From what I can glean ....
from State's 2008 fact sheet, and its longer 2005 explanation, DoS's list of terrorist organizations started out as an immigration measure; and then morphed into an aspect of the law enforcement approach to GWOT (use of this term by me should not be construed as endorsement of its general validity).
From what I glean from Wiki (probably not its best article), MEK has been around for a long time, is a bit loopy and is aimed at Iran not the US. For intelligence and military purposes, I expect the DoS list is about as (or even less) useful as the lists of subversive organizations put together during the Cold War.
This list could be of use for Federal prosecutors in some cases, but beyond that its actual utility seems questionable (IMO).
PS: I expect we could field better clandestine efforts against Iran than MEK, if we wanted to. From the statements made by the Obama administration that does not seem to be their chosen approach to the problem.
They've been around for years and is true of
many organizations and individuals, there are some folks in DC that have a long going love-hate relationship with them.
They are a trifle loopy, are tied in with some elements inside Iran and are a Marxist leaning crew that have killed civilians, did take part in the takeover of the Embassy in Tehran and did cooperate With Saddam. They were semi-jailed and were labeled as Protected Persons (under the GC) by us. Go figure -- and stay tuned...:wry:
The point I was trying to make
with this statement
Quote:
For intelligence and military purposes, I expect the DoS list is about as (or even less) useful as the lists of subversive organizations put together during the Cold War.
is that the list is not that useful for identifying enemies of the US that we have to hit directly (overtly or covertly).
E.g., the Real IRA (#38 on DoS) is a bowl of fruit loops, whose use of the term "Real IRA" is an insult to the real IRA of Michael Collins, whose true military descendent is found in the Irish Defense Forces, and who came from the same parish (Rosscarbery) as my own.
Having said that, the Real IRA has not attacked the US - but they have attacked the UK. For good reasons of reciprocity, US co-operation with the UK as to that group makes sense. However, the UK is the primary actor as to them. A similar situation exists as to ETA and Spain.
The list includes a few groups which are not or questionably directed at either the US, NATO or other allies (e.g., MEK). The political reasons for addition to the list seem as or more important than US intelligence or military reasons. ETIM (the Uighurs) is presented as an example:
Quote:
Does the ETIM target Americans?
The State Department says that in May 2002 two ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan for allegedly plotting attacks on the U.S. embassy in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, as well as other U.S. interests abroad.
....
Why did the United States decide to target the ETIM?
Experts disagree. State Department officials say they took a tougher line because of persuasive new evidence that the ETIM has financial links to al-Qaeda and has targeted U.S. interests abroad. But some experts call the sharp shift in U.S. policy on Xinjiang an obvious bid for warmer relations with China. The United States had repeatedly rebuked China for human rights violations in Xinjiang and resisted linking the post-September 11 war on terrorism with Chinese attempts to quash Uighur separatism. Skeptics note the timing: The Bush administration’s clampdown on the ETIM came as the United States sought to prevent a possible Chinese veto in any UN Security Council debate over Iraq, shortly after Chinese officials said they would tighten regulations on the export of missile-related technology, and before Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s scheduled October 2002 visit to President Bush’s Texas ranch.
Of the 22 Uighurs detained by us under this designation, 5 were voluntarily freed by the Bush administration - and the rest were cleared by the DC courts (see War Crimes thread for many posts).
Direct action vs. intelligence asset
I was mired in considering MEK as a direct action asset; but
Quote:
S:
MEK could be an intelligence gathering boon to us, regarding activities inside Iran, but State says MEK is bad, so DoD can't work with them.
your suggestion could have some potential.
Rationally, the initial question is whether they have in-country assets that could be useable - and, if so, of what value. The next question is whether they would be willing to hand off their assets. The third question is how far Iranian intelligence has managed to penetrate MEK. Probably, a few more questions as well. However, I expect MEK will continue to be approached more politically than rationally.
Quote:
S:
... one department of government can unilaterally put a potentially beneficial working relationship off limits...
and, because of the interplay between the Federal statutes, makes any "off limits" play a criminal offense. While the DoS list is not technically a Bill of Attainder, it illustrates some of the problems that gave rise to that clause in the Constitution.
Quote:
It wouldn't be the first time that someone in a position of authority turned out to be smarter and better informed than me. I hope that is the case.
Me too (as a person not big on MEK); but my hopes have been regularly dashed in the past. :(
I wouldn't have said that good...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Jedburgh
...MEK sources tend to be about as reliable as were INC sources prior to OIF ... Didn't we learn that lesson?
and we seem to have to re-learn it every 10 to 20 years...:wry:
Preventing Conflict Over Kurdistan
CEIP, Feb 09: Preventing Conflict Over Kurdistan
Quote:
....There are three interconnected sources of potential violent conflict in the Kurdish region. The first concerns the role the Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will play in Iraq, namely the extent and size of the territory (
including the oil-rich region and city of Kirkuk) they will control as part of a federal state. There is a real possibility of secession in the event that the central government and its allies fail to satisfy some of the basic requirements put forward by the Kurds. Kurdish secession, resistance to Kurdish claims on Kirkuk, and other scenarios could plunge Iraq into an all-out civil war.
The second potential source involves the rising tensions in Turkey between the state and its Kurdish minority. Ankara perceives the KRG and the Kurdish successes in northern Iraq as potential threats to its territorial integrity. It fears greater political mobilization by its own Kurdish minority and a stronger Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a homegrown insurgent group with approximately half of its fighters based in northern Iraq. Turks were adamant in trying to prevent the emergence of a robust, autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq. This has already emerged as a major irritant in U.S. relations with Turkey, a NATO ally; last year, Washington, under tremendous pressure from Ankara, provided Turkey with a green light to engage in cross-border military operations against the PKK in northern Iraq. Since December 2007, Turkish aircraft have been staging continuous, though contained, operations against the PKK, supplemented by one ground operation. Those operations risk escalating into a Turkish–Iraqi Kurdish conflict with a full-fledged Turkish intervention that could cause other neighbors to do the same.
The third source of conflict is the reaction of Iranian and Syrian Kurds to developments in their neighborhoods. Tehran and Damascus have long opposed Iraqi Kurdish aspirations and have cooperated with each other and with Turkey to stymie Kurdish advances in Iraq. Although Iranian and Syrian Kurds have not received as much attention as their counterparts in Turkey and Iraq, they too have been influenced by the regional events. Increased Kurdish mobilization and instances of violence in both Syria and Iran have alarmed these two regimes. They too may choose to intervene if Iraqi developments are perceived to threaten their territorial integrity.....
Kurds and Pukhtuns somewhat akin here
The Kurds seem to hang onto the old WW I promise of a unified Kurdistan which the League of Nations chose not to honor after all.
I would see similiarites to the Kurds tribal aspirations in the Pukhtuns fractured goals along same lines...but unaware if there was ever a promise of a Pukhtawan as there was an actual undelivered on promise of a Kurdish nation.
CEIP - point 1 - civil war potential
McClatchy sees a problem between the Kurds and ING.
Quote:
Posted on Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Iraq's Kurdish-Arab tensions threaten to escalate into war
By Leila Fadel | McClatchy Newspapers
MOSUL, Iraq — At the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Mosul, Khasro Goran, the deputy governor of Iraq's Nineveh province, is worried about the future.
Iraq's Jan. 31 provincial elections have been hailed as a sign that the country is putting its violent past behind it, is moving toward democracy and no longer is in need of a large U.S. military force. Along a 300-mile strip of disputed territory that stretches across northern Iraq, however, the elections have rekindled the longstanding hostility between Sunni Muslim Arabs and Sunni Kurds, and there are growing fears that war could erupt.
We also have a bit more of potential doom and gloom in Sunday's Wash Post.
Quote:
The war in Iraq isn't over. The main events may not even have happened yet.
By Thomas E. Ricks
Sunday, February 15, 2009; B01
....
Many worried that as the United States withdraws and its influence wanes, the Iraqi tendency toward violent solutions will increase. In September 2008, John McCreary, a veteran analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, predicted that the arrangement imposed by the U.S. government on Iraqi factions should worry us for several reasons. First, it produces what looks like peace -- but isn't. Second, one of the factions in such situations will invariably seek to break out of the arrangement. "Power sharing is always a prelude to violence," usually after the force imposing it withdraws, he maintained.
Many of those closest to the situation in Iraq expect a full-blown civil war to break out there in the coming years. "I don't think the Iraqi civil war has been fought yet," one colonel told me. Others were concerned that Iraq was drifting toward a military takeover. Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen worried that the classic conditions for a military coup were developing -- a venal political elite divorced from the population lives inside the Green Zone, while the Iraqi military outside the zone's walls grows both more capable and closer to the people, working with them and trying to address their concerns.
How the US politic would view our intervention in an outright Iraqi civil war is a good question for crystal ball soothsayers ?
This becomes a circular disucssion then
JMM, then of course Syria's Sunnis line up with the old Saddam Sunni clique inside Iraq, while Iran is more evident as it has already (my view) been into the Shiia majority camp politically and militarily for several years now via arms, training private armies, etc.
Yuck!
Turkish Air Force bombs N. Iraq 3/14/09
Local time, Saturday, March 14, within the past two hours, per CNN newsline at bottom of screen just now the Turkish Air Force has bombed Northern Iraq, I presume the Kurdish area.
Anyone have more info on this?