Lewis Ludlow: How the Oxford Street terror plotter was caught
An in depth article on the investigation that led to this aspiring Muslim convert conviction for plotting an attack in one of London's main shopping streets; known in the CT arena as an 'iconic' site.
A couple of interesting aspects:
Quote:
For 10 years, there were attempts to enrol Ludlow in the (voluntary) government's de-radicalisation programme Prevent, but he resisted until October 2017 when he began a series of 17 meetings with an assigned mentor. Ludlow sought to create the impression he was positively engaging with the scheme, which appears to have been accepted by those managing his involvement, but in fact his terrorist activity was only increasing.
His jihadist mentor being from the Phillipines:
Quote:
The device (mobile phone) revealed he had been using encrypted messaging applications to communicate with a Philippines-based IS militant and was planning to move there permanently.A subsequent official decision to revoke his passport angered Ludlow and he then switched his attention to planning an attack in the UK, encouraged and directed by a radicalised medic called Eyadzhemar Abdusalam who used the epithet Abu Yaqeen.
Link:https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-47458354
Reporting terrorism: a UK viewpoint
David Anderson, a lawyer and former Independent Reviewer of CT Legislation (highly regarded by many), recently gave a speech to a university journalism course. Naturally the focus is on journalism, including them investigating and interviewing suspects and others. It is also a good commentary on several aspects of UK CT policy and practice.
Link:https://www.daqc.co.uk/wp-content/up.../03/This-1.pdf
Taking stock and looking over your shoulder
A rather large (46 pgs) document by David Anderson, the former Independent Reviewer of CT Legislation, who was asked to conduct an assessment of progress has been made
Quote:
This is the unclassified summary of a stock-take of the progress made by MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing (CTP) in implementing the recommendations arrived at in the Operational Improvement Review and Post-Attack Reviews of 2017.It summarises progress to 31st January 2019 and looks in greater depth in some key areas: use of data, management of closed subjects of interest (CSOIs), multi-agency centre (MAC) pilots, and non-Islamist extremism.
Link:https://assets.publishing.service.go...stock_take.pdf
A lot there, often optimistic in tone and with some snippets not previously seen e.g. co-location of CT policing for London and the Security Service (MI5). This "fusion" (not called that here) happened outside London now over twelve years ago.
The 'use of data' by MI5 is currently under judicial review after an application by pressure groups following a report by the oversight body (headed by a judge). The judge stated:
Quote:
Without seeking to be emotive, I consider that MI5’s use of warranted data … is currently, in effect, in ‘special measures’ and the historical lack of compliance … is of such gravity that [the watchdog Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office] IPCO will need to be satisfied to a greater degree than usual that it is ‘fit for purpose.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jun/11/mi5-in-court-accused-of-extraordinary-and-persistent-illegality 26k up since
Responding to Streatham: Managing Low-Tech Terrorist Threat
Raffaello Pantucci, ex-IISS & ex-RUSI, is now in Singapore and has added this analysis of the most recent attack in London by a recently released, convicted terrorist - who thankfully was under armed police surveillance at the time.
Link: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publica.../#.XkEndFIzbOQ