Any thoughts on the impending change out of the MNF-I C3? Heard the incumbent is headed to be CG at Benning and his replacement is the current Northcom J3, who last saw the AO as a div G3 staff guy in DS/DS.
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Any thoughts on the impending change out of the MNF-I C3? Heard the incumbent is headed to be CG at Benning and his replacement is the current Northcom J3, who last saw the AO as a div G3 staff guy in DS/DS.
This just turned up on my e-mail. May be of interest to those here.
Quote:
PETRAEUS, AFGHANISTAN AND THE LESSONS OF IRAQ
By George Friedman
Gen. David Petraeus, who commanded the surge in Iraq, was recommended April 23 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to be (CENTCOM). If confirmed by the U.S. Senate, this means Petraeus would remain in ultimate command of the war in Iraq while also taking command in Afghanistan. Days after the recommendation, there was yet another unsuccessful attempt on the life of Afghan President Hamid Karzai on April 27. Then, media reports May 3 maintained the United States might strengthen its forces in Afghanistan to make up for shortfalls in NATO commitments. Across the border in Pakistan, April 25, the first fruits of the Pakistani government's efforts to increase its -- though these talks appeared to collapse April 28. Clearly, there appears to be movement with regard to Afghanistan. The question is whether this movement is an illusion -- and if it is not an illusion, where is the movement going?
Petraeus' probable command in Afghanistan appears to be the most important of these developments. In Iraq, Petraeus changed the nature of the war. The change he brought to bear there was not so much military as political. Certainly, he deployed his forces differently than his predecessors, dispersing some of them in small units based in villages and neighborhoods contested by insurgents. That was not a trivial change, but it was not as important as the process of political discussions he began with local leaders.
The first phase of the U.S. counterinsurgency, which lasted from the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency in mid-2003 until the U.S. surge in early 2007, essentially consisted of a three-way civil war, in which the United States, the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias fought each other. The American strategic goal appears to have been to defeat both the insurgents and the militias, while allowing them to attrit each other and civilian communities.
Reshaping the Struggle in Iraq
Petraeus reshaped the battle by observing that the civil war was much more than a three-way struggle. Tensions also existed within both the Iraqi Sunni and the Shiite communities. Petraeus' strategy was to exploit those tensions, splitting both his opponents and forming alliances with some of them. Petraeus recognized that political power in the Sunni community rested with the traditional tribal leaders -- the sheikhs -- and that these sheikhs were both divided among themselves, and most important, extremely worried about the foreign jihadist fighters from al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda ultimately wanted to replace the sheikhs as leaders of their respective communities. It used its influence with younger, more radical Sunnis to create a new cadre of leaders. The more U.S. pressure on the Sunni community as a whole, the less room for maneuver the sheikhs had. U.S. policy was inadvertently strengthening al Qaeda by making the sheikhs dependent on its force against the United States. Similarly, the Shiite community was split along multiple lines, with Iran deeply involved with multiple factions.
Petraeus changed U.S. policy from what was essentially warfare against the Sunnis in particular, but also the Shia, as undifferentiated entities. He sought to recruit elements previously regarded as irredeemable, and with threats, bribes and other inducements, forced open splits among Sunnis and Shia. In doing so, Petraeus also opened lines to the Iranians, who used their fear of a civil war among the Shia -- and a disastrous loss of influence by Iran -- to suppress both intra-Shiite violence and Shiite violence against Sunnis.
The result of this complex political maneuvering coupled with the judicious use of military force was a decline in casualties not only among American forces, but also among Iraqis from intercommunal warfare. The situation has not by any means resolved itself, but Petraeus’ strategy expanded splits in the Sunni and Shiite communities that he tried to exploit. The most important thing Petraeus did was to reduce the cohesion of U.S. enemies by recognizing they were not in fact a cohesive entity, and moving forward on that basis.
The verdict is far from in on the success of Petraeus' strategy in Iraq. The conflict has subsided, but certainly has not concluded. Indeed, we have seen increased attacks in Sunni regions recently, while conflict with radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr’s forces in Baghdad is increasing. In many ways, the success of Petraeus’ strategy depends on Iran continuing to perceive the United States as a long-term presence in Iraq, and continuing to regard suppressing conflict among Shia important so the Iraqi Shia can constitute a united bloc in the government of Iraq. But the strategy is not foolproof; should the jihadists and some of the Sunni sheikhs decide to stage a countersurge in the months ahead of the U.S. election, the fabric of political relations would unravel with startling speed, and the military situation would change dramatically. Petraeus certainly has improved the situation. He has not won the war.
The Afghan Challenge
Applying Petraeus' politico-military strategy to will be difficult. First, the ratio of forces to population there is even worse than in Iraq, making the application of decisive military force even more difficult. But even more important, unlike in Iraq -- where the U.S. effort began purely on a military track -- U.S. involvement in Afghanistan began on a political track much like Petraeus brought to bear in Iraq in 2007.
As we have pointed out many times, the United States did not actually invade Afghanistan in October 2001. That would have been impossible 30 days after 9/11. Instead, the United States made political arrangements with anti-Taliban factions and tribes to use their force in conjunction with U.S. airpower. The payoff for these factions and tribes was freedom from the Taliban and domination of the national government of Afghanistan, or at least their respective regions.
The first level of force the U.S. introduced into Afghanistan was a handful of CIA operatives followed by a small number of U.S. Army Special Forces teams and other special operations forces units. Their mission was to coordinate operations of new U.S. allies among the Northern Alliance -- which had been under Russian influence -- and among the Afghan Shia and Tajiks, who had been under Iranian influence. The solution ran through Moscow and Tehran on the strategic level, and then to these local forces on the tactical level.
Less than an invasion, it was a political operation backed up with airpower and a small number of U.S. ground forces. In other words, it looked very much like the strategy that Petraeus implemented in Iraq in 2007. This strategy was followed from the beginning in Afghanistan. Having forced the Taliban to retreat and disperse, the United States failed to prevent the Taliban from regrouping for two reasons. First, the political alliances it tried to create were too unstable and backed by too little U.S. force. Second, the Taliban enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan, which Islamabad was unable or unwilling to deny them. As a result, the Taliban regrouped and re-emerged as a capable force, challenging insufficient U.S. and NATO forces on the ground
Less than an invasion, it was a political operation backed up with airpower and a small number of U.S. ground forces. In other words, it looked very much like the strategy that Petraeus implemented in Iraq in 2007.
160 000+ troops is a small number in Iraq?? Maybe George had one too many beers when he wrote that sentence. Why he wants to compare a few hundred Air Force special operators to target JDAMS with a 160 000 man force is quite a bit beyond me. The two campaigns neither began the same way nor look the same way now.
I guess Friedman is groping to show how Petraeus may approach the challenge in Afghanistan, but he seems to be laboring under several misconceptions.
Firstly, the 'Taliban' that has re-emerged is not the same organization that we crushed in 2001. In fact, 'Taliban' is little more than a label of convenience for those too lazy or too ignorant to really dig into what is going on in Afghanistan right now. There are at least four major insurgent organizations operating in Afghanistan now, alongside and sometimes in cooperation with criminal traffickers of various stripes. Their motivation ranges from reestablishing the caliphate to creating Pashtunistan to protecting the poppy trade to simply making a living as an insurgent. Their support comes from disaffected tribes, aspirant warlords, criminals, the transport mafia, trans-national terrorists, Pakistani pols and soldiers with a Machiavellian bent, and the huge pool of unemployed young men with no particular homeland, future, or tribal loyalties. In other words, its a Byzantine mess that makes Iraq look like Switzerland by comparison.
Secondly, there is no possibility of a coherent strategic approach to 'winning' in Afghanistan. The current command structure will not allow it; NATO has the unity and command discipline of the French host at Agincourt. Each province is essentially a fiefdom within which the various responsible nations pursue those operations they deem necessary. The non-military side of the house is, if possible, even less coherent.
Thirdly, Petraeus is not in charge in Afghanistan. ISAF is a NATO headquarters; even when an American is commanding ISAF he is (technically) responsible to a NATO Joint Force Commander in Europe. Some may pooh-pooh this as a convenient fiction, but it is not, believe me. Yes, we are running our own separate war in Afghanistan alongside the NATO effort, and McNeil and his successors are likely to listen when Petraeus speaks, but I'm not sure Friedman really grasps the command dynamic in that theater.
The Petraeus Doctrine by Andrew J. Bacevich, The Atlantic, October 2008 issue.
Iraq-style counterinsurgency is fast becoming the US Army’s organizing principle. Is our military preparing to fight the next war, or the last one?
Much more at The Atlantic.Quote:
For a military accustomed to quick, easy victories, the trials and tribulations of the Iraq War have come as a rude awakening. To its credit, the officer corps has responded not with excuses but with introspection. One result, especially evident within the US Army, has been the beginning of a Great Debate of sorts.
Anyone who cares about the Army’s health should take considerable encouragement from this intellectual ferment. Yet anyone who cares about future US national-security strategy should view the debate with considerable concern: it threatens to encroach upon matters that civilian policy makers, not soldiers, should decide.
What makes this debate noteworthy is not only its substance, but its character—the who and the how.
The military remains a hierarchical organization in which orders come from the top down. Yet as the officer corps grapples with its experience in Iraq, fresh ideas are coming from the bottom up. In today’s Army, the most-creative thinkers are not generals but mid-career officers—lieutenant colonels and colonels.
Like any bureaucracy, today’s military prefers to project a united front when dealing with the outside world, keeping internal dissent under wraps. Nonetheless, the Great Debate is unfolding in plain view in publications outside the Pentagon’s purview, among them print magazines such as Armed Forces Journal, the Web-based Small Wars Journal, and the counterinsurgency blog Abu Muqawama.
The chief participants in this debate - all Iraq War veterans - fixate on two large questions. First, why, after its promising start, did Operation Iraqi Freedom go so badly wrong? Second, how should the hard-earned lessons of Iraq inform future policy? Hovering in the background of this Iraq-centered debate is another war that none of the debaters experienced personally - namely, Vietnam.
The protagonists fall into two camps: Crusaders and Conservatives...
political observer and strategist. Alas, I think he also proves yet again that his military strategy and observation capability is somewhat less well refined.
Everyone should be applauding the Army for having this debate instead of wringing their hands in concern over decisions being made by the Armed Forces that will effectively determine national strategy. We tried that once; the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines. How'd that work out?
John Nagl has some good points -- and some, IMO, less good. Gian Gentile has some good points -- and also some, IMO, less good. We need a balanced total spectrum force. Nagl, Gentile, Bacevich, White and the combined brain power of the last four and next three SAMS Courses have no clue what the next war will be like. The Armed Forces have to be ready for all types of current and possible future warfare. The 9/11 debacle and the last few years have proven that, we cannot predict what the civilian masters will direct; what we can do is prepare to cover the total spectrum of warfare, like it or not. It will not be easy and rice bowls will have to be broken but I have no doubt that will occur.
I've read a lot of Bacevich - my only general criticism is that sometimes he uses loaded terms to make his points - in short, a bit of over-advocacy at times. Of course, his critics on policy can be even more over-loaded. "Wacko Bacevich ... leftist ... socialist" (LOL) was one comment by one of my email correspondents. After a bit more of that "wacko" stuff - on both sides - we decided to play a nice game of chess. He got clobbered - hint, I cheat.
Now, more seriously, I agree with Ken that AB is a bit off here - since I don't see the danger.
It is possible that the choices will default to the military (AB last para.), but that is not a military problem.Quote:
AB article
Yet anyone who cares about future U.S. national-security strategy should view the debate with considerable concern: it threatens to encroach upon matters that civilian policy makers, not soldiers, should decide.
Here is my take (very much IMO).
My view is the equation: policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics -- ideas move up and down the food chain. If they don't, the system breaks down. Note: I am not suggesting micro-manipulation from the top to the bottom. Ken and others can explain better how well that worked in Korea and Vietnam.
My concern is whether the politicians (politics and policy people) are capable of understanding, much less properly applying, the ideas that move up the foodchain to them. When Congress gets a 10-15% positive approval rating, we have a definite competence problem at the policy level. When perhaps a dozen or so (maybe there were more - that is what I recall) read one version or another of the DCI's WMD report pre-OIF, we know we have a problem.
And, yup, I read the public version - and was not impressed (too many lawyerly weasel-words in the bold-faced paragraphs and too many stale facts). I thought (and still do) that the policy behind OIF I was justified for other reasons.
Also read MG Scales article from another thread. Don't know him, only his TV persona (to me, positive). Isolated out his 9 bullet poiints, and thought - how many congresspeople could even begin to understand what he was proposing ? The executive branch may be somewhat more competent.
What our policy makers seem to do too often (IMO) is to buy the flavor of the day - not a recipe for success; and probably a recipe to get too many good people killed.
Expressed policy (morphing critter that it is) does make a difference - since it is the measure by which one determines whether the armed conflict is "won" or "lost".
PS: We won the Southeast Asian "War Games" hands down - based on the expressed policy. You might dwell on that one. That comment is not made lightly, but after considerable decades-long thought.
Not as strong as his interview with Moyers.
Being easily identified as a "Crusader", I think he mischaracterizes Nagl's arguments. I have never heard Nagl call for what he characterizes above. He has called for more focus on counterinsurgency and a standing advisory corps, which is a long way from Prof. Bacevich's caricature.Quote:
Gentile does not doubt that counter*insurgencies will figure in the Army’s future. Yet he questions Nagl’s certainty that situations resembling Iraq should become an all-but-exclusive preoccupation. Historically, expectations that the next war will resemble the last one have seldom served the military well.
.....
Embedded within this argument over military matters is a more fundamental and ideologically charged argument about basic policy. By calling for an Army configured mostly to wage stability operations ...
Likewise, I disagree with COL Gentile, as many on this board know.
I think it was gross professional negligence that we entered Iraq 2003 with no institutional foundation in COIN. It will be gross professional negligence if we face another conflict (after these have subsided and there is a chance to retrain) and aren't prepared conventionally either.
Prof. Bacevich's argument doesn't advance the ball beyond this binary debate we've been having for months.
As I called for at the Armor conference in May - we must do both. I believe we can. And I call on all sides to stop hyperventilating about coin-only or conventional only focus and propose what we should look like - in structure and education - for full spectrum conflict in the future.
Does anyone think if we start a Big Wars Journal/Council some of the consistant concerns might be addressed.
Personally I don't know of many folks who understand the differentiation between policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics, and I include myself. Little I read today shows me that I am alone. As a I have said before, there is advice for Politicians, and advice for soldiers. Soldiers do what they are told. (compare and contrast the behaviour of Allenby with MacArthur.) Most of what I read relating to grand strategy seems not to want to make that distinction, and seems incapable of grasping the importance of that same distinction.
What is more, I am not really sure the study "strategy" and especially "grand strategy" is a true discipline. Part of me hopes it is, because it seems like an area where you can suggest all sorts of things without having to take responsibility for the outcomes. :)
Small Wars are the new Big Wars. It's just fashion! (-and this board does an excellent job of addressing both!)
Personally, I am very comfortable with small wars and COIN. Big Wars are real cans of worms.. but... having an Army that is prepared to do both is not hard! It just requires money, and good leadership. Anyone with a 14-year olds reading ability can be trained to do it.
What is more, you don't/won't have a choice. Wars in the 21st Century will contain elements of both, just as "old war" did. Both elements will rise and fall independently of each other and without warning.
I think this is pretty obvious to all the observers who don't have "skin" in the "Future of the US Army game".
Exactly. A part of the problem is a general lack of military knowledge among the denizens of the Executive Branch (to include DoD) and among Congressional staffrers (Added to which Congresscritters have 'interests' which may be at odds with strategic or military sense...). The Armed forces will do the strategic planning by default much as they picked up the nation building jobs of Agriculture, Commerce, State and USAID due to their inability to do so initially. In the end, the civilian control will still be there...Too true...Quote:
My concern is whether the politicians (politics and policy people) are capable of understanding, much less properly applying, the ideas that move up the foodchain to them. When Congress gets a 10-15% positive approval rating, we have a definite competence problem at the policy level. When perhaps a dozen or so (maybe there were more - that is what I recall) read one version or another of the DCI's WMD report pre-OIF, we know we have a problem.
. . .
What our policy makers seem to do too often (IMO) is to buy the flavor of the day - not a recipe for success; and probably a recipe to get too many good people killed.
That is a very astute -- and IMO, correct -- comment.Quote:
PS: We won the Southeast Asian "War Games" hands down - based on the expressed policy. You might dwell on that one. That comment is not made lightly, but after considerable decades-long thought.
Let me also repost Wilf's comment; it's important:Quote:
Personally, I am very comfortable with small wars and COIN. Big Wars are real cans of worms.. but... having an Army that is prepared to do both is not hard! It just requires money, and good leadership. Anyone with a 14-year olds reading ability can be trained to do it.
What is more, you don't/won't have a choice. Wars in the 21st Century will contain elements of both, just as "old war" did. Both elements will rise and fall independently of each other and without warning.
I think this is pretty obvious to all the observers who don't have "skin" in the "Future of the US Army game".
The equation was my attempt to do at least two things:Quote:
from wilf
Personally I don't know of many folks who understand the differentiation between policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics, and I include myself. Little I read today shows me that I am alone.
1. To distinguish between the primary focus of civilian input (policy) and the rest of the chain (strategy <> operations <> tactics), which IMO should be the focus of military designers, planners and tacticians.
2. To emphasize that there has to be communications between levels; so, the "<>" sign. E.g., policy (what the civilian policy makers want) obviously will control the military designer's design (let's call that strategy). However, the range of designs will obviously be controlled by the then-current capabilities of what the military can do (operations <> tactics). So, strategy will then feed back into policy - we can do A, B and C, but not D and E.
Admittedly, the terms (policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics) are squishy in each application. E.g., in Vietnam (leaving its policy <> strategy issues on the shelf), we had many, many operations (Operation Dewey Canyon, which just came out of my skull for no special reason, etc.). Each of them had its own planning and tactics (many of which were the same or similar as those employed in other operations).
Now, if we draw back a bit to a larger geographic picture (Southeast Asia), we could look at Vietnam as one operation, Malaya CT as another and the Philippines Huk thing as another. In that sense, Operation Dewey Canyon in Vietnam starts to look more like a tactic in that broader context.
Note that I am not trying to cram these concepts into neat little boxes because that ain't possible. And I don't care what specific terms are used - the equation works in my mind, but to each their own - so long as we can still communicate the concepts.
Another point I was trying to make is that civilian policy makers have to know what they are asking the military to do - and be willling to listen if it can't. There seems a tendency by pols to believe that, just because we have the best military in the world, it can do everything at a moment's notice without failures. And, many times it has done just that.
But, the imposition of policy without consideration of then-current capabilities can kill people. E.g., we had a choice between at least two policies in OIF I:
1. Invade and Leave.
2. Invade and Occupy.
The resultant military design, planning and tactics (strategy <> operations <> tactics) would be quite different in each case - I'd leave it to the military to develop those, within its capabilities.
If that is ignored, we have a truism that is not trite - if we were math types, we might call it an axiom.
If we had a legal remedy for that kind of "gross professional negligence" (which we don't - except the ballot box), my legal guns would be aimed much less at the military, and much more at the policy makers - especially those who seem to have morphed the policy in mid-stream.Quote:
from Cavguy
I think it was gross professional negligence that we entered Iraq 2003 with no institutional foundation in COIN. It will be gross professional negligence if we face another conflict (after these have subsided and there is a chance to retrain) and aren't prepared conventionally either.
Israel trained it's army to fight counter-insurgency and had trouble fighting Hezbollah.
It's approximately the difference between police work and conventional warfare. Mixing the two jobs in one unit, or mixing the units in one job, tends to be stressful. Loosely, a soldier has to shoot first and maybe ask questions later. A cop has to work in the opposite order and defuse a situation. You can't defuse Hezbollah.
And you can't defuse the Russian troops in Georgia. Although the small wars experts might be of use to the Georgians, as they were to the Afghans not so long ago.
The US military, focused on SOCOM, mixed the immiscible in Iraq. But also think of the Kent State shootings, a case of unfriendly fire. And think of the IDF in southern Lebanon.
The only solution is agility.
With respect that is slightly simplistic. The conduct of the 2nd Lebanon War had far more to do with non-sensical operational aims than it did with tactical conduct. 90% of what tactical shortcomings there were can be attributed to under-funding of training. The regular infantry units, fresh from their regular training, had far fewer problems than the reserve units.
The British Army handled it just fine with 1 BR Corps in Germany providing units to Northern Ireland for 38 years. Again it was correctly funded and planned for.Quote:
It's approximately the difference between police work and conventional warfare. Mixing the two jobs in one unit, or mixing the units in one job, tends to be stressful.
OK, it may be, but I don't understand how.Quote:
The only solution is agility.
two stressful jobs is stressful.
Not that I've figured out what bearing Kent State has on any of this...:confused:
I shall agree with CAVGUY, the framing of this dialogue as an all or nothing issue has really strained my last reserve of patience.:mad: You would think we were in an election year:p
An apt analogy might be the following....
Two neighbors on opposite ends of the street are celebrating the arrival of new year. One is banging pots & pans to create a racket, the other is using fireworks. Each notices the other and in the midst of continuing their racket begin a shouting match ridiculing the other as using an inappropriate form of noise maker for the new year's festivities.... Everyone else on the block just wishes the two idiots would go to bed, the novelty of their disagreement wearing off nearly 10 seconds into the new year.
Or put another way, I don't care that the sky is falling or the earth is rising... the clouds are fluffy and won't hurt anyone.
Or put another way, thank god the war news day has become quiet enough that these issues are hot topics of discussion. Something must be going well.
Live well and row