to realise that, and stop panicking about complexity, hybrids and networks.
I have had the good fortune to spend some time on several trips at the WWI battlefield in Asiago, Italy. As I wandered through the tunnels and trenches and across that battlefield I too gained a deep appreciation of what our brother soldiers endured in WWI, however I was not in the least impressed by the constrained/channeled/narrow/bungled thinking that led to trench warfare and its variants.
Rather than panic many, myself included, welcome the thinking and philosophy behind complexity, hybrids and networks. It seems to me that detractors of the various descriptive terms of warfare limit constrain themselves and and in so doing limit their ability to respond on the battlefield. This both contradicts the dictum 'A good commander maximizes his options' and seems contradict what Professor/Soldier Gray is presenting in his paper.
Regards,
Steve
Generally been sitting this one out
Because you all are so much more experienced at this type of thing.
Just two questions
Are these phrases being used by and for military or public wallet holder/decision makers consumption?
Does that make a difference?
In Relation to the concerns with Tech answers
How do you provide recognition of the tools which are meant to enable commanders to have better visibility of those in their subordinate commands in order to learn from and listen to them(awareness) without also providing the opportunity for micro-management?
Seems like I've heard some of our leaders say that answer is found in leaders who recognize both possibilities yet choose through wisdom not to do the latter.
Hybrid or Hijacked (our doctrine, that is...)
Wilf said:
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"Thirdly, and using the "Year Zero" model, we need to recover military thought from the nose dive it has been in for the last 10-15 years. The quality of military writing and especially that which is getting published in professional journals is at an all time low.
He's charitable. It's pretty pathetic IMO overall, there is an occasional bright spot in the journals but they're rare. Most articles tend to be too scholarly for practical use. Footnote and references are helpful, a term paper not so much so. Wilf also said FM 3-24 was 200 pages too long. I agree, however, I'm pleased to inform you, Wilf, that the even newer FM 3-24.2, designed, believe it or not for Bde and below, is 25 pages longer...
Selil said:
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"Technology makes a good sign post to the underpinnings of an organization. The more you push resources into tools the more likely you don't trust your people."
Exactly. Can't trust 'em because they're only half trained. That can be fixed and, slowly, we may be starting to do that. However, as Ron Humphrey said:
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"Seems like I've heard some of our leaders say that answer is found in leaders who recognize both possibilities yet choose through wisdom not to do the latter (micromanage).
Yep. Totally true -- we do not yet put emphasis on that trait; willingness to trust -- in the selection process.
Not all off thread as it seems -- Hybrid mess is the Thread topic and all those things I cite are indicative of such a mess. Hybrid warfare, OTOH, is older than recorded history; nothing new there...
It's QDR and New Administration time...
Thus the spate of SOCOM articles touting the troops. :cool:
That article's long on attaboys and short on specifics. Shaping, Shaping the battlefield..
Shaping the battlefield ...
Oh Ken, you old cynic - what, a flag officer being influenced by a mere QDR ?
One might find a more hands-on shaping process here. Perhaps, one answer to the Southern Border problem. The pertinent issue to this thread is whether they are military, civilian or a fusion - "balanced warfare", so to speak.
Seriously, I'd like to hear BW's comment on the admiral's article, which I did not read as pure fluff - I'd also tout my command.
Not fluff and a good article overall,
however, my cynicism is based on more years watching the circus than I probably had a right to -- certainly more than I ever expected. ;)
He's just playing the game and being smart about while giving his troops some deserved praise, synergies... :cool: