Good, thoughtful post, Rob.
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Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
In the five or six years after 9/11 it seemed correct to lump together together the current and potential conflicts on the horizon together into a single GWOT or a Long War - maybe it was needed to get our arms around it - maybe it was a way to consider how our perception of the world had changed - although arguably the conditions were there, they'd just not come to our shores in so violent a way.
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The GWOT or Long War constructs while possessing some validity were always, IMO, a bad choice of words on many levels. Aside from the obvious negative PR aspect, your point that it was and is not a good way to look at the problem is I believe correct. Mostly because in addition to developing an "us against them" mindset or belief structure on both sides of the problem, it induces in us a mind set that is not conducive to flexibility.
Your second and third paragraphs are very cogent and point at a big part of the problem -- appearances. Our overly bellicose statements do not help our case and, far more importantly, out national media portray us as a group of mindless idiots concerned more with the Tartlet of the day or the latest heinous crime in Missouri that is really not of national newsworthy caliber. Our international news coverage is so superficial as to be laughable and our domestic (and international) political coverage drips with bias in both directions and thus is not helpful. No sense beating that donkey here but those guys bear a lot of responsibility for that global perception. :mad:
Your comment that we see things as we'd like them to be is certainly true and we always have. Every war or major operation since WW II proves that. Our massive egos get in the way of reality and the military decision is turned to because it -- often quite wrongly -- seems to offer a quick solution. Most Americans are wedded to quick solutions. "There's a problem, let's fix it and move on." We do it internally (sometimes not at well thought out or successfully) and we continue to try to apply that mantra to a world that does not work that way -- and then, most Americans wonder why we are in an unpopular situation...
Because a pathetic education system has told them little about how their government works, about the rest of the world and our even more pathetic news media and its pop culture focus do nothing to aid in changing that.
I digress...
The whole GWOT / Long War syndrome is the result of a narrow worldview and a media focussed approach. It is not helpful. Our system of government is good and I wouldn't change it but a downside is that it reinvents itself every four or eight years, usually with inexperienced people with large egos at the helms of every executive agency and a Congress that is more concerned with its reelection and district rather than heeding their oath of office.
That's why we get to reinvent wheels so often. The continuity in the system can in theory only come from the Executive branch and if the system is structured and the elected leaders are disposed to ignore that continuity, then the Government will wobble back and forth. That's sort of okay.
However, the Armed Forces not only do not have to wobble back and forth they should not. Regrettably they do and that's why there is no consistency.
People are like that... :wry:
Didn't know I was on a hook...
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Originally Posted by
Pragmatic Thinker
Ken,
I guess I will let you off the hook with your previous answer, but I would argue that having a strategy and focus tends to allow the commanders (PLT and above) in theater the ability to better focus their resources with some sort of endstate in mind...
Is what you argue for a strategic or an operational decision?
Do you want a strategy or coherent commanders guidance and intent? Not a smart aleck question, really. I'm using the book definition of strategy (LINK). Not trying to be pedantic or a smart aleck. Just using the definition I'm familiar with.
How finitely do you want this end state defined? IMO, it pretty well has been defined as minimal violence in all aspects and a reasonably functional Iraqi government, thus allowing a significant drawdown in the numbers of US forces committed.
I'd also suggest that our failure to provide unity of command is a big disruptor of any effort toward coherence. The Prez says what he wants, that's strategy. DoD says do what the boss wants, the Army and the Corps generate forces and then CentCom sits in Tampa and decides who goes where with apparently little rhyme or reason and MNF-I gets to implement the resultant mess. For that kettle of worms, you can blame Goldwater-Nichols and the Congress. The Admin, DoD, CentCom and MNF-I can't really change that (well CentCom could -- but they won't) :(
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... I think if you looked at some open source information you would see that our senior leadership (President on down to MNF-I/MNC-I Commanders) have failed to provide a clear strategy for our forces operating in Iraq.
I've been a pretty voracious consumer of the open source material plus I still have a few friends and acquaintances who been there since Day 1 -- two there now -- and a serving son with three tours so I get a tad more than many do. IMO, it is not the President's job to tell DoD how to suck eggs (nor was it DoD's job to tell the Army how to do that - but that's another thread; as is the Army's failure to forcefully tell DoD of all the pitfalls...). That said, I would broadly agree with your assessment, pointing out that our one size fits all personnel 'system' placed LTG Ricardo Sanchez in initial command of MNF-I, a classic case of the wrong man for the job. In his defense, he grew up in an Army that never thought about or trained for an occupation or for an insurgency. Still, he and his successor were, IMO, more concerned about the Army than they were about the mission. That obviously led to major problems. Thus we agree on the practical effect but differ on who was at fault.
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...I am not so convinced that our strategy has a "bigger Middle East" theme and more of a "making it up as we go along" theme. I would be more convinced if the State Department could get its own foreign service corps to serve in Iraq and help implement this yet revealed Middle East strategy you refer to because I have scoured the internet looking for the POTUS and SECSTATE strategic vision for the Middle East, and how the forces currently in harms way are contributing to it.
You may be correct but indications are that you are not. My assessment -- informed guess, really -- is that the 'strategy' was loose and open ended and the implementation is having to be made up as we go because no one involved had ever done anything like this before. I do know for a fact that senior career people at State have bureaucratically resisted Iraq from the get go and are doing as little as they can get away with.
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The current calm in Iraq (if you listen to the pundits) is all due to the successful surge of U.S. forces, but I would argue (from my sources) that it is more to do with the MAS initiated cease-fire from late August then U.S. forces taking it to the enemy across Baghdad. My sources tell me the Shia's are buying time and waiting for the U.S. forces to finally withdrawal so they can finish standing up the latest Shia Islamic Republic in the Middle East. They also tell me that MAS could turn the violence back on with the snap of his finger, which is why we're doing the slow dance with Maliki and the other Shia sympathizers within the "sovereign" government...
I agree with all that. The surge was of marginal military value. FWIW, I didn't think it would make much difference and did not think the cost in several paramenters justified it.
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... Now I am not trying to be a smart ass but was this part of the greater Middle East plan our administration had envisioned when invading Iraq? I find it peculiar that our senior leaders had a plan to overthrow Saddam but after that they didn't have a clue and when their assessments (Pearle, Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and crew claimed the Iraqi's would welcome as liberators and quickly assume their own security and governing) failed to materialize they fell back and called it an insurgency. I would argue what we see in Iraq is less of an insurgency and more of a failed invasion with no real vision on how to correct it...
I agree with most of that. No question they had a short sighted and very unrealistic view of what would happen in Iraq. I think the initial plan involved a rapid withdrawal in the Aug-Sep 03 period and that something happened in early May to change that, thus the rapid (and bad) replacement of Garner by Bremer. Don't know what it was; it'll come out some day.
The insurgency in Iraq did not need to happen. The Intel community totally missed the planned insurgency even though Saddam announced his intentions. The Troops had no clue what to do after they got to Baghdad and some precipitate action by the troops and the absolutely stupid disbandment of the Iraqi Army and Police set in motion an escalation that need not have occurred.
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We will see an invetiable civil war fought inside Iraq within the next 36-48 months with the victors most likely being the Shia's, and how this will play out in the greater Middle East has yet to be seen...
Perhaps. I'm no ME expert but I know enough about the pragmatism and behind the scenes maneuvering to know that little is as it seems and things can shift in unexpected directions. We'll see
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... Anyway, I am not buying the overall greater Middle East plan that is supposedly the answer for this protracted war...
I'm not selling. You asked for my opinion and you got it, you don't have to take it or even like it.
It by the way is not the answer for this particular war -- it is the reason this particular war was started; the answer for this protracted war is for the Army, Marines (who bear significant responsibility for it being as protracted as it is) and other agencies to get their act together and fix it. The good news is that they have -- belatedly -- started doing that. And they all deserve Attaboys for doing that. Took 'em seven years to do that in Viet Nam, it's only taken three plus here. :wry:
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In regards to IED's there is something like four major task forces within theater, and according to my sources neither of them is synched or coordinated but yet their overall annual budgets run into the billions!!
True and another's on the way -- That's not a strategy effect; has nothing what so ever to do with strategy. That's a DoD typical reaction to a problem; throw money at it and try for a technological fix instead of training people and just getting on with the job. I spent 45 years in and around DoD, it was that way the whole time and in the 12 years I've been retired, nothing has changed. :mad:
You've hit one of the major protration contibutors
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Originally Posted by
Pragmatic Thinker
...
I am in violent agreement with you regarding CENTCOM, history will not speak well of it's post-invasion management of this conflict.... The Army will also not fair well in the Iraqi rearview mirror...
Edit: Uh, that would be protraCtion contRibutors. Hey. lee me loan, I'm old :)
Both true. Good news is the Army knows it and is working on fixing at least part of it. Bad news is that CentCom knows it and they and DoD don't care due to the 'joint' factor, the aforementioned B-N act and the rotation of round pegs into the square hole that is CinCCent every two or three years....
Poor way to do business.
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Modularity and the piece-mealing of units together without consideration of cohesion and unity of command is also to blame for the confusing picture on the ground. When a BCT enters into its 12 month pre-deployment train-up with its organic battalions this should be the force it fights with for 15 months. Also, with the BCT's having numerous rotations into theater you would assume it makes sense to return them to the same AOR to maximize unit familiarity with the populace, enemy, and terrain but that doesn't happen either. All too often you see a BCT train-up to go to area X, only to be told while in Kuwait waiting to enter the box that they are going somewhere else, and that two of their organic battalions will go somewhere else and they will inherit two battalions from a different BCT... I am no Patton or McArthur but that doesn't make sense to me. I am miffed as to how we justify this and expect effectiveness not to suffer?!?
Thee, me and a couple of commanders I know. I cannot understand why DA tolerates it, I cannot understand why CentCom and the MNF-I do it (both, as I understand it have a hand in it) nor do I understand why Commanders are not raising the roof about it.
It also affects Afghanistan.
Rotation of units for seven months or a year (or more) is far, far better than individual rotation -- but just 'cause it's better, is no reason to try to undo the good effect it can have. Sad.
Humanitarian Response to IEDs
There's an RFI at the end of this post. Moderator, please let me know if I should shift this over to the RFI section.
I have been exploring the humanitarian impact of IEDs upon civlian populations for the last year and a half. The humanitarian community has, by and large, been avoiding this issue. This is primarily a result of the principles of nuetrality that mainstream NGOs opeate under, and the lack of technical intervention capacity possessed by even the more advanced members of the Humanitarian Mine Action community.
I'm dropping a proposal tomorrow with a USG donor to conduct a study of IED victimilzation in three countries and craft an approrirate version of Mine Risk Education (MRE, what used to be called Mine Awareness) aimed at translating behavior modification strategies from the Humanitarian Mine Action community (and others, such as HIV Awareness) to threat reduction for civlian populations with significant IED exposure. Call it IED Risk Education (IEDRE).
My outfit has developed IED Awareness curricula in the past, and will include in this effort an exploration of strategies to protect aid workers in addition to the beneficiaries they serve. Seemed rather tragically timelly to have been writing this proposal when news of the Algiers bombing arrived.
Given our landmine survey work over the years, I started fooling around with some comparisons between our survey data and open source IED attack reports. A small example:
During the two-year period between 2004 and 2006 (our Landmine Impact Surveys examine the 24 month period prior to arrival of the data collectors), there were 12 landmine/UXO victims in Ta’meem (Kirkuk) Governorate. Of these victims, three were killed and nine wounded. On a single day during that same period, 15 June 2005, a suicide bomber struck in the city of Kirkuk. In this attack, 23 civilians were killed and nearly 100 wounded.
I'm raising this disparity within my own community largely because of the substantial amount of resorces directly toward Humanitarian Mine Action during the past 15 years. Not to say that this response shouldn't be happening, but that a similarly vigorous effort should be directed toward reducing the exposure of at-risk populations to IED attack, and toward public health response for victims.
I'm kicking out an OP/ED next week aimed at galvanizing a bit of interest and action within the relief and development arena, donors included, and will introduce four principles of humanitarian response to IEDs.
I'm interested in hearing folks' thoughts on this, and very interested in data sources (unclassified, or able to be declassified) that we might use as we drive this effort forward.
Cheers,