Well, if we have to talk about music as a basic combat fundemental...
The Red Hot Chilli Peppers? Nah! :rolleyes:
CCR when things get gloomy? That's a step in the right direction. ;)
Want 'em to march forever? This is what it sounds like done right.
Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EsIqEq9OFxE
Slapout will appreciate that. It's right from his era and area. It's also the best rendition I've found.
By the way, that's a '76 concert in the UK. Skynyrd opened for the Rolling Stones. Those people waving the Stars and Bars are a bunch a fish and chippers! Skynyrd was such a hit that the Stones delayed coming on stage because they didn't want to follow them to closely! The Stones never had Skynyrd open for them again after that! I guess Jumping Jack Flash couldn't compare. :p
You're correct on your major point -- but I still agree with Fuchs...
Occupation is not only often unnecessary, it can be counterproductive. No question one needs to be prepared to do it but one should be prepared to do many things one hopes one will never have to do and one should actively seek to not do some of those things. I can recover some aircraft from a spin and do a fishhook turn in my car but I work at not having to do those things..
Cases in point:
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Originally Posted by
Michael C
...who really would have said Afghanistan and Iraq before 9/11?), but describing what it could look like is...Failure to win the peace, as in Iraq twice and Afghanistan once, will cost us dearly.
I believe that to be a double misstatement of what actually occurred. First, both Afghanistan and Iraq were totally predictable and what in fact occurred (before, during and after...) had been predicted by many. Both nations as problems and the aftermath possibilities were well up on the radar screen. The difficulty was that no one involved in policy making at the national, DoD, HqDA and TRADOC levels (remember those last three for the future...) was remotely interested in hearing any of that. Domestic concerns took -- always take (remember that also for the future...) -- precedence. :mad:
It's well known fact that Armed Forces do pretty much what they're trained to do. Conversely, they are unlikely to do what they are not trained to do. The force that went into Afghanistan did its job beautifully -- then we inserted forces we did not need there to do things that did not need to be done there and said Forces were not trained to do what was asked of them. That is at one time a policy, a military advisory and a training shortfall that created the situation that led to your unit being better trained and more capable than its predecessor was 12 years ago.
That same cluster held true in Iraq; the initial entry and action was great; good people doing what they'd trained to do and doing it very well indeed. Then, the lack of training showed in the tolerance of looting, excessive reliance on force and the abject failure of the intelligence system -- and those forces and their commanders -- to predict Saddam's publicly announced initiation of an insurgency. The fact that all that was also eminently predictable is shown by the Franks deal with Rumsfeld -- "I'll take Baghdad for you but then I want to immediately retire..."
Secondly, the initial failure in Iraq was one of political will and not of capability (more with Viet Nam experience about; plus I cannot see Norman Schwarzkopf ever tolerating looting...:D), the second failure was engendered by a good case of merited and desirable political will but a badly flawed assessment of capability; it also happens to not necessarily be a 'failure' -- too early to tell. Same thing is true of Afghanistan. However, failures or there is no doubt that both were and are extremely costly endeavors that did not have to occur. That fact remains true with or without our being better trained at the time than was the case.
So even though it does reflect much current thought, your assessment of how we got where we are is, I believe, incorrect. The good news is that this comment by you, your bottom line, is totally correct and bears emphasis:
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So this brings me to the original point of this post: we need to train an army prepared for high intensity conflict and low intensity conflict--and everything in between. We need leaders who are adaptable, but still knowledgeable in the core competencies of moving, shooting and communicating; then acting like diplomats, police and trainers. (emphasis add / kw)
I totally agree and have been banging on that drum for almost 45 years of service and work and the fifteen years since I've been fully retired. You are correct. That is an achievable goal.
IF...
We scrap our flawed personnel and training processes and do not delude ourselves that everything in Afghanistan and Iraq would have been alright had we simply been more proficient in actions after the attack, COIN efforts and FID skills -- that is a very dangerous over simplification of the problem. Hubris can be its own worst enemy.
For example:
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Units in Afghanistan and Iraq aren't just a little better at fighting than units were in the 90s, they are ten times better. We have honed are skills in live fire training exercises called combat, and we are so much better for it.
I agree that you and we are better for it but I also submit that by pegging it against the Army of the 90s you are setting a pretty low standard. Nor is a Ranger Bn anything special -- if you had their selectivity and their money, you might well be able to do a better job than can they. :wry:
More apt comparison might be the less 'well trained' but slightly more all round capable Army of the early and mid 60s before the late 1967 Viet Nam malaise set in and led to the Army of the 70s through the 90s, the Army that created Ranger Bns to fill an obvious shortfall in Infantry capability induced by a deeply flawed training strategy and a culture of risk aversion that was developing. The capability of the Infantry has been regained in part, the risk aversion is a societal thing and will be more difficult to dispel.
Never forget that same 70 to 90s Army made Tommy Franks a four button... :rolleyes:
You may qualify it any way you wish.
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Originally Posted by
JMA
I would qualify that with the term "effective fire". If you come under effective fire, or you exchange effective fire or you deliver effective fire in the enemy.
However, if one has seen a few people killed by random, even unintended, fire one will probably look at a definition of 'effective' in a different light than others.
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There is all this talk about long range "contacts" (500-900m) in Helmand. This can not be effective fire for most platoon weapons. Does one even bother to take cover?
Depends on the weapons. If the opponents have SVD(s), any of the PK series or even old Nagants or Enfields -- even an RPK -- much less a Dshk, they can bring very effective (by any reasonable definition) fire on you at those ranges. Conversely, the M-14 series, the M240/MAG 58s and the various other long range weapons can initiate or return effective fire at those ranges. So whether one even bothers to take cover is -- as always -- situation, state of training and / or experience and all that METT-TC stuff dependent. The only rule in combat is that there are no rules... ;)
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...ah but as per my many previous comments about strolling around over open ground I guess the soldiers led into harms way by and idiot officer will probably feel a little vulnerable.
Or the Soldier led into harm's way by a quite competent officer or NCO not by strolling -- as you so repetitiously, drolly and ignorantly put it -- but by crossing open areas that are forced upon them by the situation in as tactically sound a manner as is possible.
The good news is that you don't have to worry about any of that, you can just fulminate at length over the internet while a lot of others ranging from more competent than you or I ever were to those incompetents you seem to see everywhere get on with business... :wry: